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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a case study of the comprehensive contract campaign that the 
Culinary Union, HERE Local 226 utilized in its 2002 round of negotiations with 
casino operators in Las Vegas.  The focus of this study is on how the comprehensive 
contract campaign strategy used by the Culinary Union increased the local’s 
bargaining power in the negotiations.  This case study links the success of the 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign to the local’s prior practices, long-term strategies, 
as well as its organizational structure and culture.  This case study also examines how 
the political, social, and economic context of Las Vegas’s casino industry influenced 
the Culinary Union’s comprehensive contract campaign.  It describes the interactive 
relationship between these external contextual factors, the local’s strategic choices, 
and industrial relations outcomes in Las Vegas’s casino industry.  This case study 
describes how the Culinary Union, by using the organizing model of contract 
administration, created an organizational culture and structure that lead to increases in 
the quality and quantity of rank-and-file participation in the union, and how this 
benefited the union in its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign.  In addition to citing 
specific examples from the 2002 contract campaign itself, this case study uses the 
industrial relations literature relating to union commitment and participation, in order 
to support this argument. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Local 226, of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union is widely regarded as 
one of the most successful union locals in the United States today.  Commonly known 
as the Culinary Union, Local 226 primarily represents workers in Las Vegas’s Casino 
Industry.  Evidence of the success of the Culinary Union can be found in the 
exceptionally high standard of living its members enjoy, relative to their counterparts 
in the same industry in other cities.  Las Vegas is widely touted as the only city in 
America where a hotel or casino housekeeper (GRA) can obtain the basic 
accoutrements of the American middle class lifestyle such as owning a home 
(Greenhouse, 2004).  
Taking the cost of living into account, the wages earned by Las Vegas’s hotel 
and casino workers are higher than those earned by similar workers in any of the other 
top 20 hospitality markets in the United States (Wial & Rickert, 2002).  Furthermore, 
the median wage of a housekeeper in the United States was $7.09 hour in 2002, while 
housekeepers covered by Culinary Contracts earn $10.45 an hour (Bernhardt, 2003, 
Alexander, 2002, Mirage Contract, 2002-2007).  The Culinary Union is also one of the 
few locals in the hospitality industry to successfully deal with the issue of 
subcontracting, having negotiated clauses in its contracts with most casinos, requiring 
that subcontracted work must stay within the bargaining unit and generally under the 
same terms as traditionally employed workers (Alexander, 2002).   
The Culinary Union is not only successful at maintaining a high standard of 
living for its current members; it also has had a very successful external organizing 
program.  In the 1990s, the Culinary Union was one of the fastest growing private 
sector unions in the country increasing its memberships by 250 percent.  Its 
membership grew from around 17,000 in 1987 to more than 45,000 in 2000 2 
   
(Alexander, 2005).  So far this decade it has organized more than 10,000 workers 
(Kiraly, 2005, Meyerson, 2005). 
In its 2002 round of negotiations with most of Las Vegas’s casino operators, 
the Culinary Union continued to build on its past successes, negotiating a contract that 
that local union leaders consider to be one of its best in recent memory.  The union 
obtained a five year deal that called for annual increases in compensation that were 
more than twice as large as those negotiated in previous contracts (Smith 1998b, Las 
Vegas Review Journal, 2002c).  It also protected the Culinary Union’s healthcare plan, 
which provides members with premium free family coverage with minimal co-pays 
(Pappageorge, 2003, Culinary Health Fund, 2005).  Furthermore, the contract 
introduced new rules that reduced housekeeper’s workload and protected them from 
hazardous materials (Pappageorge, 2003, Simpson, 2002b).  The ability of the 
Culinary Union to obtain such a strong contract was made more remarkable by the fact 
that it was obtained in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, which caused a severe downturn in 
Las Vegas’s casino industry and had tremendous negative repercussions for the local 
economy as a whole  (Pappageorge, 2003).   
This thesis is a case study of the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive 
contract campaign.  It will analyze the union’s campaign strategy and discuss its links 
to the external context of Las Vegas’s casino industry as well as the internal context of 
the Culinary Union culture, structure, long-term strategies and prior practices.  This 
study will show that the success of the Culinary Union’s comprehensive contract 
campaign strategy in 2002, was the result not just of the external context the union 
faced, or the short term strategies the union employed specifically for the negotiations, 
but also was the product of long-term strategies the union had been pursuing during its 
revitalization process that had been taking place over the prior 15 years.  In other 
words this study will provide a thorough analysis of the Culinary Union’s strategies 3 
   
during and prior to the 2002 round of contract negotiations as well as external 
contextual factors that the union has confronted in Las Vegas’s casino industry. In so 
doing it will discuss how the Culinary Union employed a set of strategies in its 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign that successfully navigated both external and 
internal contextual factors confronting it in order to enhance its power at the 
bargaining table.   
In examining the long-term and short-term strategies and tactics utilized by the 
Culinary Union during and prior to its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign, this 
thesis will borrow the definitions of union strategies and union tactics in Turner 
(2005). Turner defines union strategies as “more or less coherent overall 
organizational plans, implemented in pursuit of agreed-upon goals.”  In the same 
article Turner defines union tactics as the “particular initiatives designed to further a 
union’s chosen strategy.” (Turner, 2005) 
Internal and External Context  
The Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract campaign was profoundly 
influenced by the context in which it took place.  The strategy pursued by the Culinary 
Union in its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign was well suited to the external 
bargaining environment facing the union as well as to the set of internal factors arising 
out of the organization itself.  These contextual factors influenced the Culinary 
Union’s strategic choices as well as the effectiveness of the strategies the Culinary 
Union ultimately employed.  These contextual factors arose both out of the 
environment in which the Culinary Union operates, and from within the Culinary 
Union itself.  They interacted with each other and with the strategies employed by 
casino employers to form the context for the 2002 contract negotiations 
(Bronfenbrenner, 2003, Hickey, 2003).  Therefore, when analyzing the strategies that 
made up the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract campaign strategy it is 4 
   
important to study how the Culinary Union’s perceptions of its bargaining context 
influenced its strategic choices as well as how contextual factors influenced the 
effectiveness of the union’s strategies themselves. 
The foundation of the Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign was its ability 
to mobilize its members and threaten casino employers with an effective strike.  Rank-
and-file mobilization was essential for the Culinary Union because large-scale strikes 
could still be used effectively in Las Vegas’s casino industry.  Over the last 15 years 
the Culinary Union has maintained a long-term strategy designed to increase its ability 
to mobilize its members for a large scale strike, one primary reasons for this being the 
local casino industry’s continued susceptibility to strikes.  
In addition to increasing its rank-and-file member mobilization capacity, the 
Culinary Union, as part of its revitalization process, has also developed the capacity to 
employ particularly effective corporate pressure tactics.  These tactics were employed 
successfully in the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract campaign and took 
advantage of several characteristics of the local casino industry, such as the large 
amount of debt casino operators had amassed and operators concerns about the public 
image of the casino industry.  In its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign, the 
Culinary Union, used corporate pressure tactics to legitimize its strike threat amongst 
various stakeholders who influenced the decision making process of casino operators 
such as their creditors. 
Culture, Long-Term Strategies, and Prior Practices 
As mentioned previously, the Culinary Union 2002 contract campaign 
benefited greatly from the prior practices of the union in the 15 years leading up to the 
campaign.  Since 1987, the Culinary Union has implemented a broad range of 
innovative and ambitious strategic initiatives as part of an overall strategy to revitalize 
itself after a decade or more of declining power.  These initiatives were undertaken 5 
   
across the entire range of the union’s activities including contract bargaining, contract 
administration, external organizing, and politics.  The Culinary Union’s revitalization 
initiatives were comprehensive and blurred the lines separating these traditional 
categories of union activity, where initiatives in multiple areas were complementary.  
Figure 1.1 depicts the interrelated nature of the Culinary Union’s strategic initiatives 
prior to the 2002 contract campaign as they relate to the effectiveness of the campaign 
itself.   
There are numerous examples of how the Culinary Union’s prior practices and 
long-term strategies influenced and aided its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign.  
For instance, the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy is the foundation 
of its rank-and-file mobilization efforts.  The contract administration strategy 
employed by the Culinary Union is similar to the one described by Teresa Cornrow 
(1991).  Both contract administration strategies are based upon the principles of the 
organizing model of trade unionism and one of the primary goals of both strategies is 
to cultivate a less passive rank-and-file membership.  Through its contract 
administration strategy, the Culinary Union communicates, educates, and trains 
members, as well as recruits rank-and-file leaders to become shop stewards, internal 
organizers, external organizers, political/community organizers, and even political 
candidates for state and local elections.  Therefore, the contract administration 
procedure plays a significant role as a mobilizing agent on the shop floor, thus greatly 
increased the Culinary Union’s capacity to mobilize its members for the 2002 round of 
negotiations (Cornrow, 1991).  Like its contract administration strategy, the Culinary 
Union’s political, external organizing, and previous contract campaign strategies also 
emphasized rank-and-file participation and therefore similarly helped to mobilize the 
local’s rank-and-file membership. 6 
   
 
Figure 1.1 Relationship between union strategies in different areas of union activity as 
well as external environment. 
Overall the union’s strategies in these four areas contributed to the creation of 
a culture within the Culinary Union that placed a high value on rank-and-file 
participation in the union.  For example, as Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss point out 
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(2004), the Culinary Union’s external organizing strategies often involved mobilizing 
rank-and-file members for large-scale protests outside of organizing casinos, which in 
many cases lead to mass arrests.  These activities, increased the level of activism 
amongst rank-and-file members, and helped generate a general culture of mobilization 
within the Culinary Union (Fantasia & Voss, 2004).  This example also highlights 
how the Culinary Union’s contract bargaining, contract administration, external 
organizing, and political activities are designed by the union leadership are mutually 
reinforcing.   
Therefore the Culinary Union, because of its general organizational culture, 
strategies, and practices prior to the 2002 round of negotiations, was already well 
prepared to run a contract campaign like the one it ran in 2002.  Through its contract 
administration strategy, the Culinary Union had developed strong communication 
links between its leaders and its rank-and-file membership.  The local had also 
identified rank-and-file leaders and provided them with some of the skills and 
experiences necessary for the contract campaign.  Furthermore, as a result of previous 
comprehensive contract campaign it had engaged in, the Culinary Union had also 
previously exposed its rank-and-file membership to many of the tactics that were 
going to be part of its 2002 contract campaign.  Finally, through strategies pursued in 
all of its areas of activity, the Culinary Union had developed an overall organizational 
culture that would fully support the rank-and-file mobilization effort necessary to put 
together and run an effective contract campaign.  This mobilization capacity was 
especially important because casino operators were particularly vulnerable to strikes.  
Therefore, the Culinary Union’s long-term strategies were well attuned to the 
industrial relations context that it faced. 8 
   
Revitalization  
This thesis study places the strategies employed by the Culinary Union at the 
center of its analysis, and therefore makes the argument that union strategies do play a 
significant role in determining industrial outcomes.  It therefore builds upon the extant 
union revitalization literature that has emerged over the past decade.  In an article 
appearing in the journal Work and Occupations Lowell Turner argues that the union 
revitalization literature contains two primary tenets (Turner, 2005).  The first of these 
is that “contemporary circumstances provide openings for, and in some cases are 
driving, innovative, proactive, and quite promising union strategies for renewal of 
influence in changing world, national, and local conditions”.  According to Turner the 
second tenet of the union revitalization literature is that union strategies have been and 
can continue to be instrumental in promoting workplace, social, and political change 
in addition to engendering a revival in the labor movement itself.   
This thesis builds upon these two themes by arguing that in the 2002 contract 
negotiations, the Culinary Union utilized strategies that took advantage of points of 
leverage provided by the contextual environment in order to increase its power at the 
bargaining table.  Therefore, as Turner has suggested the contextual environment of 
Las Vegas held opportunities that the Culinary Union could strategically exploit in 
order increases its ability to achieve its goals in the 2002 negotiations.  Furthermore, 
the strategies employed by the Culinary Union did play a significant role in 
determining the outcome of the negotiations.  The Culinary Union would not have 
been able accomplish the outcome it did in the 2002 contract negotiations, if it had not 
utilized a strategy so well suited to the bargaining context that it faced.   
It is important to note that although a specific set of contextual opportunities 
for unions may be unique to Las Vegas, different sets of similar opportunities may be 
available in other contextual environments as well.  In other words different sets of 9 
   
opportunities will be present in different industrial relations contexts, however there 
maybe certain similarities shared across such contexts.  For example, similar to the 
gaming industry, healthcare and education have a similarly high level of contact 
between the employees and customers, creating opportunities for unions to cultivate 
their collective bargaining power through these relationships.  However, management 
culture and goals in these industries is often very different than that of the gaming 
industry.  This means that there may be some similarities between the kinds of union 
strategies that will successful in these industries and the gaming industry.  However, 
the effectiveness of these strategies across contexts is also dependent on variables that 
are internal to the union(s) operating in these different environments.   
A number of union revitalization studies have analyzed how unions 
strategically integrate tactics from a number of different areas of union activity such as 
collective bargaining and organizing in order to achieve revitalization goals  (Katz et 
al. 2003, Hickey, 2003, Hurd et. al. 2003, Benz, 2004).  All of these studies argue that 
union attempts at revitalization will be more successful when they adopt a 
comprehensive approach to revitalization that takes into account their collective 
bargaining, organizing, and political activities.  This study takes this argument one 
step further by adding one often overlooked subcategory of collective bargaining: 
contract administration.  It will make the argument that the Culinary Union 
approached its 2002 contract negotiations comprehensively, taking into account how 
its activities in other areas would impact it and in turn be impacted by it.  An 
important corollary of this argument is that in order to understand the reasons for the 
success of the Culinary Union in the 2002 contract campaign it is necessary to also 
understand how the union’s strategies prior to the 2002 negotiations created a solid 
foundation for the Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign, without which such an 
ambitious campaign would not have been as successful.   10 
   
By examining the organizing model as it is applied to contract administration, 
this study will also build on the branch of the revitalization literature that has dealt 
with the organizing model of unionism.  Although studies of the organizing model 
predate the emergence of the union revitalization literature, they are now thought of as 
being part of this literature.  Studies examining the organizing model in a 
contemporary context emerged during the early to mid-eighties and primarily analyzed 
strategies utilized by unions to mobilize their members to fight back against 
employers’ attempts to obtain concessionary contracts or to bust the union outright 
(Slaughter, 1983, Balanoff, 1985, Metzgar, 1985).  However, the term “organizing 
model” began to take on a new meaning in the 1990s when the revitalization literature 
began to focus on attempts by unions to organize non-union workplaces.  In these 
instances, the term “organizing model” was used to refer to unions that spent a larger 
proportion of their resources on external organizing.  However, within this latter 
category external organizing strategies were still often linked to internal organizing 
strategies.  For example, many of these studies examined union strategies where in 
order to make more resources available for non-union workers to organize, a union 
would mobilize its own rank-and-file members to take greater responsibility for 
contract servicing (Hurd, 2004).  Finally, it is important to note that some scholars 
have examined the organizing model as it is related to still other areas of union activity 
such as contract administration and first contract negotiations.  (Cornrow, 1991, 
Bronfenbrenner, 1993, Markowitz, 1998).   
This thesis draws upon both definitions of what constitutes an organizing 
model of unionism.  It looks at the organizing model as it relates to mobilizing 
members for an upcoming contract campaign, which fits in with the first definition of 
the organizing model.  However, it also looks at how the Culinary Union’s external 
organizing and internal organizing efforts interact with each other as well as the 11 
   
local’s activities in other areas.  Furthermore, in its analysis of the Culinary Union’s 
application of the organizing model to its collective bargaining functions, contract 
administration and contract bargaining, this study discusses how the union 
commitment literature supports arguments made by organizing model advocates that 
unions pursuing strategies based on the model will benefit from increased rank-and-
file participation.  Therefore, this discussion will give organizing model advocates 
more empirical evidence to support their arguments’ evidence. 
This case study also seeks to build on the numerous case studies of 
comprehensive contract campaigns that have emerged as part of the union 
revitalization literature in recent years  (Rosenblum, 1995, Getman, 1998, O'Malley, 
1999, Witt & Rand, 1999, Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 2001, Bronfenbrenner & 
Juravich, 2003, Hickey, 2003, Minchin, 2003).  However, this thesis differs from the 
previous studies in a variety of ways.  First, all of the preceding examples of 
comprehensive campaign case studies analyzed campaigns that included a protracted 
strike or lockout, which occur in only a small fraction of contract negotiations.  
Although there was a strike at one of the casinos involved in the 2002 contract 
negotiations in Las Vegas, it was at the smallest casino involved in the negotiations, 
and therefore, affected less than one half of one percent of the Culinary Union’s 
membership.  Furthermore, the strike only lasted a couple of days.  Therefore, this 
case study does not include a major strike or lockout and in this capacity is more 
representative of typical contract negotiations, than the aforementioned examples of 
case studies of comprehensive campaigns.   
This fact is important to the union revitalization debate because if the kinds of 
tactics that unions typically employ as part of a comprehensive contract campaign do 
in fact increase union power at the bargaining table and beyond, unions need to learn 
to utilize them in instances other than in the most extreme cases of labor-management 12 
   
discord.  Therefore, it is important to begin to analyze the role of these tactics in 
collective bargaining settings other than complete breakdowns in relations between 
labor and management.  Although relations between the Culinary Union and the 
casino operators can be described as more contentious than usual in the 2002 round of 
negotiations, both sides were committed to maintaining the bargaining relationship.  
This cannot be said for most of the negotiations analyzed by most of the case studies 
of comprehensive contract campaigns. 
Another unique characteristic of this thesis is that it analyzes a union local that 
is much further along in the revitalization process than almost any other in the United 
States.  Most other case studies of comprehensive contract campaigns have focused on 
unions that are struggling to adapt to a more hostile bargaining environment and 
therefore, have not made the kinds of strategic and tactical reforms the Culinary Union 
had been implementing for more than a decade before the 2002 round of negotiations.  
(Rosenblum, 1995, Getman, 1998, Witt & Rand, 1999, Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 
2001, Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 2003, Hickey, 2003, Minchin, 2003).   
In addition, other case studies that have looked at unions further along in the 
revitalization process have not taken a sufficiently comprehensive view of the role of 
prior union tactics strategies in influencing the unions comprehensive campaign 
(Erickson et. al. 2002).  This case study takes a more comprehensive view of the 
Culinary Union’s strategies prior to its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign, 
examining the union’s organizing, collective bargaining, political, and new member 
orientation strategies and how the local’s strategies and tactics in these areas 
influenced the campaign, both in terms of the local’s strategic choices and in terms of 
the campaign’s overall effectiveness.   13 
   
Organization of Thesis 
The remainder of this study will be divided into seven chapters.  Chapter two, 
the literature review, will show how this study fits into and contributes to the existing 
union revitalization literature.  It will focus on the three areas of the union 
revitalization literature that are most directly related to issues discussed in this paper: 
the literature dealing with strategic integration of union tactics in different areas of 
activity, discussions of the organizing model as it is applied to a union’s collective 
bargaining functions and how this is related to other areas of union activity, and 
preceding case studies of comprehensive contract campaigns.  The third chapter will 
be the methodology section and will look at how data was collected for this case 
study.  Chapter four will describe the external context the Culinary Union faced in the 
2002 contract negotiations.  It will focus on the social, economic, and political 
environment faced by the Culinary Union in the negotiations.  This chapter will also 
provide a detailed history of the gaming industry in Las Vegas.  The fifth chapter will 
discuss the historical development of the Culinary Union.  This chapter will 
specifically focus on the Culinary Union’s revitalization process through which the 
Culinary Union developed the organizational capacities it has today.  This chapter will 
also discuss the influence of the Culinary Union’s revitalization process on its 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign, particularly in terms of its strategic decision 
making and the effectiveness of the strategies that it employed in the campaign.  The 
sixth chapter will be a description of the strategy the Culinary Union used in its 2002 
contract campaign.  Chapter seven is the case study itself describing the 2002 contract 
campaign and how the strategy employed the Culinary Union for the campaign 
actually played out.  Chapter eight, the conclusion, analyzes how the Culinary Union’s 
2002 comprehensive contract campaign was influenced by both the union’s external 
environment and the strategies the union employed in the years prior to the campaign.  14 
   
It also discusses the implications of this case study for the union revitalization 
literature and suggest ideas for future research.   
  
15 
Chapter II: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This case study puts union strategy at the core of its analysis and therefore 
builds on the union revitalization literature that has emerged over the past twelve 
years. The crux of the union revitalization literature is that union strategies play a 
significant role in determining labor relations outcomes. This is a departure from the 
previous literature which tended to focus on structural determinants, management 
strategies, or a combination of the two.  Scholars at the progressive margins of the 
industrial relations field have long examined topics which later became core areas 
covered by the industrial revitalization literature, such as innovative external 
organizing tactics, community alliances, and creative grassroots rank-and-file 
mobilization tactics.  However, it was not until the early 1990s, when John Sweeny 
took over the presidency of the AFL-CIO and industrial relations scholars began to 
focus their attention on innovative collective bargaining, external organizing, and 
political strategies utilized by a few unions, such as SEIU, that these types of studies 
would enter the mainstream (Turner, 2005). 
Although scholars have discussed labor movement revitalization for more than 
a decade, only recently have they begun to come up with a clear definition of the 
concept.  Martin Behrens, Kerstin Hamann, and Richard Hurd (2004) recently defined 
union revitalization as the degree to which unions, locals, and national movements 
have regained power among the various dimensions that capture the main orientation 
or spheres of union activity. The spheres of union activity listed by Behrens et al. 
cover the collective bargaining, organizing, political functions of unions that were 
discussed in the first chapter of this study.  In addition to these three spheres of union 
activity, Behrens et al. suggest a fourth institutional dimension, which addresses a 
union’s organizational structures and governance, as well as internal dynamics.  16 
   
According to Behrens et al. this dimension captures a “union’s capacity to adjust to 
new contexts, embrace new strategies, and support change in general.”  This fourth 
dimension is captured in this case study through a description of how the Culinary 
Union has successfully been able to initiate and carry out the institutional changes 
necessary to adapt to changes in its contextual environment. 
Overall the Culinary Union has met most of the criteria set out by Behrens et 
al. for what constitutes a revitalized union at the local level.  The local has increased 
its membership dramatically and successfully incorporated into the union structure 
new ethnic groups that have entered the casino workforce.  The Culinary Union has 
also increased its collective bargaining power, thereby increasing the standard of 
living of its members, while the standard of living for most unskilled service workers 
in the United States has been declining.  Furthermore, it has increased its political 
power not just at the local but also at the state level, becoming one of the most 
powerful political forces in the state.  Finally, the Culinary Union has undergone the 
types of internal reforms that have made it possible for it to successfully employ the 
kinds of innovative tactics and strategies, which have made its revitalization possible 
(Behrens et al. 2004).   
In an article he authored in the journal Work and Occupations, Lowell Turner 
(2005) identifies two core arguments contained in the union revitalization literature.  
The first argument is that “contemporary circumstances provide openings for, and in 
some cases are driving innovative, proactive, and quite promising union strategies for 
the renewal of influence in changing world, national, and local conditions.”  The 
second is that union strategies matter.  Turner states that union strategies, “have been 
and continue to be instrumental in promoting workplace, social and political change, 
and contain as well the potential for substantial breakthroughs in broader democratic 
revitalization.”  This case study illustrates both of these key points.  It looks at how the 17 
   
Culinary Union’s strategy in the 2002 negotiations built upon the contextual variables 
faced by the local and increased the union’s power at the bargaining table.  This study 
also analyzes the interaction between contextual variables, union strategies, and 
industrial relations outcomes in the years prior to the 2002 negotiations and how this 
interaction influenced the effectiveness and the Culinary Union’s choice of strategies 
in the 2002 negotiations. 
Rob Hickey (2003) argues that the revitalization literature is fundamentally 
about how unions reconstitute bargaining power in a changing economic environment 
while also confronting increasing levels of employer hostility.  He identifies four 
indicators of union revitalization: increased political influence, increased bargaining 
power, increased union density and strategic internal organizational reforms.  These 
four signs of union revitalization correspond to the dimensions of union activity 
described by Behrens et al.  (2004) Hickey also goes on to identify attributes of a fully 
revitalized union: a vision of political, economic, and social justice; a culture of 
membership involvement, outreach, and growth; membership education, and 
leadership development; on-going strategic innovation; and comprehensive, integrated 
strategies for organizing, political action, and collective bargaining.  This study will 
show how by 2002 the Culinary Union had many of these attributes and how these 
attributes contributed to the union’s choice of bargaining strategy and the effectiveness 
of this strategy in its 2002 contract campaign. (Hickey 2003). 
The union revitalization literature has covered a broad range of union activity 
from a broad range of viewpoints.  However, this case study relates most directly to 
three common topics addresses by the union revitalization literature: comprehensive 
contract campaigns, the strategic integration of union tactics across different 
dimensions of union activity and the organizing model as it relates to contract 
administration.  18 
   
Collective Bargaining and Union Revitalization 
Other than case studies of comprehensive campaigns, collective bargaining 
activities of unions have largely been ignored by the union revitalization literature.  
Likewise, most of the traditional collective bargaining literature has ignored the role of 
union tactics in influencing industrial relations outcomes.  Union revitalization 
scholars have tended to treat collective bargaining as something that happens after 
union revitalization, rather than part of the revitalization process itself (Hickey, 2003).  
Also, many union revitalization scholars treat collective bargaining as something that 
is necessarily in competition for scarce union resources with other areas of union 
activity that are vital to revitalization such as external organizing (Fletcher & Hurd, 
1998,Voss & Sherman, 2000).  These authors create a false dichotomy between these 
two areas of union activity and do not recognize their interconnectivity nor how 
tactical initiatives in one of these areas can help the union achieve its goals in another.  
This study will highlight the mutually reinforcing nature of the Culinary Union’s 
external organizing and collective bargaining strategies, in its description of how the 
local’s prior practices influenced its 2002 contract campaign.  
Since collective bargaining has largely been ignored by revitalization scholars 
it is necessary to examine other industrial relations traditions and how they 
conceptualized bargaining power and the role union strategies play in influencing it.  
The classical economic, institutionalist, dependency, and strategic choice strands of 
the collective bargaining literature each conceptualize bargaining power differently.  
Furthermore, each tradition holds a different view of the role strategies play in 
influencing collective bargaining outcomes.  However, with the exception of 
dependency theory, each of these traditions minimizes the influence union strategy 
and tactics can have over collective bargaining outcomes.  These four traditions 
predate the union revitalization literature, and therefore also provide a good 19 
   
foundation for a discussion of the union revitalization literature as it relates to 
collective bargaining.  
In order to adequately discuss bargaining power it is important to have a clear 
definition of the concept.  The classical economic tradition frames union power as 
monopoly power and therefore measures the divergence of union wage rates from the 
market rate in order to determine bargaining power (Hicks, 1932).  However, this 
tradition fails to take into account bargaining power’s influence on non-wage issues, 
or sources of power outside the degree of product and labor market elasticity.  These 
factors were especially important considering the fact that one of the principal issues 
in the 2002 contract negotiations, workload, was a non-wage issue.   
Compared to the classical economists, institutional economists have a much 
more inclusive definition of collective bargaining power.  For example, Chamberlain 
and Kuhn (1965) defined bargaining power simply as the “ability to secure an 
agreement on one’s own terms.” Similarly, Slichter (1940) defined bargaining power 
as the cost to party A of imposing a loss on party B. Along comparable lines Kochan 
(1980) defined bargaining power as the “the ability of one party to achieve its goals 
when faced with opposition from another party to the bargaining process.”  
In their summary of the institutionalist approach to bargaining power, Leap 
and Grigsby (1986) point out that most institutionalist conceptualizations of 
bargaining power “involve ‘costs that are incurred by or imposed upon one side or the 
other.’”  These cost can be the direct costs of concessions, such as wage gains or 
losses, or secondary costs of concessions, such as the effects of pattern bargaining.  
According to the institutionalist conceptualization of bargaining power these costs 
associated with collective bargaining are “based on such factors as elasticity of 
product demand, business and market cycles, competitive position of a firm, labor 
intensity, and availability of substitute labor.”   20 
   
Occasionally, institutionalists will refer to some sort of strategic component, 
but this factor is generally downplayed in the literature (Leap and Grigsby 1986).  
Likewise, Hickey (2003), in summarizing the institutionalist literature explains, 
“While the institutionalist tradition has been strong in explaining the role of structural 
(i.e. environmental) determinants on bargaining power…it has provided fewer insights 
into the dynamic nature of collective bargaining.”  When referring to the “dynamic 
nature of collective bargaining” Hickey is alluding to the role of strategic choice on 
the part of either party in determining collective bargaining outcomes.  
Therefore, one of the primary weaknesses of the institutionalist approach to 
collective bargaining power is that it focuses primarily on the structural factors that 
contribute to bargaining power and downplays the influence of union and employer 
strategies in creating bargaining power.  Institutionalists tend to focus on factors such 
as the concentration of product market, attributes of the labor market, union density, 
characteristics of the parties and the industry, and government policies as the primary 
factors influencing collective bargaining outcomes.  For example, Thomas Kochan 
(1980) argues that the triggering forces affecting bargaining outcomes are structural 
variables, especially those of an economic nature.  Kochan sees structural variables as 
shaping organizational characteristics of both unions and employers, bargaining 
structure, the negotiations process, and bargaining power. 
By including bargaining tactics and strategies in their model, dependency 
theorists such as Samuel Bacharach and Ed Lawler correct some of the shortcoming of 
the institutionalist tradition.  In their book, Bargaining Power, Tactics, and Outcomes 
Bacharach and Lawler (1981) argue that the critical factor in collective bargaining is 
the parties’ perceptions of relative power.  According to this theory, bargaining power 
is determined by a bargainer’s perception of its dependence on its counterpart and its 
counterpart’s perception of its own dependence on the bargainer.  The more dependant 21 
   
a bargainer perceives itself to be the less bargaining power it will have.  Likewise, the 
more dependant a bargainer’s counterpart perceives itself to be, the more bargaining 
power the bargainer will have at the bargaining table.  Union and management 
strategies play key roles in Bacharach and Lawler's theory because they can be used to 
influence perceptions of power in the bargaining relationship.  Bacharach and Lawler's 
theory also highlights the interactive relationship between bargainer's perceptions of 
power in the bargaining relationship and their strategic choices.   
However, Bacharach and Lawler's model has two shortcomings.  First, they 
fail to identify specific examples of strategies used by unions or management to 
influence each other’s perceptions of dependence (Bronfenbrenner, 1993).  Secondly, 
their theory focuses exclusively on the relationship between employers and unions; 
thereby it does not sufficiently take into account contextual determinants of bargaining 
power, as well as the interactive relationship between bargaining context and 
bargaining strategies (Bronfenbrenner, 1993, Hickey, 2003). 
Strategic choice theory is another major strand in the collective bargaining 
literature that began to analyze the role of strategy in determining collective 
bargaining outcomes.  Perhaps the most well known work in this branch of the 
literature is Transformation of American Industrial Relations by Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie (1986).  In this book the authors examine the significant changes that took 
place in the American industrial relations system in the 1980s and found that structural 
factors alone could not explain the profound transformations that took place during 
this era.  They argue that, in addition to structural factors, business strategies were a 
mechanism behind this change.  According to the strategic choice model they 
proposed, business strategies adjust to changes in the external environment in ways 
that are consistent with the values of management and the firms’ historical attributes.  
While this model does acknowledge that union strategies have some degree of 22 
   
influence over collective bargaining outcomes, it clearly places business strategy at the 
center of its analysis.  
Kochan et al. propose three levels of collective bargaining activity.  The top 
tier is long-term strategic activity such as investment strategies, which is generally a 
protected realm of management rights.  The second-tier of industrial relations activity 
is the functional tier of collective bargaining, which includes such activities as contract 
bargaining.  This has been the focus of attention for most traditional industrial 
relations researchers.  The third-tier of industrial relations activity in Kochan et al.’s 
(1986) model is the workplace level tier, where industrial relations policies are played 
out and affect individuals, supervisors, and union representatives on a day-to-day 
basis.  This third tier corresponds most directly with union contract administration 
activities.  
Although, strategic choice theory downplays the influence of union strategies 
in determining collective bargaining outcomes, it does provide some insights that are 
valuable to this case study.  First, the model takes into account the dynamic interplay 
between the structural factors and parties’ strategies choices in collective bargaining.  
Secondly, by integrating the three levels of industrial relations activity, the model 
acknowledges the interactive relationship among activity at all three levels.  As 
proposed in this case study of the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract 
campaign, contract administration or third-tier activities can have a profound impact 
on the second-level of activity, where contract negotiations usually take place 
(Kochan, Katz, &  McKersie, 1986). 
Leap and Grigsby (1986), developed a hybrid of the strategic choice and 
dependency models of power.  In their study, they develop a comprehensive concept 
of collective bargaining power that takes into account the origins of power, the factors 
that enhance or diminish collective bargaining power, and the forms and uses of that 23 
   
power.  Leap and Grigsby’s concept begins with potential power, which is the total 
amount of power available to a party given the contextual factors that party faces.  The 
parties in the collective bargaining relationship employ strategies and tactics that 
transform this potential power into enacted power.  These strategies and tactics have 
implications for both long and short-term collective bargaining outcomes and can also 
influence the contextual factors each party faces in the future.   
Leap and Grigsby’s model provides a good foundation for the model employed 
in this case study.  On a basic level, both the model described in this case study and 
the model developed by Leap and Grigsby place union and employer strategy at the 
center of the analysis.  Also, both models conceptualize collective bargaining power in 
a dynamic context, where the parties’ bargaining strategies can influence contextual 
variables and bargaining outcomes over both the long and short term.   
However, these two models differ in some important areas.  First, Leap and 
Grigsby’s model does not discuss how union external organizing and politics can 
influence collective bargaining power and bargaining outcomes.  In fact Leap and 
Grigsby’s model lists public policy as an uncontrollable variable, while as this study 
will show, union strategy can influence public policy, which in turn can influence 
collective bargaining outcomes. 
There have been a number of other studies outside the union revitalization 
literature that have examined the influence of union strategies on collective bargaining 
outcomes.  However, most of these are of limited relevance to this study of the 
Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign because these other studies primarily look 
at the strategies utilized by unions a national level, while this study looks at them at 
the local level.
1  For example, in their study entitled Union Structural Choices Fiorito, 
                                                 
1 HERE is a decentralized union, with bargaining only taking place on a city by city basis.  In fact, the 
collective bargaining strategies employed by the Culinary Union are not representative of those used by 
the majority of other HERE locals before 2002. 24 
   
Gramm, and Hendricks (1991) introduce a model of union behavior based upon 
strategic choice theory.  They focus on the causal relationship between union goals, 
strategies, structures, and performance, which are all in turn influenced by external 
environmental factors.   
Fiorito et al. focus on a variety of areas of union activity including collective 
bargaining.  In regard to collective bargaining, the authors identify three types of 
union strategy.  The first is the monopoly strategy; in which the union seeks to control 
the labor market supply, typically through centralized bargaining.  Fiorito et al. 
contend that unions who pursue this strategy tend to be in highly competitive 
industries, with dispersed production centers, multiplant firms, small local unions, and 
high union density.   
They refer to the second type of union strategy as the efficiency strategy, 
where unions typically decentralize control over collective bargaining.  Unions usually 
pursue this strategy where external environmental conditions are highly diverse; where 
workers are professional, semiprofessional, or have quasi-managerial responsibilities; 
and where firms have demonstrated a high-degree of acceptance of unions and 
collective bargaining.   
Fiorito et al. refer to the third strategy in their model as the information 
strategy.  Unions pursuing this strategy will tend to centralize control over the 
bargaining process, if its local affiliates are small or if it is negotiating with a large 
multidivisional company.  Although, Fiorito et al.’s model inserts a degree of union 
strategy into the strategic choice model, the effect of specific strategies on collective 
bargaining at the local level is not discussed; rather Fiorito et al. focus mainly on how 
union strategies influence bargaining structures on the national level.  
A number of scholars have examined the relationship between globalization 
and collective bargaining strategies and outcomes (Gordon & Turner, 2000, Nissen, 25 
   
2002, Cooke, 2003,  Cornfield & McCammon, 2003).  However, much of this research 
has focused on industries that are not as geographically fixed as the casino industry in 
Las Vegas.  In other words unlike employers in manufacturing and many service 
industries, employers in Las Vegas’s casino industries cannot move to new locations.  
Furthermore, Las Vegas casino operators are selling a unique product, meaning that 
the Las Vegas experience cannot be had anywhere else, even where casino style 
gambling is legal.  This means that casino employees only have very limited 
competition from their counterparts overseas or in other regions of the United States 
(Rothman, 2003).  This is demonstrated by the fact that while other communities in 
Nevada have struggled to remain competitive as casino style gaming has proliferated 
throughout the United States and around the world, Las Vegas, particularly along the 
strip, has continued to thrive. 
Despite its focus on industries where overseas competition plays an important 
role in determining labor relations outcomes, William Cooke’s study Shifting the 
Balance of Power: Transnational Collective Bargaining in a Era of Corporate 
Globalization? (2003) provides some insights into the nature of power in industrial 
relations. In his study, Cooke identifies two types of power: 1) the employer’s overall 
ability to pay or the total gain achievable in collective bargaining, and 2) the relative 
power between the union and the employer which determines the distributive 
parameters of that total gain.  Factors that influence relative power are the external 
environment as well as employer and union strategies.  Cooke’s list of union strategies 
include increasing costs to employers through striking or leveraging employers 
through their relationships with other stakeholders.  Although Cooke recognizes the 
role of union strategies in determining labor relations outcomes as well as the 
importance of union leveraging tactics other than traditional strikes, the relevance of 
his model to this case study is limited by the fact that casino workers in Las Vegas are 26 
   
not subject to the same kinds of globalization pressures as workers in the industries 
discussed by Cooke. 
Comprehensive Contract Campaigns 
Although the union revitalization literature dealing with collective bargaining 
is relatively thin, there have been a number of important case studies published in this 
area.  However, most of these studies have been case studies of single comprehensive 
or corporate campaigns.  Examples of such studies include Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich's book on USWA's campaign against the Ravenswood Aluminum Company 
(2000) as well as their chapter on USWA's campaign against Bridgestone/Firestone 
(2003), Getman's book on the United Paperworker's campaign against International 
Paper (1998), Rosenblum's book on the failed Phelps Dodge strike (1995), Hickey's 
case study of PACE's contract campaign against Crown Petroleum (2003), Minchin’s 
book on the BASF strike (2002), as well as O'Malley's thesis (1999) and Witt and  
Wilson's article on the 1997 IBT strike against UPS (1999).   
These case studies provide a number of valuable insights into the role union 
tactics play in influencing collective bargaining outcomes.  First, they provide a 
detailed description of the kinds of innovative tactics and strategies that revitalizing 
unions are beginning to use to increase their power and win significant gains at the 
bargaining table.  Tactics such as international solidarity efforts, shareholder proxy 
fights, innovative media campaigns, boycotts, community coalitions, member 
mobilization, and regulatory pressure efforts are all discussed in the case studies listed 
in the previous paragraph.  These case studies further demonstrate that traditional 
bargaining strategies such as strikes and picketing are alone insufficient in helping the 
union achieve its goals at the bargaining table.  Likewise, these studies also show that 
corporate campaign tactics such as boycotts, community coalitions, and regulatory 
pressure efforts are rendered more effective when they are combined with rank-and-27 
   
file member mobilization around the campaign.  For example, USWA efforts to gain 
the support of the unions that represented Bridgestone/Firestone workers in Japan 
were much more successful when the USWA brought rank-and-file members to Japan 
to meet with the Japanese unionists and talk about how Bridgestone/Firestone strike 
has affected them and their families (Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, 1999). 
Secondly, these case studies provide a detailed analysis of how these tactics 
interact with each other as well as the contextual factors within which each 
comprehensive campaign operates.  For example, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich’s book 
on the USWA campaign against the Ravenswood Aluminum Company (2003) 
demonstrates how individual campaign tactics interacted with one another in order to 
focus publicity on an employer whose corporate strategy relied on keeping a low 
profile.  No one tactic in particular brought attention to the employer; rather it was a 
combination of regulatory, international solidarity, political, and rank-and-file 
mobilization tactics that accomplished this goal.  Furthermore, the campaign’s rank-
and-file mobilization efforts were greatly aided by the close-knit community in which 
the campaign took place and the long tenure most of the employees had at the plant.  
Finally, these case studies provide insight into how a union’s past practices 
influence the types and effectiveness of the strategies and tactics that make up the 
union’s comprehensive campaigns.  For example, O’Malley’s (1999), writing about 
the UPS strike, discusses how the reforms implemented by Ron Carey after he became 
President of the IBT facilitated the implementation of an effective comprehensive 
campaign when the union stuck UPS in 1997.  The list of reforms implemented by 
Carey prior to UPS strike includes the creation of a corporate campaign department, 
an increase in funding for the member education and communications departments, 
and launching an aggressive offensive against internal union corruption.  Furthermore, 
in the years between Carey’s election and the UPS strike the IBT utilized 28 
   
comprehensive campaigns against a number of smaller employers such as Ryder 
Truck System Inc. and Trucking Management, Inc.  These campaigns acted as proving 
grounds for the kinds of tactics that the IBT would use against UPS in 1997.  For 
instance, in these campaigns the IBT sought to transition the union from its traditional 
top-down approaches to contract negotiations, which minimized rank-and-file 
mobilization, to a more open negotiation strategy, which sought to involve and 
mobilize members.  Furthermore, in between rounds of negotiations the union sought 
to develop strong communication networks between the union leadership and its rank-
and-file membership, which facilitated rank-and-mobilization as well as leadership 
development.  These earlier efforts proved to have a positive effect for the Teamsters 
in their strike against UPS.  The union was able to mobilize its workers around the 
country to honor the union’s picket lines during the strike, and even more remarkably, 
utilize an innovative media campaign which garnered the support of the public for the 
workers.  
However, these case studies have a variety of shortcomings that revolve 
around their limited generalizability.  Although all case studies share this problem to a 
certain extent, it is especially pronounced in regard to the existing case studies of 
comprehensive contract campaigns.  This is because most of the case studies cited deal 
with particularly dramatic and/or lengthy strikes or lockouts that are the most extreme 
examples of modern industrial conflict.  In fact, in most of these case studies, the 
employer(s) is engaged in all-out efforts to end the bargaining relationship with the 
union altogether.  In the case studies where employers are not trying to bust the union, 
they are frequently demanding particularly dramatic concessions, which could result in 
the union ultimately being decertified.  However, these types of conditions do not 
characterize the vast majority of labor negotiations, and even more importantly, unions 
are increasingly making comprehensive campaign strategies a common part of their 29 
   
arsenal and not just something that is rolled out at the last minute when faced with a 
particularly intransigent employer.   
In the case of the Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign, comprehensive 
campaign tactics were a routine part of its bargaining strategy, irrespective of whether  
the union knew it was going to be engaged in a particularly acrimonious round of 
negotiations with the employer or not.  In fact, the Culinary Union, like a growing 
number of other union locals, sees comprehensive campaign strategies as a means to 
create an appearance of increased bargaining power and militancy prior to the 
negotiations in order to encourage employers to settle on terms favorable to the union 
rather than engage in a protracted battle with the union.  Examples of such locals 
include SEIU Local 1199NY, SEIU Local 1877, UNITE- HERE Local 26, UNITE- 
HERE Local 2, amongst others.  Therefore, an account of a comprehensive contract 
campaign taking place in a more common less acrimonious bargaining context is 
missing from the previously cited case study research on the subject. 
Another limitation of these case studies is that most of them involve unions 
that had not or were just beginning to experiment with the kinds of tactics and 
strategies that are characteristic of the revitalization process.  More specifically, with 
the exception of case studies covering the UPS and Goodyear/Firestone strikes, most 
of the unions covered in these case studies had had only limited experience with 
comprehensive campaigns at all (O’Malley, 1999, Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, 2003). 
With the exception of a few studies, analyses of comprehensive campaigns in unions 
that have moved beyond the initial transformational phase of revitalization has largely 
been absent.  
However, several local unions, such as the Culinary Union who went through 
their initial transformational process more that a decade before the 2002 negotiations, 
are moving beyond this initial transformational phase of the revitalization process and 30 
   
making comprehensive contract campaigns a regular part of their strategic repertoire.  
This new context may have several implications for comprehensive campaigns; for 
example, does experience gained from past comprehensive campaigns increase a 
union’s capacity to wage more effective campaign in the future, or do they tend to 
burn out staff and rank-and-file activists, and enable employers to develop more 
effectives responses to the campaigns?  Furthermore, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of how the organizing, political and contract administration policies of 
a union further along in the revitalizing process interact with each other and with the 
union’s comprehensive contract campaign.  This case study of the Culinary Union’s 
2002 contract campaign strategy does this by examining the local’s prior collective 
bargaining, organizing, and political strategies and their influence on the union’s 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign.  
In addition to the case studies discussed in this article there are a few studies 
within the union revitalization literature that take a different methodological approach 
to studying comprehensive contract campaigns, for example looking at multiple 
campaigns in a single study.  One of the first studies of corporate campaigns was 
Perry’s comparative analysis of ten corporate campaigns.  In his book, Union 
Corporate Campaigns, Perry (1987) identifies several dimensions common to most 
corporate campaigns.  The first of these dimensions is that the union attempts to 
control the public’s perception as to what the major issues of the campaign are so as to 
gain the moral high ground.  This aspect of the campaign can be supported by public 
rallies and protests.  The second dimension is the attempt by the union to expand the 
conflict beyond the immediate workplace.  This can be done through coalition 
building, or by engaging the employer’s board of directors, shareholders, and those 
entities with which the firm has a significant relationship.  In corporate campaigns 
unions also solicit the support of political officials and utilize regulatory agencies to 31 
   
further gain leverage on the employer.  Boycotts and other types of consumer-based 
pressure tactics make up the final component of corporate campaigns. Although Perry 
provides a thorough list of the kinds of tactics that make up a corporate campaign, he 
ignores the rank-and-file mobilization strategies that distinguish corporate campaigns 
from their more rank-and-file intensive counterparts: comprehensive campaigns.  This 
point is especially important because rank-and-file mobilization was the core element 
of the Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign strategy, even tactics that are not 
necessarily rank-and-file intensive such as the local’s efforts to pressure the union 
through shareholders or the media had significant rank-and-file components.  
Jarley and Maranto’s (1990) article on union corporate campaigns, although it 
too by definition overlooked union mobilization tactics that often accompany 
corporate campaigns, provides some insights of value for a case study of the Culinary 
Union’s 2002 contract campaign.  First, Jarley and Maranto argue that individual 
tactics by themselves generally do not trigger the settlement process; rather it is the 
cumulative effect of these tactics which pushes the parties towards settlement.  This 
insight is important in light of the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract 
campaign in that the union strategy was composed of a set of mutually reinforcing 
tactics.  These tactics gave the union significantly more power if they were employed 
in combination rather than separately.  Jarley and Maranto (1990) also point out that 
firms that rely on good public image are more sensitive to corporate campaigns.  This 
insight is also very relevant to the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract 
campaign as casino employers rely on maintaining a good image in order to expand 
into new gaming jurisdictions.  Casino employers were especially sensitive to 
damaging information about their labor policies because the provision of good jobs is 
one of their major selling points when trying to move into new jurisdictions.   32 
   
Jarley and Maranto (1990) also note that successful union campaigns lead to 
more sophisticated resistance on the part of employers, a point that is especially 
relevant to Las Vegas because the Culinary Union regularly uses corporate campaigns 
as part of their bargaining and new organizing strategies.  This begs the question as to 
whether the Culinary Union campaigns will retain their effectiveness in the future if 
employer responses become more effective.  Therefore, although Jarley and Moranto 
exclusively focus on corporate campaign tactics at the expense of looking at rank-and-
file intensive tactics that distinguish comprehensive campaigns, their study still 
provides some insights that are relevant to the Culinary Unions 2002 comprehensive 
contract campaign in Las Vegas.  
Bronfenbrenner (1993) improves upon dependency and strategic choice 
theories and studies that exclusively examine corporate campaign tactics by 
identifying rank-and-file intensive strategies and tactics employed by unions and 
management in first contract campaigns, such as house calls and captive audience 
meetings, and empirically tests their effect on campaign outcome.  She argues that: 
"Unions have greater success in first contract campaigns when they utilize a 
multifaceted rank-and-file intensive campaign strategy involving external and internal 
organizing and pressure tactics."  Thus, her analysis goes beyond the corporate 
campaigns analyzed by Perry and Jarley and Maranto by introducing a rank-and-file 
element to these campaigns.  Corporate campaigns that have this additional rank-and-
file component are generally referred to as comprehensive campaigns.  Although 
Bronfenbrenner only described comprehensive campaigns in the context of first 
contract negotiations, the types of mobilization tactics described by Bronfenbrenner’s 
are similar to the ones used by the Culinary Union in their 2002 round of negotiations. 
In the same study, Bronfenbrenner (1993) also analyzes the influence of 
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outcome of first contract campaigns and argues that contextual variables have an 
interactive relationship with union and management strategies in first contract 
campaigns.  She argues "that contextual factors influence bargaining power, 
bargaining power influences union and employer choice of tactics, yet tactics 
influence contextual factors and bargaining power."   
This interactive relationship between contextual variables and union tactics is 
also of particular relevance to this case study.  The importance of the relationship 
between context and tactics is demonstrated by comparing the relevance of traditional 
labor actions such as strikes and pickets in the Culinary Union 2002 comprehensive 
contract campaign to those in the case studies previously discussed in this section.  For 
example, the vast majority of the case studies cited above discuss campaigns against 
employers in the manufacturing sector, where the effectiveness of strikes had been 
significantly curtailed during the Reagan years.  However, in Las Vegas’s casino 
industry, because strikes and pickets can still effectively disrupt the provision of 
services to consumers, they have retained much of their traditional relevance for the 
union.  Therefore, while traditional tactics such as strikes and picketing played limited 
roles in most of the comprehensive campaigns in the previously cited studies, the 
threat of a strike was the core element of the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive 
campaign (Rosenblum, 1995, Getman, 1998, Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, 1999, 
Minchin, 2002, Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 2003, Hickey, 2003).   
Although Bronfenbrenner's model deals specifically with first contract 
campaigns, there have been a number of cases where these tactics have been 
successfully applied to more mature collective bargaining relationships.  For example, 
in a paper published in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, co-authors 
Christopher Erickson, Catherine Fisk, Ruth Milkman, Daniel Mitchell, and Kent 
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discussed in Bronfenbrenner (1993) were employed by SEIU Local 1877 over three 
rounds of negotiations with Los Angeles’s building services industry, beginning with 
the first contract campaign.  For instance, SEIU sought to increase their leverage in the 
negotiations through massive street demonstrations that would garner media attention, 
win public sympathy, and compel tenants and building owners to in turn pressure 
building service employers to settle with the union.  In order to do this, Local 1877 
had to put together an aggressive rank-and-file mobilization campaign that entailed 
substantial internal organizing, membership participation, and rank-and-file education.   
Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, in a chapter in the book Rekindling 
the Movement: labor’s quest for relevance in the 21st century (2001), provide perhaps 
the most comprehensive analysis of how unions can integrate rank-and-file 
mobilization tactics, discussed by Bronfenbrenner and Erickson et al., with the 
corporate campaign tactics discussed by Hickey into mutually reinforcing parts of an 
overall collective bargaining strategy.  In their chapter, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
argue that unions can greatly increase their power in collective bargaining if they 
employ a strategy that combines rank-and-file mobilization and corporate campaign 
tactics in a mutually reinforcing and escalating manner, taking environmental factors 
into careful account.  They discuss a number of tactics that can be employed in 
contract campaign strategies including: end user/consumer campaigns, community 
coalitions, public relations campaigns, in-plant strategies, traditional picketing, etc.  
However, they stress that there is no specific set of tactics with which a union 
can automatically achieve its objectives; rather, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich argue 
that a union must carefully select the combination of tactics which is best suited to its 
bargaining environment and goals.  More specifically, a union must do a careful 
analysis of its opponent and identify ways in which it can pressure it to settle on terms 
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primary decision makers believe that it is in their interest to settle on terms favorable 
to the union.  Therefore, a union's contract campaign strategy must be carefully 
tailored to each employer and bargaining context.  This is essentially the same 
conclusion reached by Bronfenbrenner in her study of first contract campaigns 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1993). 
Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (2001) also argue that it is important that unions 
retain the capacity to launch a contract campaign even when not engaged in an all-out 
struggle with an employer.  First, they argue that employers will be more willing to 
settle on terms favorable to a union when the employer perceives that the union has 
the capacity to significantly threaten its interests.  Secondly, Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich explain that the capacity to launch an effective corporate campaign takes at 
least several months, if not years, to develop, so if a union waits until it is locked in a 
life or death battle before deciding it wants to begin a corporate campaign it may 
already be too late (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 2001).   
Finally, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich argue that contract campaigns are most 
effective if they are well integrated into the structure of the local.  This not only means 
that the union has the technical know how and capacity to launch a contract campaign 
but also that the union has an organizational culture that embraces such strategies.  
This organizational culture should extend beyond the leadership of the local and into 
its staff and rank-and-file.  This is important because in order to be effective, a 
contract campaign needs the commitment of all of these elements within a union 
(Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 2001). 
As I show below, the strategy employed by the Culinary Union for its 2002 
contract campaign met many of the criteria for an ideal contract campaign as defined 
by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich’s chapter in Rekindling the Movement.  First, the 
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adequately support a contract campaign.  Secondly, the local began to prepare for the 
campaign more than a year and a half in advance, so they were prepared for 
employers' resistance to its contract demands.  Also, the Culinary and Bartenders 
unions carefully analyzed the employers involved in the 2002 round of contract 
negotiations as well as the bargaining context and choose escalating pressure tactics 
that were carefully tailored to their specific bargaining goals and the context of the Las 
Vegas gaming industry.  Finally, the local prepared a strategy that carefully combined 
rank-and-file mobilization and corporate campaign tactics so that one reinforced the 
other.  (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 2001). 
Strategic Integration 
The coordination of union strategies across different spheres of union activity 
such as contract bargaining, contract administration, external organizing, and politics 
has been one of the key factors behind the Culinary Union’s overall success.  For 
example, the local achieved most of its external organizing victories of the last 15 
years by negotiating card-check neutrality language in its collective bargaining 
agreements with most of Las Vegas’s major casino employers.  According to the card-
check neutrality language contained in these contracts, employers must recognize the 
union at any newly opened or acquired property once fifty plus one percent of the 
employees sign union cards.  This language not only helped the Culinary Union in its 
external organizing functions, it also increased the union’s leverage at the bargaining 
table, thereby benefiting the union’s ability to service its own members.   
Although much of the union revitalization literature has implicitly 
acknowledged the existence of these kinds of linkages between union strategies in one 
activity on the industrial relations outcomes in another and has, furthermore, 
recognized the benefits of coordinating strategies in different areas of union activity, 
few studies have focused on this subject.  Rather, much of the initial union 37 
   
revitalization literature that dealt with strategic integration has focused on the 
institutional and budgetary reforms a local needed to make in order to make a 
successful transition from a strategy focusing exclusively on representational activities 
to one that also places an emphasis on external organizing (Hurd, 2004).  This 
literature focused on how unions trying to place a greater emphasis on external 
organizing should balance this new focus with their representational responsibilities 
(Hurd, 2004; Griffin & Moors, 2004).  
However, this branch of the union revitalization literature does not cover 
strategic coordination of tactics across spheres of union activity beyond this narrow 
focus, nor does it analyze how such coordination could positively impact a local’s 
ability to mount an effective comprehensive contract campaign.  For example, Fletcher 
and Hurd (2001) argue that in order for a local to make a successful transformation 
from business unionism
2 to a model emphasizing external organizing, it must: 1) not 
compromise its representational effectiveness as a result of expending more resources 
on external organizing, 2) identify organizational barriers to change such as staff 
deficiencies and reticence, and 3) “educate and mobilize its members to build the 
political will and prepare the local for cultural change and ideological reorientation.” 
In other words, Fletcher and Hurd highlight the importance of coordinating external 
organizing and contract administration activities when a union is shifting its strategic 
focus.   
Among the comprehensive/corporate campaign case studies discussed earlier 
in this chapter, Matthew O’Malley’s (1999) examination of the IBT’s strike against 
UPS provides the most in-depth analysis of how the coordination of strategies across 
                                                 
2 Business unionism can be defined as a model of union behavior whereby a union concentrates on its 
representational functions and provides these services based on the logic of economic exchange, 
whereby members pay dues in order purchase services from the union.  Generally, this model of union 
behavior is associated with minimal rank-and-file participation in the union. (Bacharach et al. 2001, 
Turner & Hurd, 2001)  38 
   
spheres of union activity can influence comprehensive contract campaign 
effectiveness.  O’Malley’s thesis describes how the IBT started educating and 
preparing shop stewards more than a year in advance of the campaign.  The union 
sought to teach stewards how to mobilize and communicate with other union members 
about the campaign and the upcoming negotiations.  The union also sought to develop 
an effective communication network between its union officials, staff and the rank-
and-file; as well as recruit rank-and-file activists for leadership roles in the campaign.  
By the time the strike against UPS occurred, roughly a year later, the union was able 
to mobilize its membership to effectively put pressure on the company and force it to 
settle on terms favorable to the union. O’Malley’s thesis shows how the IBT was able 
to coordinate its contract administration functions with its contract bargaining 
functions and increase its capacity to mobilize its members for a strike.  This 
accomplishment seems more remarkable given the fact that many IBT members held 
apathetic or even cynical attitudes towards their union as a result of its tradition of 
minimal rank-and-file involvement in the bargaining process and chronic corruption.  
However, the IBT’s campaign against UPS presents only a limited example of 
strategic integration because it involves coordination between only two collective 
bargaining functions of a union, contract administration and contract negotiation, and 
does not involve other areas of union activity such as organizing and politics.  
Furthermore, these kinds of strategic innovations were not maintained within the IBT.  
The next round of negotiations between the union and UPS did not feature nearly the 
same levels of rank-and-file mobilization nor coordination between the union’s 
bargaining and contract administration functions.  In comparison, the Culinary Union 
has maintained this kind of coordination between its representational functions since 
the late 1980s and coordinates its strategies across its collective bargaining, 
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A more comprehensive example of a union coordinating its strategies across 
different spheres of activity is provided by an article published by Harry Katz, 
Rosemary Batt, and Jeffrey Keefe (2003).  In their paper, they examine the CWA’s 
efforts to revitalize itself as changes in its bargaining environment, such technological 
innovation and divestiture, undermine its traditional membership base and bargaining 
power.  They go on to describe how the CWA’s leadership recognized the mutually 
dependent nature of its collective bargaining, external organizing, and political 
functions and pursued a revitalization strategy that coordinated the union’s strategies 
in these areas.  The article demonstrated that where the CWA was able to link its 
strategies across the different spheres of union activity, it enjoyed its greatest 
successes, and where it was unable to do this its success was more limited. 
Although PACE’s campaign against Crown-Petroleum did not involve 
extensive coordination of union strategies across spheres of activity, Robert Hickey 
(2003), in his case study of this campaign, developed a model of strategic integration 
of union activities and linked this coordination with sustained union revitalization.  He 
criticizes much of the previous union revitalization research for focusing on single 
indicators of union revitalization, such as increased union membership or greater 
union political power.  He argues that increases in union power in one of these areas 
are an insufficient indicator of union revitalization.  Rather, Hickey argues that in 
order to achieve sustained revitalization, unions must take a comprehensive approach 
to their strategic planning and integrate their core activities, as well as undergo the 
necessary cultural and structural organizational transformations necessary to support 
their new strategic focus.  He argues that without coordinating their strategies in their 
core areas of activity, unions will be unable to institute the cultural and structural 
changes necessary to sustain revitalization.  40 
   
The success of the Culinary Union over the past 15 years provides support for 
Hickey’s analysis.  In their analysis of the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization 
efforts, Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss (2004) argue that the Culinary Union, by 
involving rank-and-file members in its external organizing efforts, has helped to 
“radicalize” its rank-and-file membership and thereby increase their capacity to be 
mobilized for the local’s collective bargaining and political efforts.  In a similar way, 
this case study shows how the Culinary Union’s contract administration procedure has 
also contributed to this effect by exposing rank-and-file members to the kinds of 
mobilization tactics that are common in comprehensive contract campaigns and 
increasing their awareness of the union as an organization in which they can become 
involved in order to resolve workplace problems.  This radicalization of the Culinary 
Union’s rank-and-file membership has helped transform its internal culture to one that 
facilitates the rank-and-file mobilization efforts that form the backbone of the local’s 
comprehensive contract campaigns.  It has also contributed to the ability of the union 
to make the internal structural reforms necessary to support these kinds of campaigns.  
Dorothee Benz’s 2004 article provides an in-depth analysis of how the 
Culinary Union has been able to successfully coordinate its strategies across its 
different core activities in order to win significant collective bargaining, external 
organizing, as well as political gains.  Benz also analyzes how the Culinary Union’s 
strategic choices and accomplishments are linked to the economic, political, and social 
contexts of Las Vegas’s casino industry.  Her conclusion is that contextual variables in 
Las Vegas’s gaming industry created opportunities that the Culinary Union was able 
to exploit in order to win remarkable victories in the areas of politics, collective 
bargaining, and external organizing.  The strategic choices made by the Culinary 
Union play an important role in the Benz’s model because by employing the correct 
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opportunities.  However, Benz argues that these contextual opportunities were unique 
to Las Vegas’s casino industry and, therefore, the same set of strategies could not be 
employed with the same degree of success in other industrial relations environments.  
Therefore Benz, much like Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (2001), emphasizes the 
importance of matching suitable union strategies to bargaining contexts, arguing that 
unions cannot have a one-size-fits-all approach to their campaigns, whether they are in 
the realm of collective bargaining, organizing, or politics, or in some combination of 
the three (Benz 2004). 
In terms of strategic integration, Benz describes how the Culinary Union has 
consistently taken a comprehensive approach to its strategic initiatives.  This 
comprehensive approach encompasses the collective bargaining, external organizing, 
and political spheres of union activity.  For example, Benz discusses how the local, 
taking into account a variety of contextual factors that gave it significant leverage 
against employers in the sphere of collective bargaining, was able to get card-check 
neutrality language covering all newly developed and acquired casinos included in its 
contracts with all of the major casino operators in Las Vegas.  The contextual factors 
that gave the union increased leverage in the sphere of collective bargaining included 
the vulnerability of the Las Vegas casino industry to strikes, the shortage of qualified 
workers at the beginning of the 1990s, the large amounts of debt most of the large 
casino operators had compiled, and the sensitivity of the industry to bad publicity.  
With this neutrality language in effect, the union was able to organize roughly 30,000 
workers with minimal employer resistance.   
The union also used political strategies to undermine the efforts of casino 
operators that did not agree to neutrality, to move into new gaming jurisdictions.  As a 
result of the heavily regulated nature of the gaming industry, especially in jurisdictions 
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political influence to prevent certain casinos from obtaining licenses to open new 
casinos, thus pressuring these operators to settle with the union.  This factor played a 
key role in the decision of MGM-Grand to eventually sign a neutrality agreement with 
the union.  This example also shows how contextual factors are linked to the Culinary 
Union’s coordination of strategies across spheres of activity (Benz 2004). 
Benz’s analysis is very comprehensive; it takes into account both the 
importance of coordinating union strategies across spheres of activity as well as the 
significance of selecting strategies that provide a union with the most leverage in a 
specific bargaining context.  However, Benz, in addition to Hickey (2003) and Katz et 
al. (2003), does not take into consideration a union’s representational functions in 
between rounds of negotiations.  In fact, of the studies discussed in this chapter, only 
O’Malley (1999) discusses the importance of coordinating a union’s contract 
administration strategies with other union functions.  
The fact that Benz did not discuss the Culinary Union’s contract administration 
strategy in her analysis is rendered even more striking by the fact that many of the 
Culinary Union’s leaders and staff that were interviewed for this case study placed 
contract administration at the core of the local’s overall rank-and-file mobilization 
efforts  (Pappageorge, 2003, Dalton, 2003, Hughes, 2003, Zeitz 2003, Alexander, 
2005, Henry 2005, Pappageorge, 2005).  Furthermore, because rank-and-file 
mobilization is the foundation of the Culinary Union’s political, external organizing, 
and contract bargaining strategies, the importance of the local’s contract 
administration strategy is especially significant.   
This thesis will correct this oversight on the part of Hickey (1993), Katz et al. 
(2003) and Benz (2005) by providing comprehensive examination of the Culinary 
Union’s contract administration strategy and discussing how it relates to the local’s 
organizing, political, and contract bargaining functions.  It will also include a case 43 
   
study of the Culinary Union’s 2002 comprehensive contract campaign and show that 
the union’s coordination of strategies across its different spheres of activity greatly 
contributed to the effectiveness of this campaign. In particular, this thesis will show 
how the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy greatly contributed to its 
rank-and-file mobilization efforts, which formed the backbone of its 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign.   
Contract Administration and the Organizing Model 
The center of the Culinary Union’s member mobilization efforts is its contract 
administration strategy.  Through this strategy the Culinary Union: communicates and 
educates its members, identifies, recruits, and trains rank-and-file leaders, promotes 
rank-and-file participation in the local, and encourages a sense of solidarity and 
empowerment amongst members in the workplace.   
Contract administration involves the establishment and implementation of the 
rules and regulations that make up a labor contract.  Bob Repas (1984) identifies three 
primary elements of the concept of contract administration: “1) the introduction of the 
contract after its approval by the negotiations parties, 2) contract alteration and 
revision during its term….3) the actual operations of the contract, including grievance 
handling and pressure tactics.”  Repas’s definition of contract administration is 
distinguished from other definitions of the concept because it recognizes the use of 
alternative methods of resolving grievances and workplace issues other than formal 
grievance procedures.  The importance of power is also implied in Repas’s definition 
of contract administration.  Other definitions of contract administration tend to 
concentrate on its formal and legalistic characteristics and often overlook the 
importance of power and non-legalistic alternative means of resolving workplace 
issues to this concept (Lewin & Peterson, 1988, Duane, 1993, Bremmels & Foley, 
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Union because pressure tactics outside of the traditional grievance process, such as 
group delegations to management, play a major role in the local’s contract 
administration strategy.  In fact, the Culinary Union negotiates specific provisions in 
its labor contracts, which facilitate the use of these alternative pressure tactics (Caesars 
Palace Contract 2002-2007, Mirage Contract, 2002-2007). 
The contract administration strategy utilized by the Culinary Union in the years 
prior to the 2002 round of contract negotiations is similar to that described by Teresa 
Cornrow (1991).  In Cornrow’s model the union places a priority on rank-and-file 
membership involvement in the contract administration process.  Furthermore, the role 
of union staff in this model is to facilitate the ability of union members to take 
advantage of the tools provided by the contract themselves, rather than to have 
members rely on paid union staff to resolve grievances.  In order to do this the union 
must give rank-and-file leaders increased responsibility and ownership of the 
grievance process.  Unions must also provide rank-and-file leaders with the education 
and training necessary for them to take advantage of their increased responsibility. 
Finally, Cornrow argues that a union’s contract administration strategy must help 
rank-and-file members develop a sense of solidarity and empowerment in the 
workplace by encouraging members to conceptualize their work issues collectively 
rather than individually.  
In her article, Cornrow outlines several tactical recommendations for unions 
adopting the organizing model of contract administration.  Her first recommendation 
is that unions ought to adopt a strategy that focuses on issues that generate a 
community of interest among the members and build member solidarity.  In other 
words, the union ought to give priority to those grievances which affect groups of 
workers and which workers can rally around, rather than those which impact 
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informal power structures that exist in the workplace and pursue a strategy that builds 
members’ sense of empowerment.  In order to do this she recommends that union 
pursue group grievances, and involve union members in the grievance process as 
much as possible by utilizing such tactics as delegations to management, break room 
rallies, solidarity days, and petitions.  (Cornrow 1991).  These kinds of tactics are a 
common part of the Culinary Union’s tactical arsenal.   
A strong two-way communications network between union staff, leadership, 
and rank-and-file makes up another important element in Cornrow’s organizing model 
of contract administration.  This network should include regular face-to-face contact 
between these different groups and be used to educate the membership about wider 
union issues.  Furthermore, regular face-to-face communication with the membership 
should help union leaders and staff develop an accurate understanding of the informal 
power relationships that exist in the workplace and where the union membership is 
physically, mentally, and ideologically.   
The Culinary Union is one of the few union locals utilizing the organizing 
model of contract administration, and its use of this model is much more ambitious 
than most other locals pursuing a similar strategy.  Although it is common for unions 
to mobilize members immediately prior to the beginning of negotiations or elections, it 
is rare for a union to do so in between these cycles (Lopez, 2004).  Therefore, it is 
important to look at the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy and the 
kinds of impacts it has for other areas of union activity such as contract bargaining. 
Outside of the case studies discussed above, contract administration has been 
largely ignored in the union revitalization literature.  When it is addressed, contract 
administration is often characterized as being in competition with external organizing, 
or other areas of union activity that are crucial to revitalization for limited union 
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administration that exists outside of the union revitalization literature does not address 
the role of union strategies and/or power in the bargaining relationship, and therefore 
is of limited relevance to this study.  In particular, this prior research does not address 
the influence union contract administration strategy can have on contract bargaining or 
other areas of union activity.  Instead, this literature has focused on issues such as 
arbitration; the influence of various demographic, economic, and technological factors 
on grievance rates; the influence of management policies and supervisor behavior on 
grievance rates, the influence of union policies and union official behavior on 
grievance rates;  the connection between perceptions of industrial relations conflict 
and high incidence of grievance filing; and the influence of grievance procedures on 
where and how grievances are resolved (Lewin & Peterson 1988; Bremmels & Foley 
1996). 
However, there is an extensive amount of organizational behavior literature 
which has shown that a union’s contract administration strategy can have a profound 
impact on members’ union commitment and participation in the union and therefore 
influence a union’s rank-and-file mobilization capabilities.  The Culinary Union’s 
extraordinary rank-and-file mobilization capacity formed the backbone of its 2002 
contract campaign strategy; therefore, this literature linking contract administration 
strategy to mobilization provides essential background and support for the arguments 
made in this thesis.   
Numerous studies have shown that grievance procedures are one of the most 
important functions of a union in the eyes of its members.  This may be because it is 
one of the most visible and regular services a union provides to its members.  One 
survey of approximately 1500 union members found that, among these workers, 
grievance representation was considered the most important of all union activities 
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rank-and-file union members’ subjective evaluations of the grievance procedure and 
union commitment
3 (Gallagher & Clark, 1989, Clark, Gallagher, & Pavlak, 1990, 
Eaton, Gordon, & Keefe, 1992, Bemmels, 1995a).  The connection between union 
member attitudes towards the grievance process and union commitment is important 
because a strong positive correlation has been found between union commitment and 
rank-and-file participation, and thus a union’s capacity to mobilize its membership 
(Fullagar & Barling, 1989, Thacker, Fields, & Barclay, 1990, Bamberger, Kluger, & 
Suchard, 1999, Sverke & Kuruvilla, 1995, Sverke & Sjoberg, 1995, Redman & Snape, 
2004).   
Beyond just finding a strong positive correlation between union commitment 
and rank-and-file participation, some scholars have found a link between specific 
contact administration strategies that are common to the organizing model and 
increased levels of commitment and participation.  For example, Patricia Fosh (1993) 
compared the contract administration strategies and leadership styles of five different 
unions in unrelated industries in Great Britain and found that unions could increase 
rank-and-file participation by pursuing contract administration strategies that focused 
on collective rather than individual concerns of workers and gave members a high 
degree of responsibility in resolving grievances.  Along similar lines, Ed Snape and 
Tom Redman (2004b), in their study of unionized teachers in Great Britain, found that 
contract administration strategies that focus on servicing members individually rather 
than mobilizing workers to resolve problems collectively have a negative impact on 
overall union participation. In another study focusing on unionized firefighters in 
                                                 
3 The definition of union commitment utilized in these four studies has four primary components: 
  1) A clear awareness of the benefits of belonging to a union for an individual. 
  2) The degree of willingness to fulfill the day-to-day obligations and duties of a member in 
  order to protect the interests of the union. 
  3) The willingness of a member to exert extra effort on behalf of the union above and beyond 
  the generally expected efforts for union members generally. 
  4) ideological belief in the general concept of unionism. (Gordon et al 1980) 48 
   
Great Britain, Snape and Redman (2004a) found that contract administration strategies 
that encourage feelings of workplace solidarity and place an emphasis on collective 
grievances are positively correlated with higher levels of rank-and-file union 
participation.  
Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich (1995) have found a strong correlation 
between the organizing model of contract administration and a union’s ability to fight 
off raids by other unions and decertification attempts.  More specifically, they found 
that contract administration strategies that are common to the organizing model, such 
as building and developing rank-and-file leadership, regularly communicating with 
membership, and developing solidarity between members, were positively correlated 
with union success in decertification votes and in fending off raiding attempts by rival 
unions.  This relationship was balanced across most of the demographic variables 
tested by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich.  Union success in withstanding decertification 
votes and raiding attempts provides a reasonable proxy for membership commitment 
to the union.  Given that a strong positive correlation has been established between 
union commitment and union participation, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich’s study 
provides additional evidence for a link between the organizing model of contract 
administration and increased rank-and-file participation.   
Lois Tetrick (1995) provides a theoretical foundation for the correlation 
between the organizing model of contract administration and increased rank-and-file 
union participation  She argues that union commitment is not generated as a result of a 
simple economic exchange between the union and its members, whereby union 
members make a rational economic choice to become active in their union because of 
the financial reward they may receive as a result of their activism.  Rather, Tetrick 
argues that rank-and-file union participation occurs dynamically as result of the 
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union staff and leadership.  The organizing model, Tetrick points out, highlights the 
mutual obligations union members owe to one another by involving them in the 
resolution of their collective problems.   
Samuel Bacharach, Peter Bamberger, and William Sonnestuhl (2001) flesh out 
Tetrick’s theoretical model.  They argue that the more intensely an individual 
participates within an organization, building life experiences and relationships 
associated with it, the greater the sense of social obligation a person will feel towards 
that organization.  This sense of social obligation leads to the formation of normative 
commitment towards the organization.  This type of commitment is what is generally 
associated with increased organizational participation, an example of which is 
increased rank-and-file union participation. However, in order to generate more 
intensive rank-and-file involvement, a union must legitimize itself in the eyes of its 
members.  Bacharach et al. argue that unions can use logics of action to legitimize 
their authority and elicit commitment from their members.  The authors define logics 
of action as “an interdependent set of representations or constraints that influence 
action in a given domain.”  In other words, logics of action guide the behavior of 
individuals and groups as they tackle the practical constraints of their lives.  
Bacharach et al. argue that in regard to rank-and-file union participation, logics of 
action form the cognitive frame that guides union-member relations.  The authors 
define labor’s “logic of union-member relations as the cognitive framework guiding 
union strategies for legitimizing the union to its members, securing commitment from 
its members, and attracting new members.” Bacharach et al. argue that there are two 
logics of union member relations: the servicing logic and the mutual aid logic.  The 
servicing-logic is organized around a utilitarian principle of legitimacy whereby the 
union provides members with services and benefits in exchange for a fee in the form 
of union dues.  Therefore, according to the servicing logic, members assume a more 50 
   
passive role in their union.  Within this context, members do not expect the union to 
play a large role in their lives; they feel that their obligations to the union are met by 
paying dues, attending occasional meetings, and voting on the contract.  Union 
members do not form the kinds of relationships or have the kinds of experiences that 
lead to them developing a sense of obligation towards the organization, and therefore 
the union is unable to generate high levels of rank-and-file participation (Bacharach et 
al., 2001). 
The second type of logic of action described in the same analysis is the mutual 
aid logic.  According to the mutual-aid logic, the union is seen as an entity whose 
members, staff, and leadership have multiple mutual obligations to one another.  
Members are given more responsibility in union matters and are encouraged to address 
issues both in and outside of the workplace collectively.  In fact, the union is seen as 
an organization that can help members resolve problems both in and out of the 
workplace.  This logic generates rank-and-file participation in the union because it 
facilitates rank-and-file participation in and a sense of responsibility for the union.  
Furthermore, it encourages union members to look at their problems collectively and 
seek to resolve them with aid of their peers, instead of relying on paid union staff.  
Problems are seen as issues around which prospective or current members are 
organized, and workers learn the essence of unionism by participating in and 
experiencing collective action.  Instead of providing services to the members, the role 
of paid union staff and leadership is to facilitate the ability of members to help 
themselves by empowering and organizing them so that they are able to resolve their 
problems collectively.  Therefore, the mutual-aid logic increases the capacity of 
unions to mobilize their rank-and-file members.  Bacharach et al. argue that the 
organizing model, such as that which the Culinary Union employs for its contract 
administration as well as other activities, is consistent with the mutual aid logic.  51 
   
Therefore, as this case study of the Culinary Union shows, unions pursuing an 
organizing model of contract administration should enjoy increased rank-and-file 
participation and greater capacity to mobilize members for periodic rounds of 
negotiation.  
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Case studies are an integral part of the union revitalization literature, 
particularly the branch of the literature dealing with comprehensive contract 
campaigns.  This is because one the key arguments made by scholars studying union 
comprehensive contract campaigns is that in order for such campaigns to be successful 
unions ought to utilize strategies that are matched to their contextual circumstances  
(Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, 2000).  Therefore, studies examining comprehensive 
campaigns need to take into account the context in which each campaign takes place.  
Because it facilitates a detailed description of the social, political, and economic 
context of the subject under analysis, the case study approach is well suited for 
researching comprehensive contract campaigns. 
Case studies are also particularly appropriate for describing the processes 
through which an outcome occurs.  This is because of the rich detail a case study 
provides.  This thesis focuses on how the Culinary Union’s strategies, both prior to 
and during its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign, influenced by the external 
industrial relations context of Las Vegas’s gaming industry, increased the Culinary 
Union’s collective bargaining power in its 2002 round of negotiations.  Therefore, a 
case study approach is well suited to this study.    
However, case studies have their own particular drawbacks.  Most importantly, 
due to their singular nature, it is difficult to draw definitive generalizable conclusions 
from case studies.  Nevertheless, this case study does provide further evidence 
supporting the argument that contract administration strategy and strategic integration 
have significant roles to play in the union revitalization process.  This thesis also 
provides an illustration of how the organizing model can be used to increase rank-and-
file union participation and increase the effectiveness of comprehensive campaign 
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both the strategic choices of the Culinary Union and industrial relations outcomes in 
Las Vegas’s casino industry. 
This case study relied on a wide variety of sources of information.  Thirty 
hours of interviews were conducted with union staff and leaders for this case study.  
Gaming wire reporters, who provided the primary coverage of the negotiations for 
both the local and national press, were also interviewed.  I worked as an intern in the 
Culinary Union’s research department in the summer following the 2002 round of 
negotiations, which provided me with both observational and experiential data.  This 
internship provided me with a large degree of insight into the internal functioning of 
the Culinary Union.  It also allowed me to have numerous informal conversations with 
Culinary Union staff and leaders about the 2002 contract campaign, as well as other 
activities of the union.   
I also shadowed several internal organizers as they went about their daily work 
routine.  This entailed following them into the casino and observing them meeting 
with workers and managers in order to resolve grievances.  This allowed me to witness 
the Culinary Union’s contract administration procedure in practice. 
Other valuable sources of information for this thesis were the people I shared 
an apartment with while living in Las Vegas.  Both were casino workers; one was a 
shop steward for the Culinary Union and the other was a non-union subcontracted 
worker at a unionized casino.  Numerous informal conversations with these 
individuals provided me with a great deal of insight into the everyday internal 
operations of a Las Vegas casino.   
The union also granted me access to some primary materials related to the 
campaign, such as weekly updates distributed to members, training materials used to 
prepare the bargaining committee for the campaign, numerous flyers and other 
publicity related materials, etc.  However, I was not given access to the Culinary 54 
   
Union’s bargaining notes.  Finally, I made considerable use of secondary materials for 
this case study.  I relied extensively on press accounts from Las Vegas’s two primary 
newspapers: the Las Vegas Review-Journal and the Las Vegas Sun.  I also analyzed a 
variety of academic literature on union revitalization, the organizing model, union 
participation, and contract bargaining, and Las Vegas’s gaming industry.  This 
academic literature provided this thesis with its theoretical underpinnings and allowed 
for it to be placed within the context of the existing industrial relations research.  
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Chapter IV: Las Vegas Background 
Introduction 
A key argument made in this thesis is that unions and employers can 
strategically manipulate advantages and disadvantages accruing from their bargaining 
environment in order to increase their power at the bargaining table.  This case study 
provides a detailed explanation of how the Culinary Union did this in the 2002 
negotiations.  The bargaining environment the Culinary Union faced in the 
negotiations can be divided into two parts, the first being the social, political, and 
economic context of Las Vegas’s casino industry.  The second is the Culinary Union’s 
own internal history, culture, structure, resources, and long-term practices which 
played an integral role in influencing its decision making and capabilities during the 
negotiations.  This chapter as well as the following chapter will describe the context of 
the 2002 contract negotiations.  This chapter will focus on Las Vegas and its casino 
industry.  The next chapter will focus on the history of the Culinary Union.  The 
second chapter will also analyze the Culinary Union’s current structure, culture, and 
long-term practices and discuss their influence on the local’s choices and capabilities 
in the 2002 negotiations.   
The City of Las Vegas 
The City of Las Vegas itself covers only a relatively small proportion of the 
area that is popularly conceived of as "Las Vegas."  The Las Vegas Strip, UNLV, the 
airport, and a large proportion of the residential and commercial development all fall 
outside the City of Las Vegas's boundaries and lie in unincorporated parts of Clark 
County.  State legislation passed after World War II prevented Nevada cities from 
annexing unincorporated townships without the county’s approval.  This has meant 
that Las Vegas has never been able capture the strip or any of its rapidly growing 56 
   
suburbs and has only been able to retain its declining core areas.  Therefore, when 
studying Las Vegas it is important to look not at the City of Las Vegas itself but at its 
wider metropolitan area or the county the city resides in: Clark County.  This is 
highlighted by comparing the population figures of Las Vegas with that of its entire 
metropolitan area.  In 2000 the population of Las Vegas was 483,734, while the 
population of the Las Vegas metropolitan statistical area was 1,381,086. (U.S. Census 
Bureau). The chief public body governing these unincorporated areas is the Clark 
County Commission, which some have argued is the most powerful governmental 
body in the state.  However, it should also be noted that Clark County also covers an 
area significantly larger than the Las Vegas Metropolitan area, much of which is 
unpopulated desert (Littlejohn, 1999).   
The political economy of Las Vegas and Nevada is very laissez-faire.  Nevada 
has no franchise tax, personal or corporate income tax, or inheritance gift taxes, and 
has minimal property taxes.  It has been a right-to-work state since 1952 and otherwise 
has generally lax labor protections.  The political and social climate in Nevada is very 
libertarian and therefore tends to favor as little government involvement in economic 
and social issues as possible (Rothman, 2002a).  Traditionally, the City of Las Vegas’s 
political leaders have been very supportive of the local gaming industry; however, 
they have also been somewhat more progressive on employment issues than their 
colleagues at the county and state levels (Arnado, 2003).  
The Las Vegas Casino Industry   
Las Vegas’s economy is dominated by the Hotel Gaming and Recreation 
(HGR) Industry.  In 2002 the HGR industry employed 174,226 people in the Las 
Vegas metropolitan area and accounted for 26.4 percent of all jobs in the area.  If jobs 
that support the HGR industry were counted in this statistic, such as taxi drivers and 
airport workers, this proportion would be much higher (Wial & Rickert, 2002).  Over 57 
   
the past 20 years the area’s economic base has become more diverse as employers 
have located to Las Vegas to take advantage of its business friendly climate.  In this 
period CitiCorp, Ocean Spray, and the US Postal Service have also become major 
employers in Las Vegas.  Due to the expansion of its airport and its strategic 
geographic location, Las Vegas has become a major mail distribution center for the 
southwestern United States.   
This increasing economic diversity has diluted the traditionally dominant 
influence of the gaming industry over state and local government (Rothman, 2002a).  
Furthermore, the Culinary Union in the 1990s became more aggressive in asserting 
itself in state and local politics, which has also weakened gaming operators’ hold over 
local politics.  In the years between 1990 and 2002 the union successfully elected two 
of its members to the state legislature and played a leading role in the defeat of several 
state and local politicians that had sided explicitly with management in a variety of 
labor disputes that occurred during this period (Arnado, 2003).  
The Las Vegas Casino industry is generally subdivided into three categories. 
The first are casinos located along or near to the Las Vegas Strip.  The second 
category are casinos that are located along or near to the Fremont Street Experience, a 
covered pedestrian walkway in downtown Las Vegas.  These casinos are known as 
downtown casinos. The third category are neighborhood casinos.  Neighborhood 
casinos are located in neither of the two previously mentioned areas, but are rather 
scattered throughout the Las Vegas metropolitan area.  Neighborhood casinos are a 
relatively new phenomenon in Las Vegas: prior to the 1990s the location of casinos 
outside of the strip, downtown, and a few other areas was restricted (Rothman, 2002a) 
Strip Casinos are located on or just off Las Vegas Blvd. in the corridor 
between the McCarran International Airport at the southern end of the Strip and the 
intersection of Las Vegas Blvd and Sahara Ave at the northern end of the Strip.  Strip 58 
   
Casinos are generally the large gaming mega-resorts, such as the Bellagio or Caesar’s 
Palace, for which Las Vegas is now known.  These casinos primarily serve out-of-
towners (Rothman, 2003).  In 2002 there were four casino companies which operated 
multiple properties along the strip: MGM-Mirage, The Mandalay Resort Group, 
Harrah’s Entertainment, and the Park Place Entertainment Corp.   
The strip has been booming since the Mirage Hotel and Casino was built in 
1989, with only a brief interruption caused by 9/11 and the recent recession.  In the 
period between 1990 and 2002 there have been 16 new casinos built either on or just 
off the strip (Rothman, 2002a).  The names of these recently built casinos are: The 
Mirage, the Excalibur, the Luxor, Treasure Island, MGM Grand, the Hard Rock Hotel, 
the Stratosphere, Monte Carlo, New York, New York, the Bellagio, Mandalay Bay, 
the Venetian, Paris, the Aladdin, the Rio, and The Palms.  Other casinos such as 
Caesar’s Palace and the Tropicana have undergone major renovations during this 
period enabling them to compete with the newer and more elegant recently opened 
properties (Alexander, 2002).  Casinos which have not undergone such major 
renovations, such as the Stardust and the New Frontier, have been forced to compete 
by focusing on more budget-minded tourists (Rothman, 2002a).   
The vast majority of the Culinary Union’s members work in casinos along the 
Strip.  Roughly 41,000 of the Culinary Union’s 45,000 plus members
4 work in Strip 
casinos (Simpson, 2002f, German, 2002l, Berns, 2002m).  Union density along the 
Strip in occupations typically represented by the Culinary Union is more than 90% 
(Greenhouse, 2004).  At the time of the 2002 negotiations, the Culinary Union 
represented workers at 25 properties along the strip: Bally’s, Barbary Coast, the 
Bellagio, Caesar’s Palace, Circus Circus, the Excalibur, the Flamingo, Harrah’s, the 
Las Vegas Hilton, the Luxor, Mandalay Bay, MGM Grand, the Mirage, the Monte 
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Carlo, the New Frontier, New York, New York, Paris, Rio, Riviera, Sahara, Slots-a-
Fun, the Stardust, the Stratosphere, Treasure Island, and the Tropicana. 
The second category of casinos are downtown casinos.  These casinos are 
patronized by a mix of locals and budget-minded tourists.  In contrast to the thriving 
Strip casinos, downtown casinos with a few exceptions
5 have struggled to remain 
competitive in Las Vegas’s dynamic gaming industry.  The vast majority of downtown 
casinos are unionized.  However, due to their comparatively small size, downtown 
casinos employ only about 4,000 Culinary Union members in total (Simpson, 2002m). 
The downtown properties with contracts with the Culinary Union are Binion’s 
Horseshoe, El Cortez, Fitzgerald’s, the Four Queens, the Fremont, the Golden Gate, 
the Golden Nugget, the Las Vegas Club, the Plaza, and the Western.   
Traditionally, downtown casinos have drawn from two major market niches: 
budget-minded tourists and locals.  However, over the past twenty to thirty years these 
two markets have been siphoned off by Strip and neighborhood casinos and, as a 
result, most downtown casinos have been going through a long steady decline 
(Simpson, 2002a).  In addition, downtown casinos have lost customers as a result of 
the emergence of gaming in other parts of the United States.  Several additional factors 
have contributed to the decline of downtown casinos:  first, the overall economic 
decline of downtown Las Vegas has decreased the attractiveness of downtown casinos 
for gamblers.  Downtown Las Vegas suffers from many of the common problems that 
downtowns across America face: a lack of parking, increased crime, a population shift 
to the suburbs, and a declining tax base.  Furthermore, downtown casinos are older, 
smaller, and offer fewer amenities than either Strip casinos or the newer neighborhood 
casinos.  These factors have been compounded by the failure of most downtown 
casino operators to significantly invest in their establishments (Simpson, 2002a).   
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The third sector of Las Vegas’s gaming industry are neighborhood casinos.  
These casinos primarily serve local gamblers and are located throughout the Las 
Vegas metropolitan area.  Although this sector of the Las Vegas casino industry is 
thriving as a whole, older neighborhood casinos have struggled in recent years, 
causing several to shut down.  The failure of these older properties can be explained to 
a significant degree by the proliferation of two casino chains that have come to 
dominate the neighborhood casino sector in Las Vegas: Stations Casinos and Coast 
Casinos.  The new casino chains have redefined the neighborhood gaming market in 
Las Vegas.  The older neighborhood casinos generally offer minimal non-gaming 
amenities beyond food service.  However, the newer Stations and Coast casinos offer 
an expanded the list of amenities by including such things as movie theaters, live 
entertainment, nightclubs, bowling, etc.  Furthermore, the newer neighborhood casino 
chains are much better located geographically than their older counterparts.  The older 
neighborhood gaming properties tend to be located in declining areas such as North 
Las Vegas, while the newer neighborhood casino properties are located near Las 
Vegas’s newer and more middle class areas, making them more convenient for local 
gamblers with more spending money.  Overall, union density amongst neighborhood 
casinos is very low.  The Culinary Union only represents employees at three of these 
properties: Castaways, El Dorado, and the Jerry Nugget.  Furthermore, all of the 
Stations and Coast neighborhood casinos are non-union
6 (Rothman, 2002, Rothman, 
2003).  
Las Vegas Gaming Industry Workforce 
There is a high degree of occupational segregation by gender, race, and 
ethnicity in the gaming industry nationwide.  For the most part this pattern of 
segregation type is present in Las Vegas’s casinos as well.  African-Americans are 
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over-represented in out-of-sight “back-of-the-house” jobs such as maids and 
housemen, janitors and cleaners.  In comparison, African-Americans are under-
represented in front-of-the-house jobs such as front desk clerks, bartenders, and food 
servers in which there is a higher degree of interaction with casino guests.  These same 
patterns exist for Hispanics as well.  (Waddoups & Eade, 2002). 
There is also a high degree of occupational segregation by gender in the 
hospitality industry.  Sales counter clerks, maids, and waitstaff are disproportionably 
female, while women are under-represented in security guard and bartender positions.  
One of the effects of the occupational segregation in the gaming industry is that 
women as well as racial and ethnic minorities earn less than their male and Caucasian 
counterparts, in occupations of equivalent skill level.  However, these wage disparities 
are mitigated in casinos covered by collective bargaining agreements (Waddoups & 
Eade, 2002).  Undocumented workers do not have much of a presence in Las Vegas 
due to various state, county, and city licensing requirements for casino workers, 
although some of these regulations have recently become repealed (Pappageorge, 
2003). 
Patterns of Collective Bargaining in Las Vegas’s Casino Industry 
Union density in Las Vegas’s casino industry stands at roughly 65%.  
However, union density in Clark County's hotel, gaming, and recreation industry is 
highly variable by occupation.  For example, occupations that are generally 
represented by the Culinary Union, such as housekeepers and cocktail waitresses, have 
a very high union density, while others such as card dealers and most other 
occupations directly related to gambling activities are almost entirely unorganized
7 
(Waddoups & Eade, 2002, Benz, 2004, Fantasia & Voss, 2004).   
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Several labor unions in addition to the Culinary Workers' and Bartenders 
unions represent workers in Las Vegas casinos.  However, the Culinary Workers' 
Union is the dominant local union representing workers in Las Vegas’s casinos.  
Occupations typically covered by the Culinary Workers' Union are: food preparation, 
kitchen sanitation, dining room staff, bell desk, housekeeping, slot change, cocktail 
servers, and valet parkers in some casino/hotels.  The vast majority of these job 
categories are unskilled or semi-skilled (Occupational Information Network 2005).  
Other unions with a presence in Las Vegas casinos include the Carpenters, 
IBT, IUOE, IATSE, AFM, UNITE!
8, and the TWU
9.  For the most part, these unions 
have not been as successful as the HERE-affiliated locals in organizing newly opened 
Las Vegas casinos, resulting in much lower union densities in the occupations that 
they tend to represent.  UNITE! has been the one exception in this regard.  Before 
UNITE!’s merger with HERE in 2003, it had successfully organized the laundry 
workers in a number of casinos as well as several of the major subcontractors who 
clean casino laundry (Waddoups & Eade, 2002, Bohner, 2004, Berns, 2002s)  
There were no reported instances either in the press or in any of my interviews 
of any of the above labor unions engaging in any solidarity actions on behalf of the 
Culinary or the Bartenders Unions in the 2002 negotiations.  Historically, there have 
been several instances where unions in Las Vegas’s gaming industry have cooperated 
in contract negotiations, perhaps most significantly in the period between 1968 and 
1980 when the Teamsters, Bartenders, and Culinary Unions all agreed to honor each 
others’ picket lines.  This agreement was broken by the Culinary Union when they 
agreed to a no-strike clause in their 1980 contract (Waddoups & Eade, 2002, 
Rothman, 2002a). 
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History of the Casino Industry in Las Vegas  
Early History 
The area where Las Vegas currently stands was once the site of a spring-fed 
creek which created an oasis in the middle of the Mojave Desert.  It was the only free 
flowing water and grass for miles around.  Prior to the original development of Las 
Vegas, the springs had been the site of a variety of Native American villages as well as 
a failed Mormon settlement prior to when Las Vegas got its official start.  This spring-
fed creek, long ago buried by construction, is ultimately responsible for the city’s 
development.  Railroad developers, who wanted to take advantage of the only 
available source of water for miles around, determined that the Las Vegas Valley 
would be a prime spot for a water station and repair facility for a line connecting Los 
Angeles to points east.  When construction on the line began in 1904, a tent town 
comprised of salons, stores, and boarding houses sprung up in the Las Vegas Valley.  
By 1905, a permanent downtown had been constructed. The population of Las Vegas 
expanded rapidly over the next 15 years to more than 3,000 residents.  Las Vegas’s 
origins as a railroad town were also responsible for its original association with vice.  
Businesses that catered to travelers’ demands for gambling, prostitution, and alcohol 
flourished in early Las Vegas (Land & Land, 2004).   
As a result of the efforts of progressive reformers and Prohibition, gambling 
became illegal in the Nevada in 1910, and drinking became illegal in 1919.  However, 
these activities still flourished in Las Vegas’s underground economy, as they did in 
many other cities and towns across America.  In fact, Prohibition failed to curb 
gambling and drinking activity in Las Vegas to any extent at all.  Most casinos and 
salons were at best poorly kept secrets and were regularly attended by local business 
and political leaders (Land & Land, 2004).   64 
   
The national railway strike of 1922 nearly lead to the end of the fledgling 
community.  The city was a hotbed of union activism during the strike.  In retaliation, 
Las Vegas’s primary railroad operator at the time, the Union Pacific, moved most of 
its operations to the town of Caliente, about 125 miles to the east.  As a result of the 
Union Pacific moving its operations, the number of jobs in Las Vegas dwindled and 
the city’s residents began to move away (Land & Land, 2004). 
Las Vegas was saved by the construction of the Boulder Dam, now known as 
the Hoover Dam, about 30 miles from the city.  Construction on the dam began in 
1931, the same year that gambling became legal again in Nevada, and only two years 
before the end of Prohibition.  The coincidence of these events was especially 
fortuitous as entrepreneurs in the city began to build gambling halls catering to the 
estimated 5,000 workers who had migrated to southern Nevada in order to find 
employment on the dam project.  Although most of the workers did not live in Las 
Vegas, they traveled to the city to take advantage of the town’s bustling salons and 
gambling establishments.  They also traveled to Las Vegas because Boulder City, a 
city closer to the dam project where most of the workers lived, had strictly enforced 
laws against gambling and alcohol consumption.  By becoming the entertainment 
center for these workers, Las Vegas was once again able to thrive.  The effect of the 
Hoover Dam project on Las Vegas was so significant that the city continued to thrive 
even in the midst of the Great Depression (Land & Land, 2004). 
However, once the Hoover Dam project was completed and the workers 
moved away, Las Vegas again faced decline.  The city tried to sustain itself by 
advertising itself as the prime place to stay for tourists visiting the Hoover Dam and 
most of Las Vegas’s hotels offered gambling as an additional amenity for tourists 
visiting the dam.  During World War II the military spent nearly $25 million on 
military installations around the city, further contributing to the city’s economic 65 
   
livelihood.  The military continued to make large investments in the area throughout 
the cold war, becoming one of the city’s primary economic pillars, adding some 
diversity to the local economy (Land & Land, 2004). 
Las Vegas’s Golden Era 
Development along what is now known as the Las Vegas Strip began in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s.  Development began, because of a shortage of space in Las 
Vegas’s downtown commercial area.  Developers also preferred to build along what is 
now known as “the Strip” because it was located at the end of highway 91
10, the 
principal thoroughfare between Las Vegas and Southern California.  Therefore, 
visitors from southern California traveling to Las Vegas by car would come to hotels 
along the Strip first, giving these hotels a competitive advantage.  Development along 
the Strip began in the late 1930s; however, the initial hotel-casinos were similar to Las 
Vegas’s downtown gambling halls, not the casino-resorts which later made the Las 
Vegas Strip famous. The first resort-style casino in Las Vegas was the El Rancho, 
which opened in 1941.  The El Rancho was developed by Thomas Hull, who wanted 
his new Las Vegas casino to be similar to high-end hotels he owned in Fresno and 
elsewhere in California.  The El Rancho’s lush palm tree-shaded pool area and low 
bungalows differentiated it from the city’s typical gambling halls, which often still had 
sawdust floors.  The El Rancho was very successful, and it was followed a year later 
by the even fancier Last Frontier Hotel and Casino, which still stands today
11 (Land & 
Land, 2004). 
The Flamingo Hotel and Casino, which opened in 1945, was the first truly 
extravagant casino-resort in Las Vegas.  The original visionary behind the project was 
Billy Wilkerson, the founder of the Hollywood Reporter as well as the owner of three 
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Sunset Strip night clubs.  Wilkerson lacked sufficient financing to complete the hotel, 
and at that time most legitimate lenders and investors were unwilling to get involved 
in casino ventures.  Therefore, with these avenues of financing unavailable, Wilkerson 
reached out to contacts he had made in the organized crime world through his 
nightclub business.  Through his relationships with various mob figures, Wilkerson 
was able to win the backing of the infamously violent mobster Benjamin “Bugsy” 
Siegel.  At the time, Siegel as well as many other mob figures already owned shares in 
Las Vegas gambling halls, so it was not hard for Siegel to convince some of his mafia 
colleagues to invest in Wilkerson’s hotel (Denton, 2001). 
Siegel quickly took control of the development of the Flamingo, pushing 
Wilkerson to the sidelines.  Unfortunately, he did not have much experience as a 
developer, and the project was plagued by delays and cost overruns.  The Flamingo’s 
opening was a flop, and the casino initially failed to turn a profit.  Furthermore, 
rumors began to emerge about propertied financial improprieties related to the project.  
As result of these rumors and the Flamingo’s failure, Siegel’s relationship with his 
business partners soured.  Not long after the opening of the Flamingo, he was found 
dead in his house, a probable victim of a mob hit, although his case was never solved 
(Denton, 2001). 
Ironically, after Siegel’s death the Flamingo rapidly became the most 
successful casino in Las Vegas up to that point, and inspired the type of casino resorts 
that have made Las Vegas famous.  When the Flamingo’s tremendous success became 
apparent, it sparked a mafia-financed building boom along the Strip that continued 
unabated for the next 20 years.  Casinos built during this time include The 
Thunderbird, The Desert Inn, The Sahara, The Sands, The Riviera, The Dunes, The 
Moulin Rouge, The Hacienda, The Tropicana, and The Stardust (Land & Land, 2004). 
Over this same period, the population of the greater Las Vegas Metropolitan area 67 
   
mushroomed from 8,000 in 1940 to 269,000 in 1967.  The rise of Las Vegas as a 
gambling mecca was aided considerably by the rise of Castro in Cuba.  Prior to Castro, 
Cuba had been the leading gambling destination in the Western Hemisphere.  
However, when Castro came to power in Cuba, Americans could no longer travel 
there to gamble and began to visit Las Vegas instead (Rothman, 2002a). 
The Flamingo also provided the model for the predominant method of casino 
financing in Las Vegas for the next 20 years.  Mob figures who wanted to enter the 
Las Vegas gaming market would team up with less sordid local Las Vegans in order to 
develop and/or own a casino.  The mobsters brought financing into the relationship 
while the locals provided legitimacy.  The locals were the visible partners in the 
relationship and were the licensed operators, while the mob figures were unnamed 
partners and were not licensed (Rothman, 2002a, Land & Land, 2004).  
A number of factors contributed to the mob’s dominance in the Las Vegas 
gaming market.  First, the mafia had already gained a foothold in the gaming industry, 
because it ran illegal casinos in other parts of the United States, before casino-style 
gambling became legal again in Las Vegas (Land & Land, 2004).  Secondly, despite 
the fact that gaming was legal in Nevada, mainstream financial institutions would not 
invest in casino ventures because of the stigma attached to the industry; as a result 
casino developers had few choices other than the mob as a source of financing.  
Furthermore, other than military spending there was no source of revenue for southern 
Nevada at the time, so Las Vegas’s residents and political leaders were willing to look 
the other way when the mob began to invest in Las Vegas casinos.  This situation was 
compounded by the fact that Nevada had retained much of its permissive cultural and 
legal climate left over from its frontier days.  Finally, gaming regulations designed to 
clean up the industry were either ineffective or had effects opposite to their stated 
intent (Rothman, 2002a).  68 
   
As a prime example, after 1955 state regulations required that every 
stockholder of a gaming establishment be licensed by the state.  Although this was 
designed to prevent unnamed mobbed up investors from becoming involved in the Las 
Vegas gaming industry, it effectively prevented any large publicly held corporation 
from investing in the gaming market, because of the vast numbers of shareholders in 
these corporations.  The effect of this law became more pronounced as gambling’s 
stigma began to wear off in the 1960s, and thus legitimate investors became more 
willing to invest in casino ventures.  Therefore, casino developers were forced to rely 
on the mob as a primary source of financing (Rothman, 2002a).     
By the late 1950s developers began to design more lavish casinos with 
development costs that exceeded the financial means of the mob.  Since legitimate 
investors were blocked by either social mores or state gaming regulations, developers 
had to find alternative sources of revenue to finance their more lavish casino projects.  
The mobbed up casino operators began to rely on the Teamsters Pension Fund as an 
additional source of revenue for their projects (Rothman, 2002a).  Mobbed up casino 
operator Moe Dalitz, who was a longtime friend and associate of Teamsters leader 
Jimmy Hoffa, is generally credited with the idea of using Teamster pension fund 
money to finance casino development.  Dalitz and Hoffa had become friends decades 
earlier, when Dalitz owned a number of laundry businesses in the Detroit area whose 
drivers were represented by the Teamsters Union.  The use of Teamsters Pension fund 
money led to newer and more lavish casino resorts along the strip such as Caesar’s 
Palace, which cost $16 million to build.  By 1966 the Teamsters Pension Fund was the 
largest source of revenue for casino developers in Las Vegas (Denton, 2001, Rothman, 
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Corporatization of Las Vegas 
As the 1960s progressed, more mainstream financial institutions began to take 
an interest in Las Vegas’s gaming industry.  This lead to what is commonly known as 
the corporatization of Las Vegas, as hospitality corporations and mainstream financial 
institutions replaced the mob and the Teamsters as the primary players in Las Vegas’s 
casino industry.  Five factors contributed to the decline of the mob and the rise of 
corporate power in Las Vegas’s Gaming Industry.  The first was the arrival of Howard 
Hughes in Las Vegas.  Hughes became the first truly legitimate major investor to enter 
Las Vegas’s gaming market when he bought the Desert Inn in 1966.  He soon 
followed this first purchase with a buying spree that included Castaways, the Frontier, 
the Landmark, the Sands and the Silver Slipper.  At one point Hughes controlled one-
seventh of Nevada’s gaming revenue.  The expansion of Hughes’s gaming empire was 
only halted by an anti-trust lawsuit.  Hughes’s company was able to get around 
Nevada’s gaming regulations concerning shareholders because Hughes was the sole 
owner of his company. Furthermore, a man of Hughes’s stature had little trouble 
manipulating the state’s minimal bureaucracy in his favor.  Finally, unlike most 
previous Las Vegas casino investors, Hughes had no public association with organized 
crime (Denton, 2001, Rothman, 2002a, Land & Land, 2004).   
Hughes undermined mob control of Las Vegas in a number of ways.  First, 
Hughes’s public stature helped to reduce the already declining stigma attached to Las 
Vegas’s casino industry and the gaming industry in general.  Furthermore, his 
financial resources greatly exceeded those of the mob or the Teamsters pension fund.  
This allowed Hughes to create lavish gaming attractions with which the mafia or 
Teamsters financed casinos simply could not compete (Rothman, 2002a, Land & 
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By the time Hughes took an interest in Las Vegas, the casino industry was 
already gaining acceptance in popular American culture.  By the 1960s Las Vegas 
became the subject of several major movies and TV shows.  The public began to 
associate Las Vegas with popular entertainers like the Rat Pack and fictional 
characters such as James Bond, rather than unscrupulous mob personalities such as 
Bugsy Siegel and Meyer Lansky.  Hughes helped this process along, and soon other 
major legitimate interests began to invest heavily in Las Vegas (Denton, 2001, 
Rothman, 2002a, Land & Land, 2004). 
The Hilton Corporation entered the Las Vegas Casino Industry in 1970 with 
the purchases of the Flamingo and International casinos.  Hilton enjoyed enormous 
success in Las Vegas, and by 1976, 43% of its total gross revenue was coming from its 
Las Vegas operations.  Seeing Hilton’s success, the Holiday Inn and Ramada soon 
also entered Las Vegas’s casino industry.  This influx of corporate investment was 
facilitated by the elimination of the state requirement that every shareholder in a 
gaming venture pass a Gaming Control Board background check.  This meant that 
corporate investors were able to enter the local gaming industry, flooding it with 
unprecedented amounts of money.  The financial resources of mainstream investors 
were much larger than those of the mob, making it hard for the mafia-controlled 
casinos to compete with their more lavish corporate-owned counterparts.  The mob 
was largely overwhelmed by the wealth of the corporate investors that were entering 
the Las Vegas casino industry and lacked the resources to compete.  By 1980 
Nevada’s top five gaming entities, Harrah’s, Del Webb, MGM, Hilton, and Caesar’s 
World, were all publicly traded corporations (Denton, 2001, Rothman, 2002a, Land & 
Land, 2004). 
With legitimate sources of funding now available for casino development, 
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sought to operate in the city.  For example, the Nevada Gaming Control Board began 
to crack down on the mafia’s practice of using legitimate front men to mask their 
involvement in various casino interests.  By 1985 mob control of Las Vegas’s casino 
industry was largely a thing of the past.  The population of Las Vegas continued to 
grow dramatically throughout 1960s and 1970s.  By 1980 the population of Clark 
County was 463,087, nearly twice as much as it had been 13 years earlier in 1967.  
(Smith, 1995, Rothman, 2002a).   
Las Vegas Gaming Industry in Decline 
The casino industry in Las Vegas began to stagnate in the 1980s.  Revenues in 
the industry actually declined for most of the first half of the decade.  There were a 
number of reasons for this decline.  First was the recession that hit the United States in 
the early 1980s, which dramatically cut into discretionary income.  Secondly, many of 
the new casinos that opened in the late 1970s and 1980s failed to capture the public 
imagination in the way earlier casino openings had.  Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 
into the 1970s each new casino became the hottest and trendiest gaming property in 
town—that is, until the next casino along the Strip had its grand opening.  The new 
casinos that opened along the strip in the late 1970s and early 1980s failed to continue 
this pattern and generally opened to lackluster reviews.  Right from their opening 
these newer casinos were overshadowed by their predecessors like Caesar’s Palace.   
The legalization of casino-style gambling in Atlantic City also contributed to 
the failure of newer Las Vegas casinos to capture the popular imagination.  Atlantic 
City was more convenient for gamblers from east coast population centers, and its 
casino openings stole the spotlight from those in Las Vegas.  In many ways Atlantic 
City began to be seen as the trendy place to gamble, and Las Vegas was considered to 
be old and passé.  A major fire at the MGM casino in 1980 that killed 85 people and 
injured hundreds, as well as a 60-day city-wide casino strike in 1984, with images of 72 
   
thousands of striking workers getting tear gassed and arrested along the Strip 
broadcast all over the country, only served to further sully Las Vegas’s image with the 
public (Hopkins, 2004b).  
Mirage Phase Las Vegas 
After this period of stagnation in the 1980s, a casino entrepreneur Steve Wynn 
breathed new life into Las Vegas’s casino industry.  Starting in 1989, Steve Wynn, 
followed by other casino operators, began to build new massive gaming resorts along 
the Strip.  These new casinos exceeded all previous establishments in terms of size, 
extravagance, and amenities offered to the guests.  This era, which began in 1989 with 
the opening of the Mirage Hotel and Casino and continued through 2000, is known as 
the Mirage phase (Rothman, 2002a).  The Mirage casino is a prime example of the 
kinds of attractions these new casinos offered in addition to gaming activities and 
traditional Las Vegas shows.  The Mirage featured a large volcano that exploded 
hourly, Siegfried and Roy and their famed white tigers, a large dolphin tank, and the 
renowned nouvelle circus, Cirque du Soliel (Hopkins, 2004b). Not only did Steve 
Wynn create innovative casino attractions, he also was a pioneer in casino financing.  
Realizing that it would be difficult to finance his highly expensive projects through 
traditional means,
12 Wynn turned to high-yield junk bonds.  As a result, in the late 80s 
and 1990s Drexel Burnham Lambert became the dominant financial force in the 
industry (Rothman, 2004a). 
Soon after work began on the Mirage, other major casino operators in Las 
Vegas, in order to remain competitive, launched plans to develop Mirage-style casinos 
of their own and/or substantially renovate their existing properties.  These new casinos 
included Treasure Island, Excalibur, The Venetian, Paris, New York - New York, The 
                                                 
12 The Mirage cost $630 million to build, $500 million more than any other previous casino in Las 
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MGM Grand, The Luxor, Mandalay Bay, and the Stratosphere amongst others.  Other 
casinos such as Caesar’s Palace and Circus-Circus went through extensive renovations 
that added more space for gambling, introduced new types of games, made the casinos 
more extravagant, and added elaborate non-gaming attractions (Hopkins, 2004b, Land 
& Land, 2004).  Altogether in the ten years after the Mirage opened, 11 major resorts 
were built along the Las Vegas Strip (Rothman, 2002a).  Furthermore, Las Vegas 
added 84,286 hotel and casino jobs in the period between 1989 and 2000, almost 
doubling its employment in this sector (Land & Land, 2004).  
A significant feature of these new casinos is that they offered a wide array of 
entertainment options to visitors other than gaming.  For example, the Excalibur 
features live jousting, the Bellagio and the Venetian feature art museums, and several 
casinos built extensive shopping malls.  Another significant feature of the Mirage-
phase casinos was their theming.  All of the Mirage-phase casinos were built around 
particular themes such as the Excalibur Casino, which is designed around a medieval 
theme, and the Paris casino, which recreated many of the sites of the city from which 
it takes its name.  This theming and the developing of non-gaming attractions was part 
of casino operators’ efforts to make Las Vegas more palatable to families and 
mainstream America (Hopkins, 2004, Land & Land, 2004).  Although Las Vegas did 
become a popular tourist destination with mainstream America to a degree it never had 
previously, its appeal as family vacation spot remained limited  (Littlejohn 1999). 
Other Strip casino operators who did not have the financial resources to either 
open new Mirage-style casinos or substantially renovate their existing properties were 
began to focus on budget-minded tourists.  Most Strip operators were successfully able 
to make this transition, causing downtown operators to lose a substantial portion of 
their consumer base.  Downtown casino operators also had to deal with the 
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off a large amount of the downtown’s local consumer base as well.  These changes 
further contributed to Las Vegas’s already declining downtown (Alexander, 2002, 
Rothman, 2002a, Land & Land, 2004). 
The Mirage-phase casinos caught on with the American public, and by the 
early 1990s Las Vegas had clearly surpassed Atlantic City as the prime gaming center 
in the United States.  The numbers of visitors to Las Vegas mushroomed, and casino 
operators had no trouble filling all their new hotel rooms.  This growth in the industry 
was aided significantly by the booming economy of the 1990s (Hopkins, 2004, Land 
& Land, 2004). 
The city’s growing casino industry created enormous demand for new workers, 
causing Las Vegas’s population to explode.  The population of Clark County increased 
from an estimated 691,467 in 1989 to 1,375,765 in 2000.  In the period between 1986 
and 2001, Las Vegas was the fastest growing metropolitan area in the United States. 
Furthermore, as the stigma attached to gambling receded, so did the stigma attached to 
Las Vegas.  This lead to non-gaming employers such as CitiCorp, Ocean Spray 
Cranberries and Ethel M Chocolates to move in to the area, creating a more diverse 
economic base for Las Vegas.   
Present-Day Las Vegas 
Since the 1990s Las Vegas has gone through numerous changes, but the casino 
industry has continued to thrive.  The only time the industry appeared to struggle was 
right after 9/11.  In March of 2000 the MGM staged a surprise, unfriendly takeover of 
Steve Wynn’s Mirage Resorts.  This left Steve Wynn with no properties along the 
Strip, effectively signaling the end of an era in Las Vegas.   
William Bennett was another influential Las Vegas casino operator who left 
the industry during this period.  Bennent was forced out of his Circus-Circus 
Enterprises in 1994.  Although he retained one property, the Sahara, which he 75 
   
controlled until his death in 2002, with the loss of Circus-Circus Enterprises Bennent 
was no longer a major force in Las Vegas’s gaming industry.  William Bennett was 
notable because he pioneered the idea that Las Vegas could be a family destination.  
As far back as 1968, when he built Circus-Circus, Bennett was trying to build casinos 
which catered to the needs of families.  The absence of both William Bennett and 
Steve Wynn from the gambling industry is also notable because both placed a high 
value on establishing a cooperative relationship with the Culinary Workers Union and 
signed contracts with the union after which the other casino operators loosely 
patterned their contracts (Rothman, 2002a, Land & Land, 2004). 
The marketing strategies of the major casino operators along the Strip were 
also changing.  Instead of focusing on family-orientated entertainment, many of the 
new casinos along the strip began adopt more of a Disneyland-for-adults theme, 
perhaps best characterized by the new official motto for Las Vegas: “What happens in 
Vegas stays in Vegas.”  Newer casinos such as the Palms and the Hard Rock Café 
focused on attracting young and hip consumers, rather than families (Land & Land, 
2004) 
Although the casino industry in Las Vegas continued to thrive in spite of the 
recession in the early part of this decade, it did suffer a dramatic if relatively short-
term fallout from the 9/11 attacks.  Although hotel occupancy rebounded after only a 
couple of months, room rates stayed depressed well into 2003.  The attacks led to 
widespread lay-offs in Las Vegas’s casino industry, as interest in tourism disappeared 
almost overnight.  At the peak of the crisis about 30,000 casino employees had lost 
their jobs, and even more had their hours cut back so that they were only working part-
time.  These layoffs, compounded by the falloff in tourism following September 11
th, 
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heavily dependent on the spending of both tourists and casino workers (Rothman, 
2002b). 
A year after the 9/11 attacks, however, the casino industry was back in full 
gear and was clearly in expansionary mode (Rothman, 2002b).  Several new casinos 
are under construction along the Strip.  Steve Wynn has reentered Las Vegas’s Casino 
Industry with his new casino, which he named after himself.  Several other casinos are 
undergoing substantial renovations and/or expansion.  Furthermore, the primary 
neighborhood casino chains, Stations and Coast, have continued to thrive.  In contrast, 
the casino industry in downtown Las Vegas is still in decline, with no hope of 
recovery on the horizon (Pappageorge, 2005) 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief background and history of the Las Vegas gaming 
industry, and the environment in which the 2002 negotiations took place.  As will be 
discussed in the following chapters this environment had a profound influence on the 
Culinary Union’s strategic choices and their outcomes in the 2002 contract 
negotiations.  However, it is important to take into account the local’s internal as well 
as external environment when discussing the influence of context in the 2002 
negotiations.  As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the Culinary Union’s 
internal environment consists of its history, culture, structure, skills, resources, and 
long-term practices.  These factors all have had a profound impact on the union’s 
choice of strategies and the effectiveness of those strategies in the 2002 negotiations.  
The next chapter will discuss the history of the Culinary Union, and the union’s 
internal practices and strategies in the years leading up to the negotiations.  It will also 
discuss the bargaining environment’s influence on the negotiations themselves.   
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Chapter V: Culinary Workers Union Local 226 – History and 
Context 
Introduction 
This chapter chronicles the history of the Culinary Union from its beginning in 
the 1930s through the beginning of the Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign.  It 
will describe how the Culinary Union developed the internal capacity to launch its 
ambitious 2002 contract campaign.  The union’s rank-and-file mobilization capability 
was the key to its success in the 2002 contract negotiations.  In the years prior to the 
2002 contract campaign the Culinary Union pursued several long-term practices and 
strategies that increased its rank-and-file leadership skills, developed strong 
communication networks between union leaders, staff, and members, cultivated 
member commitment to the union, and created a culture which encouraged rank-and-
file participation in the union.  This chapter will describe how current culture, 
practices, and strategies of the Culinary Union came into being as well as the historical 
development of the local overall.  In so doing this chapter will look at the Culinary 
Union’s contract administration, contract negotiation, external organizing, and 
political activities, examining how they both complemented and undermined each 
other throughout the history of the Culinary Union.   
Beginning in the late 1980s the Culinary Union went through a comprehensive 
revitalization process that encompassed its contract administration, contract 
negotiation, external organizing, and political activities.  This revitalization process 
did not occur in each area of union activity separately; rather revitalization in one 
sphere of activity helped to reinforce the revitalization process in others.  The Culinary 
Union recognized these relationships and pursued a strategy during this era that took 
advantage of the mutually reinforcing nature of these linkages.  This revitalization 
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major contributing factors to the effectiveness of the local’s 2002 comprehensive 
contract campaign.  The final section of this will focus on the relatively recent 
revitalization of the Culinary Union and its influence on the 2002 round of contract 
negotiations. 
History of the Culinary Union through the 1980s 
Early History 
The Culinary Union’s roots date back to the 1930s when HERE began 
organizing hotels nationwide as part of the surge in industrial unionism that took place 
during the New Deal (Cobble & Merrill, 1994, Rothman, 2002).  The local was 
chartered by HERE in 1938 with a membership of between 500 and 1,000 workers 
(Culinary Union, 2002).  The union remained small and only became influential after 
World War II, when HERE’s international office sent Elmer “Al” Bramlet to Las 
Vegas to help build the local (Rothman, 2002a). 
Bramlet was born on a farm near Jonesboro, Arkansas.  He came from a 
poverty-stricken southern farming family.  The family’s already poor economic 
situation was made worse by the Great Depression, and as a result Bramlet left home 
and traveled about the country working menial odd jobs.  He served in the Navy 
during World War II and was discharged from the Navy in Los Angeles, where he 
found work as a bartender.  There he joined an HERE-affiliated bartender’s local and 
soon became a business agent.  After working as a business agent for a couple of years 
in Los Angeles, the international office of HERE sent him to Las Vegas to help build 
the local; it was then an emerging tourist destination. (Rothman 2002a) 
Bramlet built the Culinary Union from the ground up, organizing workers 
already in Las Vegas and traveling around the country recruiting individuals to work 
in Las Vegas’s casinos.  Las Vegas at the time was still a small and isolated city that 79 
   
was incapable of generating a sufficient workforce for its burgeoning gaming industry.  
Facing a severe labor shortage, casino operators allowed the Culinary Union into their 
casinos as long as the local was able to furnish operators with a steady supply of 
qualified workers.  Bramlet would spend months on the road, recruiting workers for 
Las Vegas’s casinos.  He would mainly recruit young people in the south on anperson-
by-person basis.  Since he came from a poor southern background himself, he was 
very successful in convincing these types of people to move to Las Vegas to work in 
its casinos (Rothman, 2002a).   
Casino operators generally hired their workers from the Culinary Union’s 
hiring hall, meaning that in addition to providing the casino operators with a labor 
force the Culinary Union also screened applicants for casino jobs.  This system 
granted the Culinary Union a great deal of power in Las Vegas’s gaming industry.  
This was one of the primary reasons why casino operators did not oppose Culinary 
Union organizing at their properties (Benz, 2004, Rothman, 2002).   
With the support of all the members he helped bring to Las Vegas, Bramlet 
was elected to the Culinary Union’s most powerful position, secretary-treasurer, in 
1954.  Bramlet’s leadership style was autocratic, and he maintained an iron discipline 
within the local through a combination of charisma and intimidation (Rothman, 
2002a).  He played favorites and cultivated a dedicated cadre around him, ensuring 
their allegiance with money, power, and in some cases a share of the spoils in other 
businesses he ran on the side
13 (Rothman, 2002a).  Bramlet also cultivated support 
amongst African-American members by negotiating contractual provisions that were 
favorable to occupations where they predominated (Rothman, 2002a).  
                                                 
13 In addition to serving as Secretary-Treasurer of the Culinary Union, Bramlet maintained several 
business interests that primarily catered to the casinos with which the local had contracts (Hopkins 
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Bramlet did not use a negotiating team when negotiating a contract and instead 
met with casino owners himself.  The owners themselves often came from working 
class backgrounds and enjoyed a good rapport with Bramlet in negotiations. Signed 
contracts were rarely used in these negotiations, just “understandings sealed with a 
hand shake” (Rothman, 2002a).  So interpersonal relationships played an important 
role in determining collective bargaining outcomes in Las Vegas’s gaming industry 
during this period.  The terms Bramlet negotiated were considered to be the best in the 
industry and were often used as models by other HERE locals across the country 
(Rothman, 2002a). 
One of the key provisions in all of Bramlet’s contracts was a guaranteed 
minimum gratuity for all customers in order to help tipped workers’ problems with 
highly variable pay (Rothman, 2002a).  Another important provision gave Banquet 
waiters a cut of the highly lucrative banquet profits. (Rothman, 2002a). Also included 
in the contracts were firm work rules.  These were important because the unskilled 
nature of most casino work made it easy for casino employers to increase the 
workload of casino employees (Rothman, 2002a).  These favorable contract provisions 
created a strong sense of loyalty among Culinary Union members for Bramlet.  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Culinary Union thrived under Bramlet. 
When Bramlet became secretary-treasurer of the Culinary Union in 1954, its 
membership was 2,000; by 1963 the union had 8,000 members (Hopkins, 1999), and 
by 1967 membership was up to 16,000 (Rothman, 2002).  In 1963, Jude Wanniski, a 
columnist for the Las Vegas Review-Journal at the time, estimated that union density 
in Las Vegas’s casino industry was 98% in occupations traditionally represented by 
the Culinary Workers Union (Hopkins, 2004a).   81 
   
Corporatization of Las Vegas 
The corporate takeover of the Las Vegas gaming industry signaled a shift in 
labor management relations.  The management philosophy of corporate casino owners 
was very different from that of the mafia-linked operators, leading to a more 
acrimonious relationship with the Culinary Union.  For example, while mafia owners 
treated much of the non-gaming functions of their operations as loss leaders, the new 
corporate owners focused on making each sector of the casino profitable (Rothman, 
2002a).  Furthermore, the informal and familiar relationship between casino operators 
and Bramlet was replaced by a much harder-edged and legalistic relationship.  No 
longer were contracts settled with a handshake, and increasingly written formalized 
contracts became the norm.  The new corporate casino operators did not have the kind 
of paternalistic goodwill towards their workers that their mobbed up predecessors had.  
This led to a common attitude amongst veteran casino employees and industry 
observers that the mob bosses treated casino employees much better than the corporate 
owners that followed them (Benz, 2004).   
Therefore, the dawn of the corporate era in Las Vegas was marked by the local 
gaming industry’s first strikes.  In 1967, the Culinary Union went out on its first strike, 
shutting down twelve downtown hotels before a contract was reached.  Unable to 
reach an agreement in the following round of negotiations in 1970, the Culinary Union 
struck three Strip properties: the Las Vegas Hilton, the Desert Inn, and Caesar’s Palace 
(Hopkins, 1999).  These casinos incurred significant losses as a result of the strike.  
Eventually the union forced the casino operators to settle on their terms, and the four-
day strike lead to wage and benefit increases amounting to 31.5 percent over three 
years.  The losses the casino operators incurred from the strike dampened the casino 
operators’ appetite for taking on the Culinary Union, and in the next round of 
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However, when the next contract expired in 1976 the Culinary Union was unable to 
reach an agreement with the casino operators, so it struck over wage increases and the 
terms of the no-strike, no-lockout clause in their contract.  In this first city-wide strike 
in the history of Las Vegas’s gaming industry, the Culinary joined the Musicians 
Union and the Teamsters, striking 15 resorts for 15 days.  Eventually, the two sides 
settled, with management largely conceding to the union’s wage and other demands 
(Rothman, 2002a) 
Death of Al Bramlet and decline of the Culinary Union 
Al Bramlet was murdered in 1977.  The murder was never solved but had all 
the characteristics of a mob hit.  Bramlet’s death came as part of a spike in mob 
violence in Las Vegas resulting from a mafia attempt to maintain its power base in the 
city in the face of growing corporate dominance in the local gaming industry 
(Rothman, 2002a).  Furthermore, Bramlet had created a sense of resentment in the 
HERE international office by preserving the independence of the Culinary Union.  
When Ed Hanley became president of HERE in 1973, one of his major goals was 
centralizing the union’s local health and welfare fund, under control of the 
international.  Hanley was known to have connections to organized crime, especially 
to the mob in Chicago, which also had a big stake in Las Vegas’s casino industry.  
Bramlet’s resistance to efforts to merge the Culinary Union’s health and welfare fund 
with international’s created much resentment in Hanley’s new administration 
(Hopkins, 2004).  Either or both of these factors are probably responsible for 
Bramlet’s murder.  At the time of Bramlet’s death, Culinary Union membership was 
between 20,000 and 30,000 (Rothman, 2002a). 
Ben Schmoutey was Bramlet’s first successor.  Schmoutey came up through 
the rank-and-file and was a former fry cook.  He lacked Bramlet’s leadership ability 
and charisma.  Specifically, Schmoutey had little negotiating experience or skill.  83 
   
Furthermore, he was linked to organized crime and therefore was dogged by legal 
troubles, which began to tarnish the reputation of the Culinary Union in general 
(Rothman, 2002a). 
Under Schmoutey’s leadership the Strip’s first non-union casino, the Imperial 
Palace, opened in 1979.  The union put up minimal resistance to this new casino.  This 
created a great deal of consternation amongst the Culinary Union’s members.  
Furthermore, during Schmoutey’s tenure the Culinary Union’s leadership and staff 
became increasingly inaccessible to the members, further alienating the rank-and-file.  
In 1980, the Culinary Union negotiated a contract that included a no strike pledge that 
violated the agreement the union had with other unions to honor each others’ picket 
lines.  This ended any solidarity efforts between the Culinary Union and other unions 
representing workers in Las Vegas’s casinos (Rothman, 2002a). 
In 1981, Jeff McColl beat Schmoutey handily in a union election that featured 
mob goons harassing and intimidating McColl supporters as they went to vote.  
Although he was not linked to the mafia, McColl proved to be no more of an effective 
a leader than Schmoutey.  Support for the union continued to decline during McColl’s 
administration, and it allowed Culinary Union membership to decline to below 20,000, 
down 20% from when Bramlet was killed (Rothman, 2002a). 
1984 Strike 
The Culinary Union reached its nadir in 1984 when Las Vegas casino 
operators provoked a strike in the hope of winning significant concessions from the 
union or breaking it outright.  Taking advantage of the Culinary Union’s weakened 
position and the anti-union atmosphere that prevailed in the country during the 1980s, 
the Nevada Resort Association (NRA), an association of corporate Las Vegas casino 
operators, decided to take an aggressive approach in the negotiations.  The NRA 
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their fight.  However, as tensions rose during the negotiations and a strike seemed 
imminent, some of these private casino operators decided to settle with the union, 
rather than follow the casino operators’ lead in provoking a fight with the Culinary 
Union (Rothman, 2002a, Alexander, 2002).  
In the negotiations leading up to the strike, The NRA insisted on several 
concessionary demands that were unacceptable to the union.  These demands included 
rescinding many of the work rules that protected workers from excessive workloads, 
giving the NRA control over the union’s health plan, elimination of the 40-hour 
workweek, and reduced guaranteed gratuities (Alexander, 2002, Rothman, 2002a). 
Without strong support of the rank-and-file, McColl was in a difficult position.  
Accepting the NRA’s terms would be a complete defeat for the union, significantly 
lowering its members’ standard of living.  However, McColl was not sure if he had 
enough support within the union to pull off a successful strike.  Furthermore, in the 
current anti-union political climate the Culinary Union risked decertification if the 
strike lasted for more than a year.  Forced into a corner, McColl chose to fight, so 
tensions mounted throughout the negotiations until the union called a strike on April 
2
nd, 1984 (Rothman, 2002a). 
Casino operators got an injunction that placed strict restrictions on the union 
members’ ability to picket.  In addition, casino operators hired police officers to stand 
guard outside their casinos.  Tensions between striking workers and the police 
escalated quickly, and soon violent confrontations broke-out.  Roughly nine hundred 
demonstrators were arrested, and the police used tear gas on the strikers.  Images of 
the police tear-gassing and beating strikers were broadcast across America, creating a 
public relations disaster for the gaming industry, which was trying to improve its 
image after several high-profile cases drawing attention to the mob’s remaining 
influence in the local industry.  These images caused travelers to avoid Las Vegas, not 85 
   
wanting a labor conflict to ruin their vacations.  The strike lasted 67 days and cost the 
local gaming industry $60 million in lost revenue.  Business fell off by 9.6 percent on 
the Strip and 10.3 percent downtown in the first month of the walkout.  Furthermore, 
the bad publicity created by the strike undermined casino operators’ lobbying efforts 
to get casino-style gaming legalized outside of Las Vegas and Atlantic City 
(Alexander, 2002, Rothman, 2002a).   
These factors forced casino operators to compromise and settle with the union 
after two months.  This strike demonstrated to corporate casino operators that strikes 
are still an effective weapon in their industry, even as the effectiveness of the tactic 
became highly questionable in most other sectors in the United States.  The strike with 
the corporate casino operators was settled in June 1984, and provided for a five-year 
contract with small increases in wages and contributions to the health insurance fund 
and an 80% new hire rate for the first year of employment.  Although the Culinary 
Union avoided disaster in the strike, the contract they eventually signed was 
considered by most to be weak, and a precursor to the local’s further decline. 
(Alexander, 2002, Rothman, 2002a, Benz 2004). 
However, a few privately owned casinos who had joined the NRA in 
provoking the strike opted not to settle with the Culinary Union.  These private casinos 
were not as vulnerable to the pressures that led the corporate casinos to settle with the 
union.  Privately-run casinos did not have to answer to the concerns of investors who 
worried over lost revenue over a relatively short-time period.  Secondly, privately 
owned casinos were not trying to expand into jurisdictions where casino-style 
gambling was then prohibited (Alexander, 2002).  Unaffected by these factors, these 
private operators, lead by the Boyd Group, decided to continue the fight.  Eventually 
they were able to decertify the union at six locations:  Sam’s Town, The California, 
(Both operated by the Boyd Group), the Four Queens, The Marina, The Holiday Inn 86 
   
South (currently the Boardwalk), and the Holiday Inn International, which later 
became Main Street Station (Alexander, 2002, Rothman, 2002a). 
Seeing the success that these casino operators had had breaking the union, 
several other privately run casinos, who had previously settled with the union, began 
to renege on their contracts.  The most prominent in this group was long-time casino 
operator Jackie Gaughan, who owned the El Cortez and the Western.  The operators of 
the Union Plaza, the Las Vegas Club, the Golden Gate, and the Showboat followed 
Gaughan’s lead and froze wages and ignored contract-mandated increases in health 
insurance payments.  This issue provoked another long battle with the Culinary Union, 
which extended over the next couple of years. 
Overall, the 1984 strike was costly for the Culinary Union, and many industry 
experts thought it signaled the beginning of the end for the local.  Although Local 226 
had withstood most employers’ attempts to win significant contract concessions or 
bust the union outright, the union lost six hotels, and several family operators were 
openly refusing to live up to the newly signed contract.  Many gaming industry experts 
expected the union to capitulate completely in the next round of negotiations 
(Alexander, 2002). 
Revitalization of the Culinary Union 
After the brutal citywide strike of 1984, the Culinary Union took stock of its 
current situation and embarked upon an ambitious revitalization strategy.  The 
beginnings of the Culinary Union’s revitalization efforts date back to 1987, when Jim 
Arnold was elected secretary-treasurer of the local.  Jim Arnold is a native of Las 
Vegas and spent most of his life in the Culinary Union.  He grew up in a union family; 
his father was a unionized construction worker.  Arnold began work in the casino 
industry as a houseman, picking up and delivering laundry for the Las Vegas Sands.  
He became a shop steward and then a union rep in 1974.  He was generally considered 87 
   
to be in Bramlet’s inner circle (Lampros, 1999).  In order to help the Culinary Union’s 
revitalization efforts, in 1987 the international sent a team of highly regarded 
organizers, several of whom had played a leading role in the 1984 strike.  These 
organizers began to build a rank-and-file organizing committees in each of the casinos.  
The union tried to make these committees as reflective of the membership as possible, 
in terms of gender, ethnicity, race, occupation, and shift.  Members of these 
committees participated in the union’s decision making process, attended negotiations, 
kept their co-workers informed about union affairs, and mobilized their co-workers 
around workplace issues (Alexander, 2002). 
Mopping up after the 1984 Strike 
In December of 1987, just as the internal organizing process was getting 
underway, a federal judge ordered the privately owned casino operators who had 
reneged on their contract with the Culinary Union to begin to honor their contracts and 
pay millions of dollars in back wages and benefits.  The downtown casinos continued 
to appeal this decision.  This ruling jump-started the union’s campaign to make these 
casinos live up to their contracts, starting a battle with downtown casinos that would 
climax with the 1989 contract negotiations. 
In the spring of 1988 union members picketed the privately owned casinos that 
were not complying with their contracts, delivered petitions to management, and 
publicized their disputes to tour groups and travel agencies.  The union also began to 
utilize corporate campaign tactics against these casino operators.  In one case, the 
union was almost able to defeat a poison pill measure that prevented a pro-union 
operator from taking over the Showboat Casino.  The Culinary Union also distributed 
videos telling the story of a federal indictment for racketeering charges against 
Binion’s Horseshoe, making it difficult for the casino to get a license to operate 
casinos in jurisdictions outside of Las Vegas (Alexander 2002). 88 
   
The next big flareup in the conflict occurred when the privately owned 
Binion’s Horseshoe illegally fired the bargaining committee after the committee 
opposed the casino’s contract offer.  On Jan 19
th 1990, after filing numerous ULPs, the 
union struck the casino.  The casino’s founder, Benny Binion, had just died and his 
son had inherited the casino. Benny Binion was a local legend and was very politically 
connected; in addition, he inspired a strong loyalty from his clientele which was only 
heightened after his death.  Furthermore, the casino was one of downtown’s few 
thriving properties.  Nevertheless, after months of picketing consumers began to go 
elsewhere, especially locals who were drawn away by the emerging neighborhood 
casinos. Overall it was estimated that the strike cost Binion’s Horseshoe $16 million, 
and the casino settled with the union in November, 1990. 
With the Binion’s Horseshoe strike settled, the Culinary Union began to focus 
on the Boyd Group.  In 1985, federal regulators gave control of Stardust and the 
Fremont Hotel to the Boyd Group after their former owners were found to have 
connections to organized crime.  Both of these properties employed Culinary Union 
members and therefore the Boyd Group went on the offensive against the union.  In 
response, the union began to build up its rank-and-file committees in those casinos.  
The union discovered the company was highly leveraged and its profits were 
decreasing, so it developed a relationship with the company’s lenders and through this 
relationship put pressure on the company.  As a result of these pressure tactics the 
Boyd Group eventually decided to settle with the union.   
Furthermore, because the downtown casinos are located so close together, the 
Boyd Group, concerned that the effects of a strike against one of the other downtown 
operators would spill over to its own properties, corralled the other remaining 
downtown casino operators into settling with the union.  The settlement with the Boyd 
Group wrapped up the final loose ends remaining from the 1984 strike, marking the 89 
   
end of an era for the Culinary Union.  This meant that by the beginning of the 1990s 
the union had successfully warded off the most serious threat to its existence in its 
history.  It also enabled the union to concentrate its efforts on maintaining its density 
during the rapid growth of the casino industry along the Strip that was about to take 
place over the next decade. 
Obtaining Card-Check Neutrality along the Strip 
During the 1990s the membership of the Culinary more than doubled.  This 
was largely the result of the expansion of the casino industry along the Las Vegas 
Strip during the 1990s, and the card-check-neutrality language that was included in all 
of the Culinary Union’s contracts with most of the major Strip casino operators.  The 
local first negotiated this language in 1989, and it covered any new property opened 
by most of the major casino operators during the length of the contract.  This contract 
language was rolled over into subsequent contracts the Culinary Union had with the 
major Strip operators as well as later added to the contracts the Culinary Union held 
with all the other Las Vegas Casino operators.   
There were a number of factors that contributed to the Culinary Union’s ability 
to obtain such favorable terms in its labor contracts.  These factors were the result of 
changes that were taking place in the late 1980s in the gaming industry as well as the 
revitalization process the Culinary Union was going through at the time.  The result of 
these factors was that going into the 1989 negotiations, the Culinary enjoyed a greater 
degree of leverage over the casino operators, particularly the major Strip operators.  
Recognizing these factors, the Culinary Union and Golden Nugget, Inc., which 
was owned by Steve Wynn, settled on a contract whereby the Golden Nugget Inc. 
agreed not to oppose union organization at its future strip properties and to recognize 
the Culinary Union once 50% plus one of its employees within a bargaining unit had 
signed union cards.  In return the Culinary Union agreed to: not take economic action 90 
   
against the company for the period of the contract, use its lobbying power on behalf of 
the gaming industry, reduce the number of job categories in the contract, and forgo 
some increases in compensation the union would have otherwise have received.  This 
contract set the standard for most of the other major Strip casino operators: Circus-
Circus, Caesar’s Palace, the Las Vegas and Flamingo Hilton, The Tropicana, and 
Bally’s
14 (Alexander, 2002, Rothman, 2002a, Pappageorge 2003, Greenhouse, 2004).  
There were a number of factors that led the major Strip casino operators to 
pursue a much more conciliatory strategy in the 1989 round of contract negotiations 
than they had in 1984.  First, casino operators faced a very tight labor market at the 
end of 1980s.  Rapid expansion of the casino industry in Las Vegas at the time, 
particularly at the higher end of the market, meant that there was a dramatic increase 
in the demand for qualified workers.  However, Las Vegas was still too small and 
isolated to provide a sufficient workforce for these casinos.  These factors placed a 
premium on workers in Las Vegas that were qualified to work in the higher-end 
casinos.  This meant that it would be hard for casinos to recruit a sufficient number of 
qualified replacement workers if the 1989 negotiations ended in a strike or lockout.  
Furthermore, as a result of this shortage of labor, casino operators became more reliant 
on the Culinary Union’s traditional role of recruiting and screening potential 
employees for Las Vegas’s casinos, and this gave casino operators another incentive to 
develop a constructive relationship with the Culinary Union (Rothman, 2002a). 
Secondly, even before the expansion, the Culinary Union already represented a 
large majority of casino workers in Las Vegas, which gave it a significant amount of 
leverage in the industry.  This greatly enhanced the union’s ability to engage in 
collective action against casino operators and made the operators fearful of the effects 
of poor labor relations on service quality in their casinos.  Service quality is very 
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important in the casino industry; it is often what distinguishes popular from less 
popular properties.  This especially is the case amongst the Strip casinos in Las Vegas, 
because these casinos are overwhelmingly higher-end facilities, where the importance 
of service quality is especially acute.  The clientele of higher-end casinos are 
especially sensitive to poor service; therefore service quality can have a dramatic 
impact on casino operators’ bottom line (Rothman, 2002a, Rothman, 2003, Benz, 
2004).   
Another factor which operated in the union’s favor in 1989 is that there is a 
strong union consciousness amongst workers in Las Vegas, especially in the casino 
industry.  Unlike most other cities in the southwest, Las Vegas has historically had a 
strong labor movement.  Native Las Vegans usually had parents who were union 
members and, therefore, were favorably disposed towards unions.  Furthermore, 
because Las Vegas is largely a one-industry town, many of their parents were actually 
members of the Culinary Union.  For the same reason it is not uncommon to have 
multiple people from the same families belonging to the Culinary Union.  These 
factors contributed to a tradition of strong union sentiment and sense of community 
amongst Las Vegas’ casino workforce, which made it easier for the Culinary Union to 
mobilize its members for the 1989 negotiations (Pappageorge, 2003, Benz, 2004). 
Casino operators were also anxious to avoid a strike in the 1989 negotiations 
because they were carrying a lot of debt from all the new development that was going 
on at the time.  Las Vegas’s casino industry experienced a dramatic building boom 
that began in the late 1980s and continued through the end of the 1990s as each casino 
operator rushed to develop multiple Mirage-style casinos.  These new casinos were 
primarily financed by high-interest junk bonds, which meant that casino operators at 
the time were facing expensive debt servicing requirements, and would have a difficult 92 
   
time affording a disruption in revenue caused by a strike (Rothman 2002a, Benz, 
2004).   
Not only were gaming companies rapidly expanding in Las Vegas, they were 
also trying to introduce casino-style gambling to new jurisdictions where it had 
previously been prohibited.  In addition to exacerbating casino operators’ debt 
problems, this expansionary effort made casino operators more public-relations 
conscious.  This was because casino operators relied on public officials and ballot 
initiatives to rescind prohibitions on casino-style gambling in jurisdictions all across 
the country.  Casino operators did not want a repeat of the public-relations nightmare 
caused by the mass arrests and tear gas that characterized the 1984 strike, undermining 
their efforts to convince voters and public officials of the benefits of bringing casino-
style gambling to their communities.  Furthermore, one of the key arguments that 
casino operators used in these efforts was that casino-style gambling would bring 
good-paying jobs to economically depressed areas.  It would have been hard for casino 
operators to make this a convincing argument if they were simultaneously engaged in 
a labor with the Culinary Workers Union (Rothman, 2003). 
The Culinary Union’s parent organization, HERE, also had a set of political 
relationships that it could utilize to increase its power vis-à-vis the gaming industry.  
The casino industry at the time was not very well connected to politicians and public 
officials in jurisdictions outside of Nevada.  Because unions were a significant force in 
areas targeted by the gaming industry for expansion, such as Detroit and Chicago, 
HERE often enjoyed a stronger relationships with public officials in these areas than 
gaming operators.  HERE used these relationships both to prevent anti-union operators 
from getting gaming licenses, and to help union-friendly operators obtain gaming 
licenses (Alexander, 2005).   93 
   
Furthermore, Steve Wynn, who became in the late-1980s the leading casino 
operator in Las Vegas, had a history of working to establish cooperative relationships 
with the unions that were represented in his facilities.  Steve Wynn was the first to 
negotiate a card-check neutrality agreement with the Culinary Workers Union in 1989; 
and this contract became the model upon which all other subsequent contracts between 
the major operators and Culinary Union were patterned in that round of negotiations 
(Rothman, 2002a). 
The Culinary Union’s revitalization effort in the late 1980s was another factor 
behinds its ability to gain card-check neutrality language in its contracts with major 
strip operators.  The Culinary Union painstakingly built representative rank-and-file 
bargaining committees in each of the casinos and greatly increased its ability to 
mobilize its members for a contract campaign.  Furthermore, the Culinary Union 
developed the capacity to wage effective corporate campaigns against its opponents.  
The Culinary Union’s ability to effectively mobilize its members and put pressure on 
employers in a contract fight was demonstrated in its battles with the family-owned 
casinos who reneged on their contracts after the 1984 strike (Alexander, 2002, Benz, 
2004, Alexander, 2005).  
Recognizing their vulnerability to union collective action and the extent to 
which the Culinary Union had revitalized itself, the major strip casino operators, lead 
by Steve Wynn, approached the 1989 negotiations in a much more conciliatory 
manner.  Corporate casino operators did not want labor strife to jeopardize the success 
of their newly opened and planned Mirage-phase casinos or their efforts to expand into 
new jurisdictions across the country and overseas.  Therefore, in the 1989 negotiations 
they were especially interested in avoiding a costly strike like the one that occurred in 
1984.  Thus the Culinary Union was not only able to dissuade casino operators from 
completing the union-busting effort they had begun in 1984, but were also able to get 94 
   
organizing neutrality language included in its contracts with most of the major 
operators, which formed the basis of its growth in the 1990s (Rothman, 2002a, 
Rothman, 2003).    
Culinary Union during the 1990s 
Starting with the 1989 contract, labor-management relations in Las Vegas’s 
gaming industry were much less antagonistic in the 1990s than they had been in the 
1980s.  Although there were some major labor battles in the industry such as the 
Frontier Strike and the Culinary Union’s efforts to organize the MGM Grand and the 
Santa Fe, most casino operators had a cordial relationship with the Culinary Union.  
The decline in antagonism was largely the result of the same combination of factors 
that lead to the 1989 contract settlement, including the recognition by most casino 
operators that the Culinary Union was a legitimate and powerful player in Las Vegas’s 
casino industry.   
This image of the Culinary Union as a reemerged power player in Las Vegas’s 
casino industry was strengthened by series of bruising battles the Culinary Union 
waged throughout the decade against a number of anti-union casino operators; these 
conflicts include efforts to organize the MGM Grand and the Santa Fe as well as a 
campaign to prevent the Frontier from busting the union.  It should be noted that 
although these battles serve as very visible indicators of the power the Culinary Union 
enjoyed in its bargaining relationships with employers, they do not represent the 
relationship that the Culinary Union had with most of the casino operators during the 
1990s.  Although not all of these efforts were successful, they did demonstrate to 
casino operators that they could expect a protracted and costly struggle if they tried 
open their casinos non-union or demand concessionary contracts from the Culinary 
Union (Alexander, 2002, Benz, 2004). 95 
   
MGM Organizing Campaign 
Arguably, the most important battle the Culinary Union faced in the 1990s was 
organizing the MGM Grand, the largest casino in Las Vegas.  The MGM Grand was 
scheduled to be opened in 1992, replacing the old MGM casino which had been torn 
down in the late 1980s.  The management of MGM had never accepted the partnership 
model of labor relations in Las Vegas as practiced by casino operators such as Steve 
Wynn.  MGM owner Kirk Kerkorian hired Robert Maxey to manage the MGM Grand.  
Robert Maxey had previously been a manager at one of the downtown casinos that had 
resisted settling with the Culinary Union during the 1984 strike.  Maxey was 
ideologically opposed to unions and collective bargaining and thus waged a highly 
public and costly campaign to prevent the union from organizing MGM Grand’s 
employees.  In order to prevent unionization, the MGM Grand paid above union scale 
and provided employees with a very generous benefit package.  However, as a result 
of these policies the casino struggled to remain profitable and also suffered from low 
service ratings (Alexander, 2002, Benz, 2004). 
The MGM campaign was multifaceted and designed in such a way that one 
part reinforced the other.  The union’s corporate campaign strategy was to convince 
lenders and investors that Maxey was spending more to keep the union out than he 
would if he just operated with the union.  The campaign also sought to portray Maxey 
as generally unfit to lead the casino.  The union produced literature showing operating 
losses at the three previous casinos Maxey had managed.  The union warned the 
investment community of Maxey’s poor labor relations record. The union also pointed 
out to investors that companies that fought unionization in Las Vegas had trouble 
expanding into new jurisdictions, and thus were unable to take advantage of the 
relaxation of gaming laws in most states (Alexander, 2002, Benz, 2004). 96 
   
The Culinary Union also pursued a variety of political strategies against the 
MGM Grand  The Local campaigned heavily against local state political candidates 
that were supported by MGM and contributed to political candidates in areas targeted 
for expansion by MGM.  These candidates either were opposed to the expansion of 
gaming outright or favored union-friendly casino operators.  The Culinary Union also 
won the support of the district attorney, who gave them the right to protest in front of 
the MGM, free from restrictions.  Therefore, the union did not have to deal with 
restrictive injunctions as it had during the 1984 strike.  This enabled the union to hold 
several large demonstrations outside of the MGM Grand involving thousands of union 
members and their supporters.  For example, the MGM’s opening in December of 
1992 was marred by thousands of protesting Culinary Union members and their allies 
(Alexander, 2002, Benz, 2004). 
The Local also developed a strong grassroots organizing campaign that 
developed a representative organizing committee in the shop.  This committee was to 
engage in collective actions and communicate with workers that union organizers were 
unable reach.  This organizing committee was built much in the same way that the 
Culinary Union had built its bargaining committee to fight back employer attempts to 
win concessionary contracts and bust the union in other Las Vegas casinos 
(Alexander, 2002, Benz, 2004). 
The final leverage point in the MGM campaign was the Culinary Union’s 
political tactics.  In 1997, MGM had decided to build a casino in Detroit, the historical 
center of auto unionism, and a place where gambling had recently been legalized.  To 
build a casino there, MGM needed to win one of the three available gaming licenses, 
something that HERE in solidarity with other unions was able to prevent if the MGM 
continued to fight the organizing campaign in Las Vegas.  In order to obtain this 
license MGM agreed to card-check neutrality with HERE in Las Vegas and with the 97 
   
coalition of unions holding up its license application in Detroit.  After obtaining a 
card-check neutrality agreement for the MGM Grand, the Culinary Union was able to 
sign up workers at the casino and bargaining negotiate a first contract with the 
employer (Fantasia and Voss, 2004). 
This victory was important to the Culinary Union for a variety of reasons.  
First, the MGM Grand was one of the most important casino properties in Las Vegas 
and having it operating non-union significantly endangered the Culinary Union’s 
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis other gaming operators.  Furthermore, the Culinary 
Union’s successful campaign demonstrated to other casino operators the external 
organizing capability of the Culinary Union and the local’s ability to impair the 
business of casino operators who open non-union.  Finally, MGM had acted as a 
leader for other non-union operators in Las Vegas, so organizing the MGM Grand left 
this group leaderless and undermined their ability to coordinate their efforts against 
the Culinary Union (Alexander, 2002). 
Frontier Strike 
The Frontier strike is one of the most well known of all the labor-management 
battles that took place during the 1990s.  This strike was second longest in the history 
of the United States; altogether, it lasted six years and four months (Benz, 2004).  
Even more impressively, no union members crossed the picket line for the entire 
length of the strike.  The stage for the strike was set when the Elardi family bought the 
Frontier and Silver Slipper casinos from Howard Hughes’s Summa Corporation in 
1988.  The Elardis tore down the Silver Slipper to make room for a parking lot and 
concentrated on turning the Frontier into an establishment that was singularly 
concentrated on gaming activities, offering budget-minded gamblers very little in 
other amenities.  The Elardis’ cost cutting extended to every aspect of the casino 
operation, including labor costs.  Like several other privately owned casino operators 98 
   
after the 1984 strike they purposefully failed to honor the contracts they had with the 
Culinary Union.  On Sept 21, 1991, while negotiating a new contract for Frontier, the 
Elardis unilaterally implemented several of its new contract proposals, including “the 
elimination of pension contributions, wage cuts of up to four dollars an hour, the 
gutting of the union grievance procedure, and the implementation of new work rules 
and an inferior health plan that left approximately 100 workers ineligible” (Alexander, 
2002).  In addition, the management of the Frontier had been retaliating against union 
activists and committing a number of ULPs.  These actions were designed to force the 
union to strike the facility so the Elardis could eventually decertify the union.  
Accordingly, the implementation of the Elardis’ new contract proposals prompted all 
of the Frontier’s Culinary Union members to walk out on strike (Alexander, 2002). 
The Elardis’ business strategy was at odds with almost every other casino 
operator along the strip in the early 1990s.  While most casino operators were trying to 
upgrade their properties and make them more attractive to families, the Elardis 
stripped their properties of any but the most basic amenities and sought to strictly 
appeal to hardcore gamblers rather than families.  This strategy, in combination with 
their labor relations problems, isolated them from the rest of the Strip casino operators 
as well as the southern Nevada political establishment.  The Culinary Union reaped 
several benefits from the Frontier’s isolation.  For example, the police department was 
much more lenient towards picketers than they had been in previous confrontations 
between casinos and union.  Furthermore, the area’s primary newspaper, the very 
conservative and anti-union Las Vegas Review-Journal, remained neutral throughout 
the strike.  Finally, many of the other casino operators openly sympathized with the 
Culinary Union.  During the early months of the strike the Elardis aggravated their 
isolation by placing advertisements in the Los Angeles Times with the headline 
“Culinary Union Strikes the Strip,” infuriating the management of other Strip Casinos, 99 
   
who had settled their labor contracts in part to avoid this type of publicity.  The Elardis 
initially refused requests by other operators to pull the advertisement.  Not until this 
false advertising was referred to the District Attorney by the Clark County 
Commission did the Frontier desist. 
For its part, the union held huge rallies and marches in front of the Frontier, 
and almost every time a union convention was held in Las Vegas, the Culinary Union 
would get the other union’s delegates to rally in front of the Frontier.  The local would 
also mobilize their own members to rally in front of the Frontier.  In 1991, 12,000 
people marched to support the Frontier strikers; a year later 20,000 people marched 
(Benz, 2004). 
Sustaining the Frontier strike would not have been possible without developing 
a strong rank-and-file militancy.  Furthermore, the Frontier Strike itself is said to have 
cost the union $26 million.  The Culinary Union received financial help from both 
HERE and the AFL-CIO to help defray the cost of the strike.  In addition, Culinary 
Union members voted overwhelmingly to increase their dues by 40% in order to 
support the strike (Fantasia & Voss, 2004). 
The strike cut into the Frontier’s business by 40% in its first year (Fantasia & 
Voss, 2004).  Union pursued an NLRB strategy that eventually led to the agency 
ruling that the strike was a ULP strike, meaning that the Frontier could not 
permanently replace the strikers and was liable for the striking workers’ lost wages.  
The total liability was estimated at between 10 and 60 million dollars.  As the Elardis’ 
losses continued to mount and the family found itself increasingly isolated from 
gaming operators and other power centers in Las Vegas, they eventually decided to 
sell the Frontier.  In late 1997, in a deal that was mediated by the Culinary Union, the 
Elardis sold the Frontier to Phil Ruffin, a hotel owner from Wichita, Kansas.  Upon 
purchasing the casino, Phil Ruffin promptly signed a contract with the union and 100 
   
ended the strike.  The Elardis lost an estimated 40% of their normal revenue during the 
strike (Fantasia & Voss 2004). 
The Frontier strike was also an important victory for the Culinary Union.  It 
demonstrated to other casino operators the extent to which the Culinary Union was 
willing to go in order to prevent having to accept a concessionary contract or be 
pushed out of a workplace.  Unlike in 1984, when the Culinary Union was decertified 
at six casinos with relative ease, in the Frontier Strike the local was able to hold on for 
six years without one member crossing the picket line.  This demonstrated the 
extraordinary ability of the Culinary Union to mobilize its members and keep them 
mobilized even in cases of extreme hardship.  It also served as another example of the 
Culinary Union’s ability to undermine the profitability of casinos operators, if they 
adopted a combative posture in the labor relations strategy.  As a result of the Frontier 
Strike, the Elardis were forced to sell the Frontier Casino and leave the casino industry 
altogether, and the Culinary Union was able to preserve working conditions for its 
members. 
Santa Fe Organizing Campaign 
The Culinary Union’s failed attempt to organize the Santa Fe casino was 
another important campaign for the local.  The campaign lasted for almost ten years, 
and although the workers voted for union representation in an NLRB election in 1993, 
the Culinary Union was never able to negotiate a first contract with the casino.  Rather 
than negotiating with the Culinary Union, the casino operators pursued a campaign of 
intimidation and harassment of union activists.  The Culinary Union’s campaign to 
organize the Santa Fe casino demonstrates the difficulties the Culinary Union faced 
when organizing through the NLRB election procedures rather than card-check 
neutrality, and was a major contributor to the union’s decision to organize exclusively 
through card-neutrality rather than through the NLRB election process. 101 
   
Workers at the Santa Fe casino first contacted the Culinary Union about 
organizing in 1991.  At the time, the Santa Fe was operated by the Sahara Gaming 
Corporation, which also operated the unionized Sahara and Hacienda casinos along 
the Strip.  By the fall of 1992 over 75% of Santa Fe employees had signed union cards 
demanding recognition by card-check neutrality.  Santa Fe’s management refused to 
recognize the union and called for an NLRB election.  The next year, in an NLRB 
election, Santa Fe employees voted 300-241 to join the Culinary Union.  However, 
Santa Fe’s management still refused to recognize the union and contested the election 
results.  Santa Fe’s case was dismissed by the NLRB, but the company continued to 
appeal.  In the fall of 1996, the U.S. District Court of Appeals denied Santa Fe’s 
appeal and ordered the casino operator to begin bargaining with the union.  In the 
three years following the U.S. District Court of Appeals decision ordering the Sahara 
Gaming Corp. to bargain with the union, the firm’s negotiating team met with the 
Culinary Union officials more than 20 times.  However, Culinary Union officials 
claimed that Santa Fe’s management was bargaining in bad faith and was not serious 
about reaching an agreement with the union.  Eventually, in June 2000 the Sahara 
Gaming Corp. sold the Santa Fe casino to Station Casinos.  However, instead of 
bargaining with the union, the new owners simply fired most of the casino’s workers, 
thereby relieving itself of its court-imposed requirement to bargain with the Culinary 
Union (Alexander, 2002, Batt, 2002). 
Throughout the organizing campaign the Sahara Gaming Corp. continually 
harassed and intimated its pro-union employees.  The Sahara Gaming Corp.’s anti-union 
campaign went to extreme lengths to prevent Santa Fe employees from forming a union.  
The NLRB charged the Sahara Gaming Corp with 42 ULPs for such violations as illegal 
terminations, suspensions, threats to fire, refusals to promote, surveillance, and changes in 
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after they left a union meeting.  Another pro-union employee was fired after testifying 
before the state senate’s labor committee on the Santa Fe’s occupational safety problems.  
The wife of the owner of the Sahara Gaming Corp. was serving in the Nevada State 
Senate and was a member of the labor committee (Alexander, 2002 Batt, 2002). 
In addition to demonstrating why the Culinary Union now relies on card-check 
neutrality agreements exclusively for its new organizing campaigns, the Santa Fe 
campaign also provides another example of how the local had used corporate 
campaign tactics to put significant amounts of pressure on an employer.  For example, 
the union was successful in preventing the Sahara Gaming Corp. from opening casinos 
in jurisdictions where casino-style gambling had recently become legal.  The union 
was able to do this by first discovering the high levels of debt the Sahara Gaming 
Corp. was carrying and then publicizing the casino operators’ financial and labor 
difficulties to elected officials, regulators, community leaders, and voters in 
jurisdictions where the casino operator was trying to expand (Alexander, 2002).   
The Culinary Union also used its knowledge of the Sahara Gaming Corp.’s 
financial problems to undermine its ability to secure financing for new casino 
development both in Las Vegas and in other jurisdictions.  As a result of these efforts, 
in July 1995, the Sahara Gaming Corp. had to write off $25 million spent on failed 
efforts to build riverboat casinos on the Missouri and Mississippi rivers.  That same 
year the union successfully undermined a $75 million bond offering the Sahara 
Gaming Corp. was hoping to use to finance the development of a new property in Las 
Vegas (Alexander, 2002). 
The Culinary Union also launched a boycott against the Santa Fe which was 
publicized through large rallies outside the casino, as well as by contacting casino 
customers and vendors.  The boycott roughly coincided with the opening of two new 
casinos in the Santa Fe’s marketing radius: the Fiesta Hotel and Casino, which opened 103 
   
in December 1994, and Texas Hotel and Gambling Hall, which followed in July 1995.  
During the boycott, the Santa Fe’s revenues dropped by 40%, and the casino no longer 
generated enough cash to pay the interest on the debt it borrowed for its failed 
riverboat projects.  These setbacks made it even more difficult for the Santa Fe to raise 
sufficient revenue to cover its debt payments.  Eventually the Sahara Gaming Corp. 
was forced to begin selling its properties in order to meet its debt requirements.  
Ultimately, as a result of its financial troubles, the Sahara Gaming Corp. was forced to 
leave the Las Vegas Gaming market altogether (Alexander, 2002). 
The Culinary Union’s campaign took on a political dimension when the union 
mounted a successful campaign to unseat State Senator Sue Lowden, the wife of 
Sahara Gaming Corp’s owner Paul Lowden.  The union mobilized hundreds of 
members for an ambitious neighborhood doorbell ringing campaign in support of 
Lowden’s rival, Valerie Weiner.  Volunteers from the Culinary Union visited 
thousands of houses and apartments on Election Day, and the local bused members 
and their families to the polls.  In the election itself, Valerie Weiner beat Sue Lowden 
by nine percentage points.  Most political analysts considered Weiner’s victory to be 
an upset, in which the Culinary Union played a significant role (Alexander, 2002).  
The Culinary Union had put together a political action fund to support its campaign 
against Lowden.  This fund was maintained after the campaign and continues to this 
day, supported by dollar-a-month donations that rank-and-file union members 
contribute in addition to their dues.  This campaign fund has been used to back union-
endorsed candidates for political office as well as to fund the campaigns of union staff 
and rank-and-file leaders who run for political office (Alexander, 2002). 
Political Efforts of the Culinary Union during the 1990s 
The Culinary Union’s battle with the Frontier, MGM Grande, and Santa Fe 
casinos also demonstrated the increasingly powerful presence the union had in state, 104 
   
local, and federal politics.  In addition to successfully campaigning against candidates 
that supported its opponents in the gaming industry, the Culinary Union was able to 
elect two of its own members to the state legislature and to defeat an initiative that 
would have made it more difficult for the union to raise money for political 
campaigns.  The Culinary Union’s political efforts during the 1990s left many of its 
enemies politically isolated, as casino operators who openly pursued a strategy of 
union avoidance were pushed to the margins of the Las Vegas gaming industry.  Given 
the heavily regulated nature of the gaming industry, the Culinary Union’s rise as a 
major political power in the state greatly increased its leverage at the bargaining table 
as well as in new organizing campaigns.  This is exemplified by the political barriers 
faced by anti-union operators such as MGM and the Sahara Gaming Corp. as they 
tried to expand their operations beyond Nevada and Atlantic City (Alexander, 2002). 
The newfound political power of the Culinary Union also made it a valuable 
ally for casino operators who were able to develop cooperative relationships with the 
local.  In such efforts the Gaming Industry often enlisted the help the Culinary Union 
or HERE on some political or regulatory issue and in return offered the union 
concessions on bargaining or organizing issues.  These types of strategic alliances 
between labor and management were much more common in Las Vegas’s casino 
industry during the decade than pitched political battles exemplified by the fights with 
the MGM Grand, The Frontier, and the Santa Fe (Wilhelm, 2004, Alexander, 2005).   
Throughout the 1990s the Culinary Union and its parent HERE cooperated 
with casino operators on a number of issues, perhaps the most notable being the 
National Gambling Impact Study.  The study was the final product of a commission 
appointed by the Clinton administration in 1997 to study the social and economic 
impacts of legalized gambling.  The commission consisted of a nine-member panel 
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John Wilhelm was appointed to be on the panel as one of the gaming industries’ 
advocates (Weinert, 1999).  Prior to becoming the president of HERE, John Wilhelm 
served as an official for the Culinary Union in a variety of capacities.  Another gaming 
industry advocate who was appointed to the panel was MGM Chairman Terrence 
Lanni, with whom HERE president John Wilhelm cooperated closely (Wilhelm, 
2004).  As a panelist, Wilhelm focused on how the gaming industry benefited local 
economies by creating new jobs that tended to compensate workers better, both in 
terms of wages and benefits pay, than other low-skilled service sector jobs (Weinert, 
1999).  The commission’s final report was received favorably by the casino industry 
and included Wilhelm’s arguments about the benefits of gaming for job creation.  
Many in the casino industry voiced gratitude for Wilhelm’s involvement in the study 
(Batt, 1999). 
In addition to working with the Gaming Industry on the National Gambling 
Impact Study, the Culinary Union and its parent HERE cooperated with the casino 
operators on a variety of other issues.  For example, together they successfully lobbied 
the federal government for infrastructure improvements that would increase the 
accessibly of Las Vegas for tourists.  Such improvements included the expansion of 
Las Vegas’s airport and the widening of I-15, the main thoroughfare used by those 
living in and around Los Angeles to travel to Las Vegas (Alexander, 2005). 
HERE has also cooperated with friendly Casino operators in helping them get 
gaming licenses in new gaming jurisdictions as well as lobbying with casino interests 
to prevent local and state lawmakers from raising taxes on casinos.  HERE’s help in 
new gaming jurisdictions was especially useful for casino operators because their 
operations had historically been limited to Nevada and New Jersey, so they had not 
developed relationships with political leaders in jurisdictions that were considering the 
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considering relaxing their gaming laws are areas where HERE already had a 
significant presence, meaning that the union had precisely the kinds of political 
relationships with local political leaders that the casino operators desired (Alexander, 
2002). 
The Culinary Academy 
In addition to cooperating in the political sphere, the Culinary Union had 
cooperated with casino operators in a variety of other areas.  Perhaps the most notable 
example of labor-management cooperation outside of the political sphere is the 
Culinary Training Academy.  The Culinary Academy was established in 1993 by a 
consortium of gaming employers and the Culinary Union to provide job training for 
hospitality workers in Las Vegas.  The Culinary Academy provides training to 
individuals looking for their first casino jobs as well as current casino employees 
hoping to upgrade their skills.  In addition to courses aimed specifically at the gaming 
industry, the Culinary Academy also offers ESL, GED, and variety of soft skills 
classes (Bernhardt et. al., 2003).   
The Culinary Academy graduates an average of 2,500 people each year, and a 
total of 16,000 people have graduated from the academy since its inception (Bernhardt 
et. al., 2003; Greenhouse, 2004).  The Culinary Academy works with the casino 
operators to ensure that graduates are first in line for new casino jobs.  Seventy percent 
of Culinary Academy Graduates have found jobs in Las Vegas’s gaming industry 
(Bernhardt et. al., 2003).  This placement rate is especially impressive because the 
Culinary Academy acts as one of Clark County’s primary vocational rehabilitation 
facilities, training some of the county’s least employable residents (Pappageorge, 
2005).   
The academy is funded through a combination of employer contributions and 
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bargaining agreements they hold with the Culinary Union.  In 2002 employers 
contributed 3.5 cents per hour worked per employee (Bernhardt et. al., 2003).  
The Culinary Academy is of value to casino operators for a variety of reasons.  
First, it helped to allay the recruitment and retention problems that Las Vegas casino 
employers faced during the dramatic expansion of the city’s gaming industry in the 
1990s.  The academy helped relieve casino employers’ recruitment problems by 
giving previously unqualified individuals the job skills necessary to enter the casino 
industry, thereby increasing the pool of workers from which casino employers could 
hire.  Furthermore, the Culinary Academy helped to create job ladders within the 
gaming industry, thereby addressing casino employers’ retention problems, and the 
turnover rate amongst academy graduates was 50% lower than among of the street 
hires (Bernhardt et. al., 2003). 
Casino operators also valued the Culinary Academy because it successfully 
addressed structural problems within the local gaming industry that discouraged 
gaming operators from setting up their own training facilities individually.  For 
example, since casino employees’ skills are highly transferable, and there is a high 
turnover rate in the industry, it is not beneficial for casino operators to invest 
significant resources in the training of their employees, as it is relatively easy for one 
gaming operator to poach the trained employees of another operator.  This problem is 
especially acute in Las Vegas because of the high-end nature of the most of Las 
Vegas’s largest casinos and the shortage of qualified workers.  The Culinary Union 
was able to help resolve this problem, making employer contributions to the Culinary 
Academy part of the collective bargaining agreement it has with each operator, thus 
preventing one or a number of casino operators from free riding off the training efforts 
of the other casino operators (Bernhardt et. al., 2003). 108 
   
The Culinary Academy has also been beneficial to the Culinary Union.  For 
example, because it is primarily administered by the Culinary Union, the Culinary 
Academy offers potential members a vivid example of the services the local can 
provide for them.  This is especially important because the Culinary Academy is often 
the first contact these individuals have with the Culinary Union, enabling the local to 
leave a positive first impression with these potential members free from employer 
interference.  Several studies have shown that this type of initial impression has a 
strong positive correlation with members’ union commitment and participation.  This 
correlation remains significant at least ten years from when an individual initially 
comes into contact with the union (Clark, 2000).  This is also important because 
Nevada is a right-to-work state, meaning that the Culinary Union must be able to 
convince the workers it represents that the services it provides are valuable enough for 
them to pay their union dues. 
Contract Negotiations in the 1990s 
There were two rounds of negotiations that took place in the 1990s; although 
both were characterized by a high degree of rank-and-file mobilization and highly 
public demonstration, they were overall much less antagonistic than any of the 
previous rounds of negotiations that had occurred over the last 15 years.  In fact, the 
1994 and 1997 rounds of negotiations were the first consecutive rounds of 
negotiations to be completed without a work stoppage since the 1960s.  The fact that 
these negotiations could be completed relatively conflict-free during a period of 
dramatic change in Las Vegas’s gaming industry and in the midst of pitched battles 
between the Culinary Union and the operators of the MGM Grand, The Frontier, and 
Santa Fe casinos, demonstrates the positive relationship the Culinary Union had with 
most of Las Vegas’s casino operators at the time. 109 
   
The unresolved disputes between the Culinary Union and the MGM and 
Frontier Casinos, as well as the issue of subcontracting, were the primary issues in the 
1994 round of contract negotiations.  Largely as a result of the uncertainty created by 
the ongoing battle between the Culinary Union and the Frontier and MGM, casino 
operators wanted a shorter, three-year contract, as opposed to the five-year agreements 
that had become the norm.  The union prepared for the 1994 round of negotiations 
much in the same way it had prepared for earlier rounds of negotiations.  Using the 
steward structure that was already in place, the union built a large representative 
bargaining committee that acted as a means through the union could train, 
communicate with, and mobilize the rank-and-file.  The union then mobilized workers 
to engage in a variety of rank-and-file intensive leverage tactics designed to put 
pressure on casino owners to settle with the union and signal the local’s willingness 
and ability to strike.  Examples of such tactics included holding several rallies 
involving thousands of workers and mobilizing for mass meetings with upper-level 
management to discuss specific bargaining issues. 
Similar to 1989, Steve Wynn, of Mirage Resorts, was the first casino operator 
to settle with the Culinary Union, and most other casino operators agreed to contracts 
patterned after this first one.  The new contract language granted casino operators 
broad leeway in their ability to subcontract; however, it mandated that all new 
subcontracted work be done by union members under the Culinary Union’s collective 
bargaining agreement.  The settlement also provided for 25 cents an hour in raises 
each year, a continuation of organizing neutrality language for any new properties 
acquired or opened by the operators, and the preservation of no-cost health insurance 
for workers and their families. 
There were two properties that initially resisted settling with the Culinary 
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Desert Inn and the Sahara.  The Sahara Casino was owned by the Sahara Gaming 
Corp., along with the Santa Fe.  The Sahara Gaming Corp.’s resistance to the 
settlement probably was the result of the same strategy to minimize the influence of 
unions in the company’s operations that had led to its concurrent battle with the 
Culinary Union at the Santa Fe casino.  The Sheraton-Inn resisted the 1994 settlement 
largely because it had hoped to emulate the Frontier and MGM casinos and operate 
along the Strip non-union.   
The Culinary Union eventually forced a settlement based on the pattern 
agreement with the Sheraton-Desert Inn by delaying the ability of the operators to get 
permits to develop new casino properties.  The Culinary Union was soon able to get a 
pattern contract at the Sahara as well, as a result of its corporate campaign against the 
Sahara Gaming Corp.  By the time the 1994 round of negotiations were wrapping up 
the corporate campaign elements of the Culinary Union organizing campaign at the 
Santa Fe casino were really beginning to take their toll on the Sahara Gaming Corp.  
As a result of the campaign the gaming operator desperately needed to increase its 
cash flow to finance its debt burden.  Therefore, the casino operator sold the Sahara 
Casino to union-friendly Bill Bennett of Circus-Circus Enterprises, who promptly 
agreed to a contract patterned after the Mirage settlement. 
The Culinary Union and casino operators entered the 1997 negotiations facing 
many of the same issues that they had faced in the previous round of negotiations. Key 
issues in the 1997 negotiations were wages, subcontracting, health and welfare 
benefits, pensions, and contract length (Caruso, 1997).  Casinos wanted an annual 25 
cents an hour increase, while the union wanted more.  In addition, casino operators 
wanted union members to begin contributing to their healthcare, which the union 
steadfastly resisted (Caruso, 1997).  The Culinary Union also demanded that strict 
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Union and management disagreed over the length of their contract.  Casino operators 
favored a shorter contract because of the rapidly changing nature of Las Vegas’s 
gaming industry, while union officials wanted a longer contract so they could have 
more time for external organizing between rounds of negotiations, allowing them to 
dedicate more resources to this area of activity (Smith, 1997). 
The 1997 negotiations were a long, drawn-out process, with some Culinary 
Union members having to work up to year without a contract.  Culinary Union 
officials did not blame this so much on the intractability of either the union’s or 
management’s bargaining positions as much as on the ongoing Frontier Strike and the 
failure of the Culinary Union to reach a settlement on a first contract covering MGM 
Grand employees.  These factors introduced a significant degree of uncertainty into 
the bargaining process and therefore casino operators did not want to settle on a new 
contract until these two disputes were resolved.  Culinary Union officials also blamed 
the delay to reach a settlement on the insistence of each casino operator to bargain 
separately (Smith, 1997). 
The Culinary Union reached agreements with the major Strip operators in 
March 1998, more than 9 months after their previous contract expired. These 
agreements set the pattern for the rest of the agreements along the strip (Smith, 
1998a).  Other Strip operators soon settled, and downtown operators, after some initial 
grumbling that the decline of gaming in downtown Las Vegas was making it difficult 
for them afford contracts patterned after Strip agreements, also settled with the 
Culinary Union within the next couple of months. 
The new contracts included strict restrictions on subcontracting; they also 
maintained the Culinary Union’s fully funded family health benefit package.  The 
Culinary union was also able to get the five-year contract that it wanted.  However, the 112 
   
local did have to compromise on the pay issue, agreeing to 25-cent retroactive raises 
for 1997, 30 cents for 1998 and 1999, and 35 cents in 2000 and 2001 (Smith, 1998).  
Changes in Casino Industry Workforce Demographics during the 1990s 
Hispanics had become the dominant ethnic group within the Culinary Union’s 
membership by 1990s.  In Las Vegas’s casino industry they had replaced African-
Americans as the most prominent ethnical/racial group in the less-skilled back-of-the-
house occupations, such as GRAs and housemen. (Waddoups & Eade, 2002, 
Pappageorge, 2003)  Furthermore, these particular back-of-the-house occupational 
categories were making up an increasingly significant proportion of the Culinary 
Union’s total membership as larger and larger casino resorts were built during the 
1990s.  Furthermore, because these job categories were traditionally dominated by 
women, their disproportionate growth caused the Culinary Union’s membership to 
become increasingly dominated by women.   
As a result of these changes the Culinary Union had to adopt an organizational 
model that was equipped to serve its increasingly diverse membership.  Although the 
Culinary Union has had minorities on staff since the days of Al Bramlett, the local’s 
leadership structure had always been dominated by white males.  Beginning in the late 
1980s the union began making a concerted effort to hire more minorities on staff and 
to ensure it had a more diverse leadership structure.  By the time of the 2002 contract 
campaign, the Culinary Union had a white male Secretary-Treasurer, Latina female 
President, and an African-American female vice-president.  Furthermore, the union 
had a staff that reflected the diversity of its membership, rather than consisting of just 
a few token minorities. 
Besides having a staff and leadership that was reflective of its membership, the 
Culinary Union pursued a number of other strategies that made its organizational 
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changes.  For example, all union materials are written in both English and Spanish, 
and all speeches at union events are translated into either language depending on the 
language of the speaker.  Furthermore, the union pursued political initiatives that are 
in tune with its diverse membership, such as campaigning for the reform of 
immigration laws.  On a variety of occasions the union has acted to protect older 
female front-of-the-house workers, such as cocktail waitresses, when they have faced 
age discrimination.  
The ability of the Culinary Union to adapt to the changing demographics of its 
membership is a key part of its revitalization process.  As Behrens et al. (2004) noted, 
a key component of revitalization is a labor organization’s ability to adjust to new 
contexts and support new strategies.  Therefore, the Culinary Union’s ability to adapt 
to the dramatic influx of Hispanic and female workers into the casino industry 
workforce in the 1980s and 1990s was a key part of its revitalization process.  Without 
being able to make the organizational changes necessary to appeal to its increasingly 
diverse membership, the Culinary Union would not be able to draw upon the power it 
gains from mobilizing such a large proportion of its members (Pappageorge, 2005). 
Revitalization of the Culinary Union since in the 1990s and Current Practices 
By the end of the 1990s, the Culinary Union had made significant strides in its 
revitalization process, which created the organizational capabilities necessary for its 
2002 comprehensive contract campaign strategy.  As Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
(2001) argued in their chapter on the USWA’s contract campaigns in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, a union’s capacity to engage in effective comprehensive contract 
campaigns takes years to develop.  Furthermore, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich argue 
that contract campaigns are most effective if they are well integrated into the structure 
of the local, in terms of both technical expertise and organizational commitment.  This 
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staff but also amongst its rank-and-file.  Correspondingly, as a result of the 
revitalization process it went through in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Culinary Union 
developed the organizational capacity to effectively employ ambitious comprehensive 
campaign strategies as well as retain the organizational commitment necessary to 
successfully mount such campaigns. 
The preceding sections of this chapter also described how the Culinary Union, 
as part of its revitalization process, successfully adopted the kinds of internal reforms 
necessary to adapt to changes in Las Vegas’s casino industry, such as changes in the 
kinds of employers that predominated in Las Vegas and demographic changes in the 
casino industry workforce.  This section will describe the status of these reforms as 
they stood in the years immediately preceding the 2002 contract campaign and their 
impact on that year’s comprehensive contract campaign.  
The Culinary Union’s revitalization process was comprehensive, 
encompassing the local’s contract administration, contract bargaining, external 
organization and political functions.  Furthermore, revitalization in each one of these 
areas contributed to the revitalization process in the others as well, thereby increasing 
the Culinary Union’s overall power in the local casino industry.  As Hickey (2003), 
Benz (2005), and Katz et al. (2003) argued, unions can benefit from integrating their 
strategies in a mutually reinforcing manner, and such integration has a significant 
positive effect on the union revitalization process.  This section will describe the 
Culinary Union’s contract administration, contract bargaining, external organizing, 
and political strategies in the years leading up to the 2002 negotiations.  It will also 
discuss the complementary impact of these practices and strategies on each other and 
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Contract Administration 
The Culinary Union’s contract administration functions form the foundation of 
the rest of the local’s activities in contract bargaining, external organizing, and 
politics.  Contract administration is most closely linked to contract bargaining because 
both are part of a union’s collective bargaining and representational functions.  
Therefore, the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy prior to 2002 was 
fundamentally linked to its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign.  For example, the 
Culinary Union used its contract administration procedures to recruit rank-and-file 
activists to lead the campaign as well as to communicate with members about the 
campaign’s progress.  Therefore, the Culinary Union’s contract administration 
strategies and practices in the period preceding the 2002 comprehensive contract 
campaign played an integral role in helping the union develop the capacity to launch 
such an ambitious campaign.  This section will describe the Culinary Union’s contract 
administration strategies and practices and their influence on the 2002 comprehensive 
contract campaign. 
The contract administration strategy developed by the Culinary Union as a 
result of its revitalization process is similar to the one described by Teresa Cornrow 
(1991). As described in the literature review, Cornrow’s article outlines a contract 
administration strategy that emphasized rank-and-file membership involvement and 
responsibility.  This model also prioritizes collective rather than individual grievances 
and methods for resolving workplace issues.  It further stresses the importance of 
developing rank-and-file empowerment in the workplace through collective action.   
The role of union staff in this model is to facilitate the ability of stewards and 
other rank-and-file union members to take more responsibility over the grievance 
process, rather than resolving workplace issues for members.  Union staff should also 
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also how to do so in a collective manner, empowering rank-and-file members in the 
process (Cornrow, 1991).  Finally, Cornrow’s model stresses the important role 
contract administration process plays as a communications conduit between union 
staff and leaders and the rank-and-file membership.   
The following paragraphs provide a detailed description of the Culinary Union 
contract administration procedures and strategies.  They will first describe the local’s 
strategy for handling grievances and its representational structure.  Then the impact of 
the Culinary Union contract administration strategy on its rank-and-file mobilization 
capabilities in the 2002 contract negotiations will be discussed. 
The Culinary Union’s grievance procedure emphasizes organizing and 
collectively dealing with grievances.  In order to do this it must first identify 
grievances around which the union can organize and where it is in the local’s strategic 
interest to do so.  The first step in this process is distinguishing between grievances 
that are individual issues and those that are group issues (Pappageorge, 2005). 
The Culinary Union handles individual grievances in a traditional manner 
through a three-step process.  In the first step, the shop steward meets with the 
frontline supervisor to try work out the grievance informally.  The Culinary Union has 
delegated responsibility for this first step almost entirely to the shop steward.  Paid 
staff only become directly involved in the grievance process at the second level, where 
grievances are brought before a committee consisting of equal numbers of union and 
management representatives.  If this committee deadlocks then the grievance goes to 
arbitration  (Caesars Palace Contract, 2002 2007, Mirage Contract, 2002 2007). 
This shortened grievance process delegates significant amounts of 
responsibility for handling grievances to shop stewards.  Therefore, one of the major 
duties of internal organizers in this process is to make sure shop stewards have 
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and to provide them with help where necessary.  It is also important that the union 
maintain a sufficient ratio of shop stewards to regular members.  The union’s goal is to 
have one shop steward for every 20 members; however, at the time of the 2002 
contract negotiations the union had about one shop steward for every 25 members 
(Pappageorge, 2005).   
However, when dealing with group grievances, the Culinary Union first makes 
a determination of whether it will try to mobilize workers around the grievance or not.  
The union looks to a number of factors in making this determination, such as the type 
and number and workers affected by the grievance, what kind of leverage the union 
will gain by mobilizing workers around the grievance, and the intensity of worker 
feeling regarding the grievance.  The union will always pursues a grievance through 
the traditional channels even if it decides to mobilize workers around it as well. 
If the Culinary Union decides to mobilize around a grievance, the shop 
steward, usually with the help of an internal organizer, will organize the affected 
workers into a group, which then goes to the immediate supervisor to demand a 
meeting to work out the grievance.  If the supervisor will not sit down with the 
workers, an internal organizer will try to mobilize as large a group of workers as 
possible to march down to the supervisor’s office in a controlled but militant manner 
and again demand a meeting.  If this does not work the organizer will mobilize 
workers for other coordinated marches on management officials up the casino’s chain 
of command, until they find someone who will work with them on the issue.  
Eventually one of the managers higher up in the casino’s hierarchy will usually put 
pressure on one of the supervisors below him/her to resolve the issue.  In addition to 
these delegations to management, the union will use a variety of other tactics when 
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other types of solidarity efforts.  The union negotiates specific provisions in its 
contracts with casinos in order to protect its ability to engage in such actions. 
One of problems that the Culinary Union has faced in implementing this 
contract administration policy is that it significantly increases the workload of internal 
organizers.  This is because training shop stewards to handle grievances and 
mobilizing workers around them is much more time-consuming for internal organizers 
than just dealing with grievances in a more traditional manner.  This problem is 
compounded by the large amount of resources the Culinary Union dedicates to 
external organizing, which prevents the local from hiring more paid staff to handle the 
additional contract administration burdens.  Under the current contract administration 
structure, each internal organizer is responsible for overseeing 75-100 shop stewards 
and 1500-2000 workers (Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005). 
The Culinary Union has created a lead shop steward system in order to remedy 
this issue and give rank-and-file leaders greater opportunity to hold positions of 
responsibility in the union.  Lead shop stewards are basically regular shop stewards 
who agree to oversee about 3-5 other shop stewards, who are in turn expected to be 
responsible for groups of around 25 workers.  These oversight responsibilities include 
shop steward training, regularly communicating with stewards about union business, 
and being the first person regular stewards go to with their questions.  Lead shop 
stewards also help internal organizers identify and recruit rank-and-file leaders.  The 
union tries to give lead stewards a sense of ownership in the union such as giving them 
a part in the decision making, direction, and goal setting of the union in their shop.  
After a number of previous failed attempts, the Culinary Union instituted a lead shop 
steward program in early 2001 in preparation for the 2002 contract negotiations 
(Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005). 119 
   
In order to ensure its shop stewards have the adequate skills necessary to 
handle their responsibilities competently, the Culinary Union has set up an extensive 
training program for its shop stewards.  This training program mixes regular classes 
with mentor-style teaching in which trainees work closely with internal organizers and 
lead shop stewards.  This training is mandatory for all shop stewards, and if trainees 
refuse to complete the training they lose their shop steward responsibilities (Dalton, 
2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Henry, 2005, Pappageorge, 2005).    
Under the Culinary Union’s contract administration structure, shop stewards 
are not elected but rather are recruited by internal organizers and other shop stewards.  
The Culinary Union’s internal organizing director, Ted Pappageorge, said that the 
local pursued this strategy because it wanted to ensure that all of its shop stewards had 
workplace leadership capabilities.  In other words, the local recruits shop stewards that 
it has identified as natural or indigenous leaders in the particular worksite or among 
various other constituencies such as a particular gender, ethnic, occupational, or racial 
group.  Generally, these are people to whom other workers already look to resolve 
workplace problems.  Examples of leadership behaviors include organizing co-
workers to come down to the union hall to discuss a work issue, organizing co-
workers to meet with management over an issue, organizing co-workers to participate 
in events, especially of a union or political nature.  If individuals exhibiting such overt 
behaviors are unavailable in a particular worksite, the union will look for people to 
whom co-workers defer in the resolution of, or in forming an opinion about, 
workplace issues (Pappageorge, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005). 
In order to identify and recruit workplace leaders the Culinary Union maintains 
an extensive database of instances where workers have demonstrated workplace 
leadership qualities.  One of the primary activities of shop stewards and internal 
organizers is to identify these types of workplace leaders.  Once a leader has been 120 
   
identified, an internal organizer, accompanied by a shop steward, will visit the 
individual at home to assess their attitude toward the union and to recruit for a position 
as a shop steward or some other active role in the local (Pappageorge, 2003, 
Pappageorge, 2005).   
By recruiting individuals that have already demonstrated workplace leadership 
qualities, the Culinary Union is able to tap into and leverage existing relationships, 
leadership roles, and lines of communication between workers, instead of having to try 
to create new ones.  By doing this the union hopes to take advantage of organic social 
networks between workers, union activists and non-activists alike.  Rank-and-file 
members tend to take union issues more seriously if they hear about them through 
existing social networks rather than through communication networks created 
specifically for dealing with union issues (Clark, 2000).  The role of union issues in 
these networks waxes and wanes, but the networks themselves tend to be relatively 
stable even where job turnover is a significant factor.  The organic aspects of these 
networks also means that union affairs tend to become intertwined with other aspects 
of members’ daily lives, such as friendships in and out of work.  As hypothesized by 
Bacharach et al. (2001), this process helps to legitimize the union in the eyes of its 
members and increase membership commitment to and participation in the union. 
Unlike leaders of business organizations, shop stewards receive relatively little 
formal power from their position within a union’s organizational structure.  Therefore, 
shop stewards must rely upon on informal sources of power such as the respect and 
support of their co-workers (Barling et. al, 1992).  This is especially true in the case of 
the Culinary Union, where the local deemphasizes legalistic procedures in the 
resolution of grievances, and instead organizes around grievances, taking advantage of 
informal power structures in the workplace.  121 
   
In addition to building upon existent social networks, the Culinary Union’s 
contract administration strategy has a positive effect on the local’s rank-and-file 
mobilization capacity in a variety of other ways.  For example, as described in the 
literature review, organizational behavior scholars have found a strong positive 
correlation between contract administration procedures that facilitate and promote 
rank-and-file responsibility in the grievance process and increased union commitment.  
These scholars have also found strong links between contract administration 
procedures that emphasize collective means of resolving workplace issues and 
increased rank-and-file participation and commitment.  Furthermore, a similar 
correlation has been found between procedures that emphasize worker empowerment 
and union commitment and participation (Fosh, 1993, Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 
1995, Tetrick, 1995, Bacharach et. al., 2001, Snape & Redman, 2004a, Snape & 
Redman, 2004b).  As described in the preceding paragraphs, the Culinary Union’s 
organizing-model-based contract administration strategy contains all of these 
correlates of increased union commitment and participation. 
In addition, the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy increases its 
rank-and-file mobilization capacity in a variety of other ways as well.  For example, it 
gives rank-and-file leaders experience in organizing their co-workers and in leading 
the types of rank-and-file mobilization tactics that were commonly used in the 2002 
contract campaign, such as delegations to management and break room rallies.  
Furthermore, regular rank-and-file members got used to participating in these tactics 
as well as hearing from rank-and-file leaders about union issues.  This built members’ 
confidence about using these tactics to exercise their workplace rights (Dalton, 2003, 
Pappageorge, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005). 
Furthermore, this contract administration strategy helped the Culinary Union 
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personal relationships.  This helped union leaders and staff get a better understanding 
of what issues are important to rank-and-file members, as well as members’ attitudes 
about the union and their employer.  It also helped union leaders develop an 
understanding of the informal power structures that were present in the members’ 
workplace.  In addition, such an effective communication network also helped 
members get a better understanding of what was at stake in the contract negotiations 
process and why their participation was so important.  It also helped the union get its 
message out to members during the negotiations and undermine the ability of 
employers to convince members of their position in the negotiations (Dalton, 2003, 
Pappageorge, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005). 
Politics 
The Culinary Union’s political program also had a positive influence on the 
local’s rank-and-file mobilization capacity for the 2002 contract negotiations.  In 
addition to increasing the mobilization capacity of Culinary Union members, as a 
result of its political program. the Culinary Union was recognized as an important 
force in state and local politics, which made it easier for the union to get the support of 
politicians in the 2002 contract campaign.  Finally, the Culinary Union’s progressive 
political agenda helped it win the support of the public in the negotiations, especially 
in regard to its campaign around workload issues. 
The Culinary Union’s political program emphasizes member involvement.  
Instead of making monetary contributions to political candidates, the local focuses 
more on door-to-door get-out-the-vote tactics.  The Culinary Union does not have a 
separate political action committee; rather it utilizes its shop steward committee for its 
political program, meaning the many stewards are either involved in the get-out-the-
vote drives directly or recruit other rank-and-file volunteers for these efforts.  In 
addition the union has a leave of absence program where rank-and-file members take 123 
   
time off from work in order to work on political campaigns full time.  The Culinary 
Union even has a few rank-and-file leaders, that it has recruited, serving in the state 
legislature.  
The Culinary Union’s political program is relevant to the union rank-and-file 
mobilization for the 2002 contract campaign because it created yet another way for 
rank-and-file members to become directly involved in the local’s activities in the years 
prior to the negotiations.  This further cultivates a culture within the local where 
membership participation is encouraged, with all the previously discussed benefits this 
entails for the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization capacity.  Additionally, the 
local’s political program creates another venue through which shop stewards and other 
rank-and-file leaders can communicate with regular members about union issues, 
thereby strengthening the Culinary Union’s organizational communications network 
and opening up another avenue for rank-and-file members to talk about union affairs.  
Furthermore, the local’s political program provides rank-and-file leaders with 
organizing experience that would be valuable in the 2002 contract campaign.  Finally, 
as mentioned earlier, the Culinary Union’s political program also includes organizing 
around specific policy issues that are important to the union’s diverse membership 
such as immigrant rights.  This helps build union commitment amongst the local’s 
diverse membership and demonstrates to these members how the union can be 
relevant to them both in and outside of the workplace. 
External Organizing 
The Culinary Union’s external organizing strategy related to its rank-and-rile 
mobilization efforts for the 2002 contract campaign in many of the same ways as its 
political program.  For example, the Culinary Union also promotes the involvement of 
rank-and-file leaders in its external organizing campaign.  One way this is done is 
through a leave of absence program that is similar to the one the local runs for its 124 
   
political program.  The Culinary Union’s external organizing leave of absence 
program allows rank-and-file leaders take up to three months from their job at any one 
time to come onto the local’s staff as an organizer.  As an external organizer they will 
either work on organizing non-union casinos in Las Vegas or they will work on 
campaigns in other parts of the country as part of HERE’s “Road Warrior Program.”  
In addition to the leave of absence program, the union recruits rank-and-file leaders to 
accompany external organizers on house visits.  Lastly, the Culinary Union will 
organize rank-and-file leaders to have lunch together at a non-union casino that is an 
organizing target of the Culinary Union, so they can talk to workers at the targeted 
casino about the union (Pappageorge, 2005).   
These kinds of tactics benefited the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file 
mobilization capacity for the 2002 contract campaign in a variety of ways.  First, it 
gave rank-and-file leaders experience in leading their fellow workers in the kinds of 
collectivist confrontation tactics that were commonly used in the 2002 contract 
campaign, such as mobilizing workers for rallies both in and outside of the workplace.  
Furthermore, as a result of talking to non-union workers, especially those in areas 
where the hospitality and/or casino industries are largely non-union and therefore 
employment conditions are much worse, rank-and-file leaders became much more 
aware of the benefits that accrue to them as a result of working in a union facility, 
thereby increasing their commitment to the union.  Union representation has been 
found to be strongly correlated with both higher wages and a higher percentage of 
employees with health insurance and pensions in both the hotel and gaming industries.  
The difference in wages and benefits between union and non-union establishments is 
especially pronounced in areas of low-union density.  In areas of high union density in 
the hotel and/or gaming industries, non-union employers often improve overall 
compensation so it matches union standards (Waddoups & Eade, 2002).  The Culinary 125 
   
Union’s “Road Warriors” program often sends union members to areas of very low 
union density, such as Indian reservation casinos, that are usually entirely non-union 
and have abysmal labor conditions.  
Contract Bargaining 
As discussed in prior sections of this chapter, during the late 1980s and into the 
1990s the Culinary Union also experienced a revitalization within in its contract 
bargaining sphere of activity.  Although member mobilization did play a role in the 
1984 strike, the local did not really begin to think of it in terms of a wider 
comprehensive campaign strategy until it began to prepare for its 1989 round of 
bargaining.  It was in its preparations for the 1989 round that the Culinary Union 
developed a set of corporate pressure tactics that it coordinated with its rank-and-file 
mobilization tactics.  It is also in this campaign where the local made a conscious 
effort to build rank-and-file bargaining committees in each casino and developed rank-
and-file leaders.  Throughout the 1990s the Culinary Union continued to develop its 
capacities in these two areas. This is what enabled the union to successfully carry out 
its ambitious comprehensive contract campaign strategy in 2002 (Rothman, 2002a, 
Wilhelm 2004, Benz 2005). 
The rank-and-file mobilization component of the union’s comprehensive 
contract campaigns consists of building large representative rank-and-file bargaining 
committees, rank-and-file leadership identification and recruitment, large rallies and 
marches, and utilizing innovative inside the workplace mobilization and pressure 
tactics.  Between the 1989 round of negotiations and the 2002 round of negotiations 
the Culinary Union went through two additional rounds of negotiations.  It was 
through the experiences gained by leaders and the rank-and-file in these prior rounds 
of negotiations that the Culinary Union developed the capacity to successfully carry 
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better use the rank-and-file mobilization tactics that are now part of its comprehensive 
contract campaigns, these earlier experiences also allowed the union to develop the 
organizational structure necessary for the effective use of these tactics.  For example, 
each comprehensive campaign between 1989 and 2002 led to increased levels of rank-
and-file participation in the union.  More specifically, although rank-and-file 
participation peaked during each round negotiations, after the negotiations 
participation stabilized at a level higher than it had been before the negotiations 
(Pappageorge, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005). 
As a result of its revitalization process the Culinary Union also gained 
expertise in corporate campaign tactics.  The union began to experiment with these 
tactics in the late 1980s as part of its 1989 comprehensive contract campaign as well 
as to enforce its 1984 contract.  The union has regularly used these tactics in its 
contract administration, external organizing, and political efforts as well as in its 
comprehensive campaigns.  Corporate pressure tactics played an important supporting 
role in the 2002 contract campaign.   
The Culinary Union’s efforts in this area would not have been nearly as 
effective in 2002 if the local had not already begun to develop its capacity in this area 
in prior years.  For example, during the 1990s the Culinary Union learned how to 
pressure casino operators through their relationships with a variety of stakeholders 
such as creditors, travel agents, investors, and potential business partners.  In this 
period, the Culinary Union, through its research department, cultivated close 
relationships with these stakeholders.  Therefore, by 2002, it had developed good 
working relationships with a variety of stakeholders in Las Vegas’s casino industry.  
These relationships helped the Culinary Union get its message out to these 
stakeholders during the contract campaign. The Culinary Union’s 2002 contract 
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the extent to which it had mobilized its members for the negotiations, and the 
likelihood of a costly strike if a deal could not be reached.  The Culinary Union’s goal 
was to get other stakeholders to put pressure on casino operators to settle on terms that 
were favorable to the union.  Therefore, the ability to effectively carry out the 
corporate campaign aspects of the 2002 comprehensive contract campaign was 
integral to the Culinary Union’s overall success in these negotiations.  The local 
developed this capacity, in part, through its previous comprehensive contract 
campaigns, beginning with the 1989 round of negotiations.  
Conclusion 
During the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s the Culinary Union underwent 
a revitalizing process, which ultimately enabled it to successfully pursue an ambitious 
comprehensive contract campaign strategy such as the one the local used in the 2002 
round of contract negotiations.  For example, during this period the Culinary Union 
developed external and internal organizing capabilities that were of significant benefit 
to the local during the 2002 round of negotiations.  The Culinary Union developed 
representative rank-and-file committees in each of the casino properties that facilitated 
rank-and-file mobilization, leadership recruitment, and communication between the 
union and its members.  By 2002 the rank-and-file leaders that were developed 
through these committees formed the bulk of the Culinary Union’s staff and 
leadership.  In fact, both of the union members that serve in the state legislature were 
recruited through these rank-and-file committees.  The committees also enabled the 
union to implement its innovative contract administration strategies, which further 
developed its ability to mobilize its members.   
The union’s external organizing campaigns also contributed to the Culinary 
Union’s 2002 contract campaign efforts.  First, many of the mobilization tactics that 
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Grand and the Santa Fe, were similar to the ones used in collective bargaining, such as 
building representative rank-and-file committees, mobilizing workers for large rallies, 
and using smaller scale rank-and-file pressure tactics such as the ones mentioned in 
the previous paragraph.  By the time of the 2002 negotiations, the union had gained a 
lot of experience mobilizing members for huge rallies and demonstrations involving 
thousands of workers, as well as other types of pressure tactics involving small groups 
of workers, such as delegations to management and break room rallies.  Secondly, 
these organizing efforts enabled the union to maintain density in an industry that was 
growing dramatically, thereby preventing it from being marginalized and weakened at 
the bargaining table.  At the time of the 2002 contract negotiations, the Culinary 
Union’s membership had swelled to more than 45,000. 
Furthermore, the Culinary Union’s ability to defeat repeated attempts by casino 
operators in the 1980s and early 1990s demonstrated to casino operators the risks of 
provoking a conflict with the Culinary Union.  The Frontier and the Sahara Gaming 
Corp. had lost their gaming businesses in Las Vegas entirely as a result of conflicts 
with Culinary Union; and the Boyd Group, Binion’s Horseshoe, and the MGM had 
suffered significant losses at the hands of the Culinary Union.  During the 2002 
contract negotiations the Culinary Union repeatedly invoked the losses incurred in 
these previous labor battles when encouraging nervous casino investors to put pressure 
on management to settle with the local. 
The union’s political efforts during the late 1980s through the 1990s also aided 
the local in its 2002 contract fight by earning allies amongst public officials, who put 
pressure on casino operators to settle with the union.  In the 15 years leading up to the 
negotiations the union had put together an increasingly effective electoral machine that 
was able to lend significant help to allied political officials as well as get its own 
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punishing the supporters of its opponents, for example, contributing to the upset defeat 
of Sue Lowden, the wife of the owner of the Sahara Gaming Corp, in her state senate 
reelection campaign. 
The union also developed extensive corporate campaign experience during its 
battles with casino operators in the 1980s and 1990s.  As a result the union had a well 
trained staff prepared for the 2002 campaign, with extensive experience developing 
effective strategies to put pressure on casino operators.  Furthermore, the union’s 
research staff had developed relationships with the investment community, which 
increased their ability to convince them to put pressure on gaming operators to settle 
with the union.   
Finally, through its previous fifteen years of experience the union learned how 
to coordinate activities across its three primary spheres of activity: politics, external 
organizing and collective bargaining.  For example, by bargaining for neutrality with 
the corporate casino operators the Culinary Union ensured that it could maintain 
density and, therefore, its leverage at the bargaining table, during a period of rapid 
growth in the industry.  Furthermore, the union’s campaign against MGM 
demonstrated how the union successfully used political strategies to prevent the 
expansion of MGM to new gaming jurisdictions, eventually forcing it to agree to card-
check neutrality with the union.  Therefore, the Culinary Union’s contract 
administration, external organizing, contract bargaining, and political strategies all 
contributed to the union’s capacity to successfully pursue its ambitious 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign strategy.  The revitalization of the local in all four 
of these core areas of activity was the foundation on which its comprehensive contract 
campaign was founded.  If the transformation of the union capabilities in just one of 
these areas had been lacking it would have significantly undermined the union’s 
ability to carry out such an ambitious campaign so effectively.  130 
   
This case study is different from most other case studies of the comprehensive 
contract campaigns because the Culinary Union had already gone through an extensive 
revitalization process by the time the 2002 contract negotiations were underway.  
Without having gone through this revitalization process the Culinary Union’s capacity 
to launch such an ambitious comprehensive campaign in 2002 would have been 
significantly diminished.  As mentioned in the literature review, most other analyses 
of comprehensive campaigns involve newly revitalized locals that lack the 
organizational capacities of the Culinary Union or, alternatively, lack a historical 
analysis of the local under study.  Therefore, when analyzing the Culinary Union’s 
2002 campaign strategy it is important to look at the history of the union as well as the 
local industry because this history played a very influential role in determining the 
Culinary Union’s strategic choices in the campaign as well as the effectiveness of the 
tactics employed.  It would be impossible to have a proper accounting of the 2002 
contract campaign if these historical factors and current practices were ignored.   
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Chapter VI: Contract Campaign Strategy 
Introduction 
The strategy pursued by the Culinary Union in its 2002 contract campaign was 
designed to exert pressure on casino operators on multiple fronts.  The strategy's 
foundation was a rank-and-file mobilization campaign upon which most of the other 
contract campaign tactics relied for their effectiveness.  The union's rank-and-file 
mobilization campaign was focused around a large bargaining committee made up of 
rank-and-file leaders drawn from almost every shift in each department in each of the 
casinos with contracts up for negotiation.  The Culinary Union utilized this committee 
to mobilize rank-and-file members for a number of large rallies and demonstrations as 
well as smaller rallies inside casino break rooms or EDRs.
15   
Another major part of the union’s contract campaign strategy was to exert 
pressure on gaming operators through their relationships with consumers, travel 
agents, the investment community, government officials, and the greater public.  The 
effectiveness of these corporate campaign tactics relied upon the success of the rank-
and-file mobilization campaign.  For example, the union sought to demonstrate to 
gaming investors that settling with the union would be less costly than enduring a 
strike, in the hope that these investors would put pressure on the management of 
casino companies to agree to a contract that was more favorable to the union.  In order 
to do this the Culinary Union had to demonstrate to gaming investors that it could 
sufficiently mobilize members in order to engage in an effective strike.  The ability of 
the union to demonstrate that it could mobilize its workers was especially important 
because many industry experts thought that casino employees would not strike 
because they were still recovering from the wave of layoffs that hit the industry 
following 9/11 (Wilhelm, 2004, Alexander, 2005).  
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The contract campaign's primary challenge was to legitimately threaten casino 
operators, as well as other stakeholders such as investors and tourists, with an effective 
work stoppage in the Las Vegas gaming industry.  The internal mobilization campaign 
culminated in a massive membership-wide strike vote and rally, two weeks before the 
contract expiration.  Around 20,000 union members attended this rally and voted 
almost unanimously to authorize the union's leadership to call a strike.  The union’s 
corporate campaign centered on two goals: inform stakeholders of the potential strike 
and the damage it could inflict on their interests and get these stakeholders to put 
pressure on casino operators to settle with the union.  The success of these strategy 
tactics hinged not just on the union’s contract campaign strategy, but also on several 
contextual factors which made Las Vegas casino owners particularly susceptible to 
strikes as well as facilitated the Culinary Union’s ability to mobilize its members 
(Alexander, 2005).  
Rank-and-File Mobilization Effort  
The key element of the Culinary and Bartenders Unions' rank-and-file 
mobilization campaign was the union’s large and representative bargaining committee.  
The bargaining committee provided the foundation for the unions' efforts to 
communicate with, survey, educate, and organize its rank-and-file.  As a result of 
having an active communication and organizing network in the workplace, the union 
was able to engage in various kinds of internal and external pressure as well as 
solidarity tactics.  The union was also able to mobilize workers to pressure employers 
in other ways besides in the workplace.  For example, on several occasions the union 
had workers leaflet outside of casinos along the Strip and picket casinos in downtown 
Las Vegas.  Finally, the rank-and-file mobilization campaign also provided a 
foundation for many of the unions' corporate campaign tactics, since many of these 
tactics relied on the union being able to create a legitimate strike threat in the eyes of 133 
 
casino operators, gaming industry investors, and other stakeholders in the negotiations.  
The creation of such a strike threat relied on the successful mobilization of the rank-
and-file.  
In addition to the general mobilization campaign the Culinary Union’s 
campaign strategy had elements that were specific to the GRAs.  GRAs played an 
especially important role in the campaign because they had grown to be by far the 
largest occupational category in the Culinary Union, as a result of the growing size of 
the casino hotels in Las Vegas.  Furthermore, they had been a group of employees that 
had been traditionally neglected by the local.  Although Al Bramlet had courted their 
support during the 1950s and 1960s, this occupational group had traditionally been 
treated somewhat like second-class citizens by the Culinary Union.  This disparate 
treatment may have been partially the result of the fact that these employees 
traditionally had been African-Americans, and the gaming industry in Las Vegas, as 
well as most of the rest of city, has historically been very segregated
16 (Rothman, 
2002a).  Furthermore, in recent years GRAs had been experiencing a dramatic 
increasing in the number and size of hotel rooms they were expected to clean.  These 
factors combined put GRA workload issues at the top of the Culinary Union’s list of 
bargaining priorities in the 2002 round of negotiations (Pappageorge 2003). 
However, support for the Culinary Union amongst the GRAs has been low 
compared to other occupational categories because of their historically neglected 
status.  Furthermore, many housekeepers were immigrants, did not speak English as 
first language, or came from other disempowered backgrounds.  These factors created 
several hurdles that the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization strategy had to 
overcome.  Therefore, the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization strategy for its 
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2002 comprehensive contract campaign contained several tactics that were specific to 
the GRAs and their workload concerns.  
The primary element of the unions' GRA campaign was a study of their 
workload.  This study was designed to demonstrate to casino operators and the public 
that the GRAs were suffering from a high number of work related injuries as a result 
of their excessive workload and to show to the GRAs that the union was serious about 
addressing important issues that were specific to them.  In order to further demonstrate 
how serious the Culinary Union was about addressing GRA workload issues, lead 
officials spent a day working as GRAs in the local casinos a couple of months before 
the negotiations got under way.  The union also held a special rally that highlighted 
the hardships GRAs faced at work, in which all the union's GRAs were invited along 
with local and state governmental and community leaders.  Finally, the union used a 
variety of efforts to get workers from other departments behind the GRAs such as 
having these other members work with GRAs on various contract campaign projects 
and have lunch with them in the EDRs. 
Building the Contract Committee and Administering the Contract Survey 
The Culinary and Bartenders Unions used a large and representative 
bargaining committee of about 2000 people in the 2002 contract negotiations.  The 
union's goal was to have one committee person for every 20 people in each shift in 
each department in each hotel.  Similar to shop stewards, every 3-5 committee people 
were overseen by a lead committee person, who was in turn overseen by an internal 
organizer.  The Culinary Union also took special precaution to ensure that bargaining 
committee was representative of its diverse membership. (Pappageorge, 2003, Dalton, 
2003).   
The Culinary and Bartenders unions used a large and representative contract 
committee for two main reasons.  First, a large contract committee improves 135 
 
communication with the rank-and-file about the progress of the negotiations.  This 
helped to even the playing field between management and the union leadership in 
terms of their ability to communicate with members.  Usually unions are at a 
disadvantage in this area because management has direct access to members at work.  
Also using a large bargaining committee creates an effective two-way communication 
network between the union members and its leadership, which allows the union 
leadership to get timely feedback from the rank-and-file about bargaining proposals 
made by the union or management (Wilhelm, 2004). 
The responsibilities of each bargaining committee member included keeping 
the workers they represent informed about the negotiations and collecting feedback 
from these workers about their feelings on the progress of the negotiations.  
Committee members were also expected to educate those they represent on their 
workplace rights and what to do if they are retaliated against for union activity.  
Furthermore, committee members are responsible for administering contract surveys 
to their respective groups of workers.  Usually these activities were done through 
informational meetings in the casino  
Finally, contract committee members are responsible for mobilizing their 
group of workers.  This means they make sure that these workers participate in inside 
actions such as wearing a contract button or participating in an EDR rally.  It also 
means that committee members are responsible for turning out members in their group 
for union wide activities such as the strike authorization vote (Dalton, 2003, 
Pappageorge, 2003, Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002). 
The unions' contract administration procedure greatly eased its efforts to put 
together the bargaining committees for each hotel operator.  They recruited shop 
stewards for the bargaining committee and lead shop stewards as lead bargaining 
committee members.  Generally, committee members were placed in charge of 136 
 
mobilizing the same 20 people they represented as shop stewards, and the lead 
committee members oversaw the same committee members they oversaw as lead shop 
stewards.  This meant that rank-and-file members where already familiar with those 
who mobilized them for the negotiations (Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003). 
In order to recruit shop stewards to be on the contract committee the union 
held a city-wide stewards’ meeting on December 13
th, 2001, to introduce the 
upcoming contract negotiations.  After the meeting, the union internal organizers 
house visited each shop steward to ask them if they wanted be on the bargaining 
committee and explained to them what their responsibilities would be if they choose to 
do so.  The vast majority of shop stewards agreed to serve on the contract committee.  
However, there were a significant number of workers who still did not have a 
representative on the bargaining committee either because their shop steward declined 
to be on the committee or because they were served by a shop steward who was 
already representing another group of workers on the bargaining committee. This 
occurred because in a few areas the Culinary Union had not yet recruited enough shop 
stewards to meet its goal of one shop steward for every twenty workers (Dalton, 2003, 
Pappageorge, 2003, Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002). 
The union's contract survey administration procedure was set up in such a way 
that it would mobilize workers around the contract campaign and help the union 
identify leaders amongst groups of workers who lacked representation on the contract 
committee, in addition to its traditional role of informing the union's leadership of 
what bargaining issues were most important to the membership.  Contract surveys 
were generally administered by contract committee members in EDRs when not on 
work time.  A committeeperson would set up a meeting with a few of the people, from 
the list of twenty people they are supposed to represent.  Each committee member 
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attention, who were not in their group of twenty.  Sometimes, the survey would be 
administered in a way that was similar to a rally with committee person, for example,  
yelling "Are you ready to strike?"  and those taking the survey would respond with a 
vociferous "Yes!"
17 (Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Contract Negotiations 
Information Packet, 2002). 
This helped the unions' effort to mobilize workers around the contract 
campaign as well as identify leaders from groups of workers that lacked representation 
on the committee.  By administering surveys in such an attention getting manner, 
committee members were able to draw the attention of others who had not yet filled 
out a survey.  If a person expressed interest in taking the survey, the committee person 
would briefly explain the contract campaign to him/her.  Then the committee person 
would tell him or her that if they were interested in filling out the survey they would 
either have to become a committee member by getting 20 people from their shift in 
their department to sign a form stating they wanted the individual to be their 
committee member, or the individual should find someone else who could do so.  It is 
important to note that when locating committee people in this way, the union still put a 
emphasis on leadership identification, this means that the unions screened potential 
committee people to make sure they were capable of leading their co-workers 
(Pappageorge, 2003, Dalton, 2003).   
GRA Campaign  
The Culinary and Bartenders Unions put together a special set of contract 
campaign tactics to deal specifically with GRAs and the issue of their workload.  
These tactics were designed to highlight the issue of GRA workload to casino 
operators and the general public, mobilize the GRAs for the contract campaign, create 
                                                 
17 It is important to note that the Culinary Union regularly polls it members so it was unlikely the 
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a sense of solidarity between GRAs and other rank-and-file workers, and make GRAs 
the public face of the contract campaign.  Tactics used in the GRA campaign included: 
having union leaders work as GRAs for a day in one of casinos, sponsoring an outside 
study of the GRAs workload and its health effects, holding a special rally to highlight 
the issue of GRA workload, including GRAs at the forefront of most public events, 
having rank-and-file GRAs eat lunch with rank-and-file workers from other 
departments, having rank-and-file leaders from other departments work with GRA 
rank-and-file leaders on union affairs, and educating members in other departments on 
how the GRA workload issue affects them.  
The GRA workload study was perhaps the most involved aspect of the GRA 
campaign.  The Culinary Union hoped to accomplish several goals with the study.  
First, the local wanted to confirm its suspicions that GRAs’ workload had increased 
significantly over last decade both in terms of the number of rooms they were 
expected to clean and in terms of the amount of work was required to clean each room.  
Furthermore, the Culinary Union wanted to confirm concerns that this increase was 
having a substantial adverse impact on the overall health of GRAs.  Secondly, the 
Culinary Union leadership hoped that in addition to increasing its own awareness of 
the issue, the study would also legitimize the issue to casino operators, the general 
public, and union members in other job classifications (Krause, 2002 Lee & Baker, 
2002).  
Lastly, the Culinary Union hoped that the study would aid its efforts to 
mobilize the GRAs for the final contract campaign (Krause 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002).  
This was important for two primary reasons.  First, the GRAs were supposed to be the 
public face of the campaign.  Secondly, as mentioned previously support for the 
Culinary Union has traditionally not been as strong among GRAs as it has been among 
other job classifications (Pappageorge, 2003). 139 
 
The Culinary Union hoped that the study would help mobilize its members in 
four primary ways.  First of all, the local’s leadership wanted the study to help 
convince GRAs that the union was seriously interested in addressing issues that were 
of specific importance to them.  Furthermore, the Culinary Union hoped the study 
would help it identify, recruit, and train rank-and-file leaders from among the GRAs it 
represented.  The local also hoped that the study would give members experience in 
resolving workplace issues in a collective manner through the union.  Overall, 
Culinary Union leaders hoped that the study would help develop union commitment 
and participation amongst the GRAs (Krause 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002). 
The union brought in a team of researchers from UC-Berkeley who had helped 
HERE Local 2 in San Francisco conduct a similar study.  In San Francisco, the same 
team of researchers worked for over a year to document the working conditions of 
GRAs in the local hospitality industry.  With the information gained from the study, 
HERE Local 2 was able to get language included in its next contract with hotel 
operators that reduced workloads of its GRA members.  The Culinary Union hoped 
that a corresponding study of GRA workload in Las Vegas would help it win similar 
language for its contracts with casino operators in the local gaming industry (Lee & 
Baker, 2002). 
The UC-Berkeley research team utilized a popular education model for its 
GRA work load study in order to link it to the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file 
mobilization efforts for the upcoming contract campaign.  The popular education 
model was introduced by Paulo Freire and is most commonly associated with Freire’s 
book Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970).  Popular education can be defined as a 
“systematic investigation, with the collaboration of those affected by the issues being 
studied” (Cornrow & Delp, 1999).  Under this model research is “driven by the 140 
 
questions and goals of the community and is participatory at every level.” (Cornrow & 
Delp, 1999).   
In regards to the GRA study in Las Vegas, the popular education model can be 
understood as being driven by four primary elements.  The first is that education is 
egalitarian in nature, where the assumption is that everyone has the capacity to teach 
as well as learn from others.  Secondly, the popular education model focuses on 
participants’ lived experiences and abilities of individuals confronting similar 
problems to learn from each other.  Third, is that learning and action go hand-in-hand 
,where the educational process is fundamentally linked to the resolution of the issue 
under study.  Generally, the resolution of the issue at hand is pursued through some 
sort of collective rather than individualistic means.  Finally, the popular education 
model usually has some sort of empowering effect on the participants; not just in 
regards to the resolutions of the issue at hand but rather regards to their overall socio-
economic position.  (Cornrow & Delp 1999; Krause 2002; Lee & Baker 2002) 
The GRA workload study had four principle parts: eight focus groups sessions 
where researchers identified issues that were of particular importance to the GRAs, 
data collection, the analysis of the survey results, and the dissemination of the survey 
results to rank-and-file members, casino operators, and the general public.  The focus 
group sessions took place over the summer of 2001, and each one was attended by 
about 27 GRAs that had been identified as rank-and-file leaders by the union and 
recruited to participate.  Each session was about three hours long and took place after 
the end of the GRA’s shift (Krause, 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002). 
During the focus group sessions, GRAs described and compared their job 
tasks, daily schedules, characteristics of the hotels they worked in, and work changes 
over the past five years.  Each participant carefully detailed changes in their workload. 
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problems, physical strain, musculoskeletal problems, productivity demands, and 
relationships with supervisors and management.  Finally the researchers and 
participating GRAs collected and analyzed safety information about the chemicals 
used to clean the hotel rooms  (Krause, 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002). 
For methodological reasons the survey had to be conducted in a centralized 
location, so the union was faced with the difficult task getting a sufficient percentage 
of GRAs working in union hotels to come down to the union hall to take the survey.  
In addition to the usual logistical problems that come with mobilizing such large 
groups of people, the union had to overcome the fact that many GRAs did not have 
their own transportation, could not speak English, or in some cases were illiterate.  
The first task confronting the local was to inform GRAs about the survey and why it 
was important for them to participate.  This was largely done through the union 
steward structure and other work place leaders the union had recruited specifically for 
this task.  The union put together a rank-and-file committee specifically for this task, 
consisting of about one committee member for about every 12 GRAs.  These 
committee members stressed to their co-workers how a high survey participation rate 
was integral to ability of the union to win a contract limiting GRA workload in the 
next round of negotiations. (Krause, 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002) 
The survey was administered at a variety of times at the union hall in order to 
ensure equal opportunity for GRAs of different shifts to participate.  Each GRA who 
was willing to participate scheduled a time to come down to the union hall to take the 
survey.  Because a large proportion of GRAs did not have their own transportation the 
union provided bus service to take the GRAs to the union hall.  Survey committee 
leaders met GRAs outside of their work place when they finished their shifts in order 
to escort them to buses that were scheduled to take them to the union hall.  Since some 
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survey either verbally or in written form.  After a group of GRAs completed the 
survey they were given transportation back to the their homes.  This was essential 
because Las Vegas has a poor public transportation system and many GRAs lived in 
neighborhoods that were considered unsafe after dark (Krause, 2002, Lee & Baker, 
2002). 
The researchers from UC-Berkeley analyzed the data in small groups, with 
rank-and-file leaders, and union staff.  These groups were structured in a way that 
encouraged each group bringing their own insights to the data at hand.  Role-playing 
was used to facilitate this process.  By working together each type of participant could 
learn the perspective of the other.  Furthermore, GRAs learned how many of their 
counterparts in other casinos struggled with many of the same issues they did, which 
helped to develop a sense of solidarity and outrage amongst the participating GRAs.  
They also learned of methods some of their counterparts had developed to deal with 
these issues (Krause, 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002). 
The study uncovered several troubling facts regarding GRA workload.  First, 
the study confirmed widely held beliefs that the workload of GRAs had been steadily 
increasing in almost all of Las Vegas’s unionized hotels.  This increase resulted both 
from increases in the number of rooms GRAs were expected to clean and the amount 
of effort required to clean each room.  The study also found that many GRA were 
coming into work 30-60 minutes early and working off the clock as well as skipping 
their lunches in order to complete their work assignments  (Krause, 2002, Lee & 
Baker, 2002, Pappageorge, 2003, Dalton, 2003). 
The health effects of the increased GRA workload were perhaps the most 
troubling.  The study revealed that in the past year 62% of participating GRAs had 
visited the doctor as a result of work related pain and had to take time off in 32% of 
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past four weeks due to work related pain.  Also 40% of participating GRAs suffered 
from high blood pressure compared to 25% of the overall adult US population.  In the 
focus group sessions, several GRAs reported suffering from employer retaliation as a 
result of reporting work-related injuries.  Finally, the study found that GRAs 
employed by casinos operators with more contentious relationships with the Culinary 
Union tended to be in poorer health  (Krause, 2002, Lee & Baker, 2002, Pappageorge, 
2003, Dalton, 2003). 
The findings from the study were first presented in a special joint contract 
negotiation session between the union and management, representatives from all of the 
major casino operators were present.  Also present were representatives from the 
union’s bargaining committee.  The researchers took questions from both the 
bargaining committee and management representatives about the study (Krause, 2002, 
Contract Negotiations Information Packet 2002, Dalton, 2003). Later the union held a 
press conference in which the study was presented to the wider public (Berns, 2002g). 
The GRA workload study helped the rank-and-file mobilization campaign in a 
variety of ways.  First, the focus group and data analysis sessions as well as the survey 
distribution process helped the union identify, recruit, and train rank-and-file leaders 
from among its GRA membership.  This was especially important for the local 
because GRAs have historically not been very active or supportive of the Culinary 
Union. Secondly, as result of the study the GRAs learned to think of their workplace 
problems collectively and use the union as a tool to resolve them.  Furthermore, the 
study helped the local improve its ability to communicate with GRAs about union 
issues.  For many GRAs this was the first time they had discussed union issues with 
their co-workers.  Additionally, the study encouraged GRAs to communicate across 
ethnic lines, which usually divided this diverse group workers.  Also, the survey 
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Altogether these factors helped to develop a sense of solidarity amongst the GRAs as 
well as increase their union commitment.  This is because through the popular 
education model the GRA were able to participate in the union and internalize its 
values of collective problem solving and solidarity.  This process helped to legitimize 
the Culinary Union to the GRAs. 
Another major part of the GRA campaign was a special rally the Culinary 
Union had for the GRAs at the Cashman Center, a large meeting venue in the city of 
Las Vegas.  About 2,000 GRAs attended this event along with union leaders and local 
and state government leaders, including the mayor of Las Vegas and the Governor of 
Nevada.  At the meeting several housekeepers spoke about the hardships they faced at 
work.  The union also premiered a short film highlighting the problems GRAs faced at 
work.  This rally helped the union mobilize the GRAs for the contract campaign as 
well as signaled to casino operators, consumers, and investors that the union enjoyed a 
high degree of support amongst GRAs in the contract campaign.  This event was 
important in signaling to GRAs that the union was serious about addressing issues of 
specific importance to them.  Several Culinary Union organizers reported that this 
event, as well as the data collection elements of the GRA workload study were critical, 
for winning the support of the GRAs for the contract campaign. (Dalton, 2003, 
Hughes, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Zeitz, 2003, Contract Negotiations Information 
Packet, 2002).  This rally also focused media attention on the GRAs, helping the 
Culinary Union's efforts to make the GRAs the public face of its contract campaign 
(Berns, 2002p).  
An important part of the Culinary Union’s strategy was to make the GRAs the 
public face of their contract campaign.  Their goal was that by doing this the public 
would perceive the contract negotiations as a contest primarily between GRAs and 
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industry and were overwhelmingly middle-aged minority mothers, they were more 
likely to get the public’s sympathy than other parts of the Culinary Union’s 
membership.  The effort to get the public's support was reflected in union rallies, 
where GRAs usually spoke, and in the union's campaign materials, in which GRAs 
figured prominently.  For example, the union often included graphics of housekeepers 
on their picket signs, campaign buttons and stickers (Pappageorge, 2003).  
Furthermore, it was reflected in some of the of the campaign slogans such as: "Follow 
the housekeepers to justice." (Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002).  
The union’s success in creating the public perception of the contract 
negotiations as largely contest between the GRAs and management was reflected in 
casino operators’ complaints in the media about this issue.  Casino executives 
complained in a number of articles in both the Las Vegas Review-Journal and in the 
Las Vegas Sun, that the GRA campaign was creating an unfavorable public image of 
them and undue sympathy for the Culinary Union in the negotiations  (Smith, 2002a, 
Berns, 2002f, Berns, 2003, Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002). 
In order to create a sense of solidarity between GRAs and other union 
members the Culinary Union used a set of tactics that educated non-GRAs about how 
curbing the workload of GRAs was also in their interest.  The local’s efforts to 
encourage communication between GRAs and other workers were focused on both 
bargaining committee members as well as the regular rank-and-file.  The local 
facilitated communication between GRA and non-GRA rank-and-file by encouraging 
them to take breaks and meals together in the EDR on a regular basis.  One internal 
organizer reported that this action in itself greatly alarmed casino managers because it 
was a clear demonstration of rank-and-file support for the contract campaign and the 
extent of the solidarity that existed between union members.  The union efforts to get 
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largely consisted of getting these groups of members to work together on various 
contract campaign projects.  Union organizers also got GRA bargaining committee 
members to stand up at rank-and-file meetings and describe what their work was like 
and what problems they faced (Dalton, 2002). 
The union argued that non-GRAs had a community of interest with GRAs on 
the workload issue because casinos were intensifying work across most job categories 
and that the GRA campaign was an effort to fight against this, not just for GRAs but 
for the other occupations as well.  In effect non-GRA rank-and-file members were told 
that the GRA campaign was a campaign to head off workload increases in other 
departments.   A dramatic increase in workloads following 9/11 greatly facilitated the 
Culinary and Bartenders Unions' efforts in this respect as members in many 
occupations grew alarmed about their own workloads and there became more 
supportive of the union and less trustful of employers on this issue overall  (Dalton, 
2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Wilhelm, 2003). 
Miscellaneous Rank-and-File Mobilization Tactics 
In addition to building a contract committee, administering the contract survey, 
and the GRA campaign the Culinary Union utilized a variety of other tactics to 
mobilize its membership.  These activities centered around developing other means of 
communication with the membership, building a sense of solidarity amongst the 
members, and developing rank-and-file confidence about engaging in collective action 
in the workplace. 
The Culinary and Bartenders' Union utilized a number of other means to 
communicate with their memberships other than through the bargaining committee.  
Many of these tactics are relatively common aspects of collective bargaining, such as 
regular bilingual mailings to the membership detailing the progress of the negotiations 
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bilingual radio show, with union leaders fielding calls from members and the public 
about the contract negotiations. (Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002, 
Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003) 
In addition to the previously mentioned tactics, union members wore contract 
campaigns buttons and ribbons in a show of solidarity.  Often, Culinary Union 
members in casinos whose contracts did not expire in 2002 wore campaign buttons 
and ribbons to show their solidarity with their fellow union members at properties that 
were involved in the negotiations (Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002, 
Arguello-Kline, 2003).  In one instance, a number of workers at Harrah’s were 
suspended for wearing their union buttons.  In response, the union got all the workers 
at another casino that was owned by the same company but was not involved in the 
2002 negotiations to wear contract campaign buttons in order to express their 
solidarity with their suspended colleagues.  Soon after this demonstration, the 
management of Harrah’s backed down and the workers were reinstated (Arguello-
Kline, 2003).   
Rank-and-File External and Internal Pressure Tactics 
The Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization effort enabled the local to 
effectively engage in a number of rank-and-file intensive pressure tactics that 
significantly increased its leverage at the bargaining table.  These tactics were utilized 
both within the workplace and outside of the workplace and often were also part of the 
local’s corporate campaign strategy.  Furthermore, these tactics were used to 
demonstrate to stakeholders that the Culinary Union had successfully mobilized their 
membership and could legitimately threaten to engage in an effective strike.   
The most dramatic of the local’s internal tactics were EDR rallies and 
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Berns briefly described a typical EDR rally in an article he wrote in the Las Vegas 
Review-Journal: 
On a recent morning, 100 housekeepers, waitresses and others gathered in 
Treasure Island's employee dining room for a mini-union rally led by State 
Sen. Maggie Carlton, D-Las Vegas, who herself is a restaurant waitress and 
shop steward at the Strip mega-resort.  The five-minute gathering began with 
the sort of rhythmic clapping and chanting that dominates much larger 
Culinary gatherings.  'Union! Union! Union!' Carlton yelled as her 
predominantly Spanish-speaking audience of uniformed workers joined in.  'Si, 
se puede! Si, se puede! Si, se puede!' came the Spanish-language response of 
'Yes we can!'  A collection of seven or eight Treasure Island executives stood 
along a nearby wall eyeing the scene.  (Berns 2002g) 
It is important to note that in addition to being pressure tactics, these tactics 
also served to mobilize the rank-and-file and develop a sense of solidarity in the 
workplace.  These tactics were a regular part of the unions' workplace campaign 
strategy taking place on numerous occasions in a variety of hotels.  In interviews many 
of the internal organizers expressed the opinion that if the union had not already been 
pursuing a contract administration strategy based on the organizing model, the ability 
of the union to use tactics such as EDR rallies and delegations to management as part 
of its contract campaign strategy would have been significantly diminished (Contract 
Negotiations Information Packet, 2002, Berns, 2003, Dalton, 2003, Hughes, 2003 
Pierce, 2003, Zeitz, 2003, Alexander, 2005, Henry, 2005, Pappageorge, 2005).  
In addition to employing rank-and-file intensive strategies inside the 
workplace, the union also engaged in a number of rank-and-file intensive strategies 
outside of the workplace.  Such strategies included leafleting and picketing outside of 
casinos as well as  holding in several large rallies and demonstrations.  Similar to the 
inside pressure tactics, the success of the union in employing these external pressure 
tactics is significantly linked to its prior contract administration strategies. 149 
 
The Culinary Union flyered outside casinos both downtown and along the strip 
numerous times.  In order to avoid violating their current contract, the local flyered 
outside of nonunion casinos.
18  Perhaps the most imaginative of these actions was the 
Culinary Union's "Support My Mommy Day"  This action took place on May 18th less 
than two weeks before the contract expired on June 1st.  "Support My Mommy Day"  
was staged on the Strip with a fair-like atmosphere with the union handing out 
balloons, hotdogs, and lemonade to people walking along the Strip.  The main part of 
the action consisted of the children of the GRAs handing out flyers with headings such 
as "Please help our moms!"  Also included on the flyers were pictures the children had 
drawn of themselves and their moms with information about the GRAs workload and 
its health effects and other contract campaign issues.
19 (Contract Negotiations 
Information Packet, 2002, German, 2002n, Simpson, 2002v). 
Union rallies and marches also made up a large part of the Culinary Union 
campaign strategy.  The union held numerous rallies in conjunction with the contract 
negotiations, the most important of which was the May 16
th strike vote that served as 
the capstone of the union rank-and-file mobilization effort.  The unions’ ability to 
successfully organize these rallies and demonstrations exerted a lot of pressure on 
casinos to settle because they greatly alarmed investors, consumers, and the casino 
operators themselves about the probability and severity of a strike.  The high degree of 
rank-and-file participation in the rallies and demonstrations sent a message to 
stakeholders in the negotiations that the Culinary Union had the strong support of its 
members in the negotiations and that a strike was probable if a settlement could not be 
reached. 
                                                 
18 Flyering was still effective because of the geographical proximity of the nonunion properties to the 
union properties and the heavy pedestrian traffic between the casinos, both along the Las Vegas Strip 
and downtown. 
19 A copy of one such flyer is included at the end of this paper. 150 
 
Much like the EDR rallies, the larger rallies and demonstrations that made up 
the Culinary Union’s contract campaign would not have been possible without the 
extensive shop floor organization the union built up both prior to and in the earlier 
parts of the contract campaign.  By the time it became necessary  to turn out members 
for these rallies and demonstration the unions’ rank-and-file were already highly 
mobilized.  Many of the Culinary Union’s staff members pointed out that these rallies 
and demonstrations had a snowballing effect, so that smaller rallies that were held 
earlier in the campaign acted as mobilizing agents, making it easier for the Culinary 
Union to turn out workers for similar events later in the campaign (Dalton, 2003, 
Weiss, 2003, Pappageorge, 2004). 
Other than the GRA rally discussed earlier the Culinary Union engaged in 
three other major rallies and marches in the course of the contract campaign.  
Furthermore, in addition to these major rallies the two locals held smaller rallies in 
conjunction with other unions that were holding conventions in Las Vegas.  There 
were three of these rallies: June 8th with about 1,500 marchers from the UAW,  June 
18 with 1,500 members of the CWA, and June 26th with 2,000 members of AFSCME. 
(Simpson 2002m; Simpson 2002i)  
The May 16th strike vote and rally was the most significant of the 2002 
contract negotiations.  It was the first time the Culinary Union, in its history, had 
attempted to mobilize its entire membership for a single rally.  As mentioned earlier, 
the May 16th rally/strike vote was the climax of the Culinary Union’s mobilization 
efforts.  More than 20,000 union members showed up to the rally and they voted 
18,654 to 877 in favor of authorizing the unions' bargaining committee to call a strike 
(Berns, 2002b).  Attendance at the May 16th rally exceeded the union leaderships’ 
expectations and caused traffic tie-ups that prevented even more rank-and-file union 151 
 
members from attending (Dalton, 2003, Weiss, 2003).  Much of the mobilizing for the 
May 16th strike vote was done through the union's bargaining committee. 
This rally was significant because much of the Culinary and Bartenders' 
Unions' contract campaign strategy was based upon the ability of the unions' to 
effectively strike the Las Vegas casino industry, and the May 16th strike vote and rally 
sent a clear message to casino operators, investors and consumers that the Culinary 
and Bartenders Unions were prepared to strike in order to obtain their contract 
demands.  According to several union staffers who sat in on the actual negotiations, 
management became much more willing to seriously consider the Culinary Union’s 
contract demands after the negotiations (Wilhelm, 2003, Pappageorge, 2005, 
Alexander, 2005).  In fact, in the weeks following the strike vote the union settled its 
first contract with one of the major casino operators, Park Place Entertainment.  Soon 
after this first contract, other casino operators settled with the union, signing contracts 
patterned after the one with Park Place (Pappageorge, 2004).  The Culinary Union 
accomplished their two most important goals with these contracts: protecting the 
quality of their healthcare plan and restricting GRA workload (Berns. 2002h, Berns, 
2002i, Berns, 2002j, Berns, 2002k). 
The second largest rally related to the 2002 contract negotiations took place on 
June 21st on Fremont Street in front of the downtown casinos with which the union 
was negotiating.  The estimated attendance at this rally was 12,000 consisting of both 
downtown and Strip employees.  Although Strip casino operators had settled by this 
time, downtown operators were still holding out for a less expensive contract.  In order 
to turn out such large numbers for the rally the Culinary and Bartender's Union had to 
successfully mobilize Strip workers, from casinos who had already settled with the 
union.  Therefore, the fact that about half of the people at the rally worked at Strip 
casinos was especially remarkable (Simpson, 2002d, Hughes, 2003). 152 
 
The 33-hour downtown picket line was another important public rally held to 
put pressure on downtown casino operators.  The rally consisted of informational 
pickets that were set up in front of downtown casinos 33 hours before the contract 
extension the union held with the downtown casinos expired.  The pickets were set up 
in front of these casinos at 3 p.m. on June 29th and about 1,000 people manned the 
picket line (Simpson, 2002e). 
Corporate Pressure Tactics 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter the Culinary Union’s corporate 
campaign exploited casino operators' networks of relations with investors, consumers, 
meeting planners, and travel agents as points of leverage in the contract negotiations.  
Furthermore, the local closely coordinated its corporate campaign effort with the rank-
and-file mobilization campaign, creating a comprehensive campaign strategy that was 
reliant on the local’s ability to mobilize its rank-and-file members. 
A key part of the Culinary Unions' corporate campaign was convincing casino 
investors and consumers as well as travel agents and meeting planners to put pressure 
on casino operators to settle with the union.  In order to do this, the two locals had to 
convince these parties that their respective stakes within the Las Vegas gaming 
industry, whether it was an investment, a client's account, or a vacation would be 
endangered if casino operators did not settle with the union.  The way that the unions 
did this was to convince these parties that the Culinary Union could effectively engage 
in a strike, if they were unable to reach an acceptable settlement with the major Las 
Vegas casino operators (Alexander, 2005). 
The Culinary Union also sought to convince stakeholders that the prosperity 
enjoyed by the gaming industry prior to the 9/11 attacks was partially the result of the 
cooperative relationship that existed between the union and most gaming operators 
over the previous dozen years.  For example, as discussed in the prior chapter, the 153 
 
Culinary Union’s parent union, HERE has cooperated with casino operators in order to 
enable the gaming industry to expand to new jurisdictions where it had been 
previously prohibited.  Additionally, the two parties have cooperated in order to 
contain gaming taxes and the healthcare costs of casino employees.  The Culinary 
Union also compared the performances of the generally thriving unionized casinos 
along the Las Vegas strip to their generally under performing non-union counterparts 
such as the Venetian and Aladdin, which further strengthened their argument about the 
importance of positive labor relations for the local industry’s prosperity.
20  The 
Culinary Union sought to convince stakeholders that casino operators’ were 
endangering the benefits they reaped from the cooperative labor-management 
relationship by taking such a hard-line in the negotiations (Alexander, 2005).   
In order to recognize the full value of this aspect of the Culinary Union’s 
corporate campaign strategy it is important to appreciate how important a positive 
public image is to casino operators.  The gaming industry is very image conscious 
because of  moral questions about gambling itself, and the industry’s links, in the mind 
of many people, with societal problems such as addiction and organized crime.  The 
gaming industry has become especially aware of its own image problems as it has 
tried to move into new jurisdictions, where it has been previously prohibited.  The 
gaming industry is especially sensitive to bad publicity revolving around labor issues, 
because one of the key arguments the industry makes when lobbying against 
restrictions on gambling is that the industry provides good, living wage jobs.  
Furthermore, the gaming industry usually cites Las Vegas as a prime example of 
where the gaming industry has benefited workers.  As a result, if it were widely 
reported that casino operators in Las Vegas were trying undermine the standard of 
                                                 
20 As of 2002, both the Venetian and the Aladdin had consistently lost money since their openings.  
Furthermore, the MGM-Grand, which operated with significant losses while remaining non-union, was 
able to turn itself around once its were workers were organized and by 2002 had several profitable years 
under its belt.  (Rothman 2003)  154 
 
living of their employees in Las Vegas, it would significantly undermine the industry’s 
expansion efforts overall (Alexander, 2005).  Therefore, it was especially important 
for the union to publicize the casino operators antagonistic approach to the 
negotiations as well as demonstrate to investors how management was endangering 
the gaming industry’s expansionary prospects (Alexander, 2005). 
When communicating with investors the Culinary Union used the dramatic fall 
off in business following 9/11 to its advantage as well.  The union explained to 
investors that the losses casino operators incurred in the last city wide strike in 1984 
approximated the recent losses casinos had suffered as a result of 9/11.  Local 226’s 
lead researcher felt that this message resonated particularly strongly with investors 
because they were just recovering from the dramatic financial hit they suffered as 
result of 9/11 (Alexander, 2005).  For example, although room occupancy had 
returned to pre-9/11 levels by the time of the negotiations, room rates and stock prices 
were still on the rebound.  Gaming investors were nervous that a city-wide strike in 
Las Vegas would threaten this nascent recovery.  Overall, in the case of investors the 
Culinary Union sought to demonstrate that settling on the union’s terms would be less 
expensive than trying endure a city wide strike and throwing away the mutually 
beneficial relationship that had developed between most Las Vegas casino operators 
and the union (Alexander, 2005). 
In order to convince consumers, investors and travel agents that the union 
could effectively strike the Las Vegas Strip the union had to effectively mobilize its 
membership around the negotiations and advertise this mobilization to the respective 
parties.  The union did this by holding very visible rallies such as the May 16
th strike 
vote or the Cashman Center rally, sending information to investors, travel agents, 
meeting planners as well as businesses that provide goods and services to Las Vegas 
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investors in order to give the union’s perspective in the negotiations, continually 
flyering outside of casinos, setting up a regularly updated web page dealing with the 
negotiations, and promoting extensive coverage in the regular as well as business 
media.  
It is important to note that the Culinary Union had already developed 
relationships with many important stakeholders such as several large institutional 
investors and business publications that routinely reported on the gaming industry.  In 
fact, because the union had already established a reputation with many in the business 
community for providing accurate and valuable information and analysis on issues 
related to the gaming industry, many investors as well as other stakeholders sought out 
the union’s perspective on the contract negotiations.  These relationships helped the 
union to get its message out in the 2002 contract campaign (Alexander, 2005).  This 
was especially important because Las Vegas principal daily newspaper tended to favor 
management in its coverage of labor issues (Benz, 2004). 
The Culinary Union’s corporate pressure tactics would have been ineffective if 
the Culinary union had not successfully mobilized their rank-and-file for a possible 
strike, because these tactics centered on the ability of the union to effectively convince 
stakeholders that a strike would be more damaging to their interests than if casino 
operators simply settled on terms acceptable to the union.  The goal of the Culinary 
Union was to create as much stakeholder concern as possible, so that these 
stakeholders would put pressure on casino employers to settle with the union. 
Influence of Context of Culinary Union Comprehensive Campaign Strategy 
The last chapter analyzed how the Culinary Union’s own internal practices in 
the years prior to 2002 influenced the local’s strategic decision making and success in 
mounting its comprehensive contract campaign in the spring of that year.  The 
following section will discuss how the campaign was influenced by external factors 156 
 
such as the socio-political climate and industrial context.  The Culinary Union’s 2002 
campaign strategy sought to take advantage of leverage points and minimize liabilities 
created by these factors.   
A key advantage the Las Vegas casino industry afforded the Culinary Union in 
2002 was the continued effectiveness of the strike as an industrial relations tactic for 
the local.  Unlike other industries where the advent of widespread use of permanent 
replacements and other unfavorable changes in labor law have significantly 
undermined the power of a strike, the strike remains a potent weapon for unions in Las 
Vegas’s casino industry, if combined with effective rank-and-file mobilization and 
corporate pressure campaign.  The Culinary Union demonstrated the continued 
effectiveness of strikes in the local casino industry in previous disputes with Binion’s 
Horseshoe and the Frontier as well as in the 1984 city wide strike.  In each of these 
instances casino operators lost significant amounts of revenue as a result of strikes 
called by the Culinary Union. 
Strikes are still effective in Las Vegas for a variety of reasons.  The first reason 
is that service quality is very important in the casino industry, and a strike can cut to 
the heart of casino patron’s experience in Las Vegas.  On the most fundamental level, 
having several thousand noisy picketers marching up and down the Las Vegas Strip or 
the Fremont Street Experience can ruin any vacationer’s or conferee’s trip to Las 
Vegas.  Furthermore the large amount of contact between casino employees and 
patrons means that low employee morale or unprepared striker replacements can 
dramatically effect the quality of service patrons receive (Rothman, 2002b, Rothman, 
2003).  As MGM-Mirage’s Chairman Terri Lanni explained in an interview with the 
New York Times: “When you’re in the service business, the contact our guests have is 
with the guest-room attendants or the food and beverage servers, and if that person is 
unhappy that comes across to guests very quickly.” (Greenhouse, 2004).  This factor is 157 
 
especially important for the higher-end properties that dominate the Las Vegas Strip, 
who often use higher service quality rating to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors.  The importance of a positive labor relations environment on service 
quality is highlighted by the poor ratings non-union strip casino such as the Venetian 
and Aladdin have received (Rothman, 2002b, Rothman, 2003). 
The relative isolation of Las Vegas also increases the effectiveness of strikes in 
the local casino industry.  There is not a sufficient employment base in Las Vegas’s 
metropolitan area from which casino operators can recruit replacement workers if the 
Culinary Union were to engage in a city-wide strike.  If such a strike were to occur 
casino operators would have to recruit strike replacements from other major 
population centers in the southwest such as Los Angeles or Phoenix (Berns, 2002n).  
This process is made more difficult by the unappealing nature of GRAs’ work, which 
is the largest job category in Las Vegas’s  casino industry (Dalton, 2003, Wilhelm, 
2004, Henry, 2005). 
The effectiveness of a strike in Las Vegas’s casino industry is also heightened 
by fact that three of the four largest casino operators in Las Vegas derive a large 
proportion of their revenue from their Las Vegas operations.  This fact makes it 
difficult for these operators to use revenue from other localities to wait out a strike in 
Las Vegas’s casino industry as happened in the 2003-2004 UFCW grocery strike.  
Furthermore, at the time of the negotiations, casino operators were in significant debt, 
which further increased their vulnerability to a Culinary Union strike.  This is because 
casino operators largely relied on the revenue they earned from their Las Vegas 
operations to finance their debt payments (Rothman, 2002b, Rothman, 2003, 
Alexander, 2005).  
In developing its comprehensive contract campaign strategy the Culinary 
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create very visible signs of the willingness of the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file to 
strike if casino operators did not concede to their contract demands.  The union did 
this by holding very large rallies in the build up to the contract expiration date, 
culminating with the May 16
th strike vote.  The local also held a number of smaller 
events designed for media attention as well as rank-and-file mobilization such as the 
intermittent EDR rallies and various rallies downtown.   
The Culinary Union’s research department then ensured that the various stake 
holders who influenced the casino operators’ decision making process were aware of 
the militancy of the local’s rank-and-file workers and the probable effect of a city-
wide strike on casino operator’s revenues.  The local contacted a wide variety of stake 
holders in this process such as: convention and meeting planners, creditors, investors, 
investment analysts, and travel agents.  All of these had a significant financial stake in 
the continued profitability of unionized casinos in Las Vegas.  In order to present a 
convincing argument to these parties the union demonstrated how much revenue 
casino operators had lost in previous strikes such as the 1984 city-wide strike or the 
more recent Frontier strike.  Furthermore, the local sought to show to these groups the 
benefits of having a positive labor relations environment in Las Vegas, by highlighting 
the low service ratings of non-union Strip properties.  As a result of the Culinary 
Union’s efforts casino operators began to come under pressure from a variety of 
stakeholders to settle with the union. 
Union strategy in negotiations with downtown and neighborhood casino operators 
The Culinary Union faced a very different set of circumstances in its 
negotiations with the downtown and neighborhood casino operators leading it to 
modify its strategy of negotiations with these properties.  This highlights the 
importance of adapting comprehensive contract campaign strategies to the 159 
 
environment in which they take place as discussed by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
(2001)   
Unlike their Strip counterparts, downtown and unionized neighborhood casinos 
were not flourishing businesses, rather they were businesses whose continued viability 
was questionable.  Furthermore, the vast majority of downtown and unionized 
neighborhood casinos were not owned by large gaming and hospitality corporations, 
rather they were often privately-owned family-run businesses.  Additionally, the 
unionized neighborhood casinos operated in a largely non-union market, which meant 
that unlike their Strip counterparts, they faced competition from other non-union 
casinos with less expensive labor costs.  Finally, downtown casinos competed with the 
largely non-union neighborhood casinos for local customers.   
These conditions lead the Culinary Union to alter its strategy for its 
negotiations with the downtown and neighborhood casino operators.  First, its public 
relations campaign could not rely on a David vs. Goliath public perception of the 
campaign as largely a battle between low-paid GRAs and the large greedy gaming 
corporations.  This is because, given the conditions discussed in the previous 
paragraph, most of the public in fact thought that the union had the upper hand in the 
negotiations with downtown and neighborhood casinos (Rothman 2003).  Therefore, 
in order to gain public support the union emphasized issues such as: the importance of 
maintaining affordable health insurance for the disproportionably older downtown 
workforce and the long tenure of many downtown employees with the same casino.  
Furthermore, many downtown and neighborhood operators were closely-held 
organizations, limiting the number of outside stakeholders the Culinary Union could 
use to influence the their decision on whether to settle with the union.  However, 
because most of these operations were only marginally viable they also were much 
more wary of taking on the large Culinary Union. (Pappageorge 2003)   160 
 
Also because the Culinary Union settled with the large Strip operators first, it 
sought to mobilize its rank-and-file members from these properties to become 
involved in the on-going negotiations with the downtown and neighborhood casinos.  
This was done by setting up an adopt-a-hotel program where workers from hotels that 
had already settled with the Culinary Union were assigned to hotels the had yet to 
settle.  These workers were then expected to engage in various solidarity actions with 
workers from their "adopted" hotels.  These actions included such things as eating 
meals in groups at the hotels still engaged in negotiations to show their support for 
union members in these hotels, and showing up to rallies and pickets involving their 
"adopted" hotels (Contract Negotiations Information Packet, 2002).  Again, rank-and-
file workers were mobilized for these solidarity actions through their bargaining reps, 
further demonstrating the importance of the bargaining committee and previous 
contract administration strategy to the contract campaign.  The success of the "adopt-
a-hotel" program was demonstrated by the fact 12,000 people participated in the June 
21st March in downtown Las Vegas, when only about 5,000-plus union members 
work in the downtown and neighborhood casinos (German, 2002, Simpson 2002f, 
Simpson 2002m). 
Impact of 9/11 on the 2002 Comprehensive Contract Campaign  
The 2002 round of contract negotiations was profoundly influenced by the 9/11 
disaster and the fall out in the national tourist industry that it caused. Las Vegas, 
because its economy is largely based on tourism, was one of the hardest hit cities in 
the United States from this phenomenon.  The local casino industry faced the brunt of 
the economic downturn.  Hotel occupancy and room rates plummeted.  Although hotel 
occupancy had rebounded by the end of 2001, room rates remained depressed long 
into 2002.   161 
 
This decline in tourism activity lead to massive lay-offs throughout the Las 
Vegas's casino industry.  At the peak of the lay-offs around half of the Culinary 
Union’s total membership had either been laid off or had their hours dramatically 
reduced.  Several months after the 9/11 disaster, former casino workers were still 
waiting to get called back to their jobs and an even larger number of formerly full-time 
workers remained on part-time status.  Those who were able to hold on to their jobs 
faced a dramatically increased workload as they had to cover the work of their co-
workers who had been laid off or were working reduced hours (Wilhelm, 2004, Smith, 
2002b).   
Although many laid off workers had been rehired by the time the 2002 contract 
negotiations were underway, the lay-offs following September 11th became a 
significant issue in the negotiations.  The economic fallout caused by 9/11 in the 
hospitality and gaming industries caused widespread fear among union members about 
their job security and overall economic well being.  This fear was exasperated by the 
fact most of the Culinary Union members earned relatively low wages to begin with, 
and therefore could not easily weather long periods of unemployment (Wilhelm, 2004, 
Pappageorge, 2003).  Furthermore, a proposal by the Culinary Union leaders to cut the 
hours of more senior employees who were still working, in order to decrease the 
number of more junior members that had been laid-off created divisions within the 
local’s rank-and-file membership (Rothman, 2002b).   
However by early 2002, employee outrage over how casino employers handled 
the post-9/11 crisis in Las Vegas Gaming industry overcame these earlier fears and 
divisions.  There were a variety of reasons why local casino employees began to aim 
their antagonism toward employers.  First, many employees and union officials 
thought that casino operators had used the economic fallout following 9/11 as an 
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casino operators of failing to rehire workers at a rate that was commiserate with the 
rate that business was rebounding by the end of 2001, and expecting workers to handle 
an increased workload long after it was necessary (Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, 
Wilhelm, 2003). 
Furthermore, on April 2nd just as the 2002 contract negotiations were getting 
underway, it was revealed that executives at MGM-Mirage had received large bonuses 
in the midst of the post 9/11 fallout.  These bonuses undermined the rhetoric of shared 
sacrifice used by many in the casino industry after 9/11 and were later used by casino 
operators to justify some of their concessionary contract demands.  The bonuses also 
created a sense of bad feeling towards casino operators within the general local 
population, since the post-9/11 fallout in the gaming industry had caused tremendous 
hardship in the rest of the local economy.  This helped the Culinary Union obtain the 
sympathy of the public in the 2002 negotiations.  Finally, The Mandalay Resort Group 
exasperated this sense of bad feeling by going ahead with their project to add a 
convention center and additional hotel tower to the Mandalay Bay Casino, while 
arguing they could not afford union demands as a result of  9/11 (Rothman, 2002b, 
Simpson, 2002a, Smith, 2002b).  
According to HERE President John Wilhelm, employee anger towards casino 
operators was higher than anything he had ever previously experienced in Las Vegas’s 
casino industry.  Most of the  Culinary Union’s internal organizers interviewed for this 
case study, reported similar feelings among the workers they interacted with.  They 
also said that antagonism created by the actions of casino employers in the aftermath 
of 9/11 significantly aided their efforts to mobilize rank-and-file union members.  
Furthermore, before 9/11 the Culinary Union had already decided to focus on GRA 
workload issues in the 2002 contract campaign, so widespread suspicion that casino 
operators had used the disaster to increase work loads, facilitated the union’s 163 
 
mobilization efforts in this area, in particular.  Several organizers stated that they felt 
that employer reluctance to reduce workloads as tourism began to pick-up after the 
9/11 emergency subsided created much more sympathy for the GRA workload issue 
amongst union members outside of the housekeeping department.  Overall, the 9/11 
disaster may have had the effect of highlighting the divisions in the interests of casino 
employees and management (Dalton, 2002, Hughes, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, 
Wilhelm, 2004).   
In the wake of the post-9/11 fall out in the tourism industry many hospitality 
and gaming industry experts predicted that unions in these industries would have to 
make significant concessions in upcoming rounds of negotiations, and Las Vegas was 
no exception.  However, HERE's national leadership argued publicly that the effects of 
9/11 were only temporary and they did not see them as adequate justification for 
locking their members into inferior contracts for several years into the future.  HERE 
had its first post-9/11 round of negotiations in Boston in October and November and 
many labor experts saw these negotiations as setting the precedent for subsequent 
post-9/11 rounds of negotiations, including Las Vegas.  In spite of the fact that hotel 
occupancy in Boston was down by roughly 60% and at least half the local's 
membership had been laid off,  HERE Local 26 in Boston put together an aggressive 
comprehensive contract campaign and was able to achieve one of the best contracts in 
the history of their local.  The union was able to obtain a five-year contract granting 
their members a five percent wage increase and an additional personal day off as well 
as providing Local 26 with card check neutrality for any new hotels opened in Boston 
by the hotel chains that signed the agreement.   
This successful contract campaign demonstrated that it was possible to 
negotiate a strong contract in the wake of 9/11.  Furthermore, it demonstrated that the 
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position.  This was especially true for employers who were deep in debt, like the major 
employers in Las Vegas.  This was because the events of 9/11 had made it more 
difficult for them to meet their debt service requirements, therefore making them and 
other creditors nervous about potentially disrupting revenue flow by engaging in a 
protracted labor struggle.  (Berns, 2002g, Wilhelm, 2004, Stoughton, 2001).  
Therefore, although on a prima facie level it seemed likely that the 9/11 
disaster should have undermine the Culinary Union’s bargaining position in the 2002 
negotiations, it actually had a more mixed effect.  Initially the fallout in the tourism 
industry following 9/11 divided the Culinary Union’s membership and left them 
concerned about the future of their jobs.  However, the actions of casino operators in 
the aftermath of 9/11, alienated casino employees.  This had the ultimate effect of 
aiding union mobilization efforts for the 2002 contract campaign.  For example, the 
increase in overall employee workloads aided Culinary Union efforts to mobilize 
members around the GRA workload issue for the 2002 contract campaign.  The 9/11 
disaster also made casino employers more vulnerable to corporate pressure tactics 
because they were concerned labor unrest may disrupt ability of casinos to meet their 
debt service requirements and threaten the post-9/11 recovery of the casino industry 
that was taking place at the time of the negotiations. 
Conclusion 
The primary strategy of the Contract Campaign was to credibly threaten to 
strike the entire Las Vegas casino industry if gaming operators did not concede to the 
union’s contract demands.  This strategy consisted of two parts.  The first part 
consisted of mobilizing workers in a very visible way thereby creating the appearance 
of widespread worker militancy in the industry.  The second part of the campaign was 
to convince stakeholders in the negotiations that the strike threat was real and compel 
them to pressure casino operators to settle with the union. 165 
 
This strategy was well adapted to the context of the negotiations both in terms 
of the Culinary Union’s own internal organizational strengths and in terms of the 
bargaining environment the local faced.  Largely as a result of its prior contract 
administration, contract bargaining, external organizing, and political strategies the 
Culinary Union had developed the organizational capacity to mobilize its more than 
45,000 members for the negotiations.  The local’s contract administration strategy in 
the years leading up to the negotiations probably played the largest role in preparing 
the union’s rank-and-file members for the mobilization effort.   
The Culinary Union’s 2002 contract campaign strategy was also well adapted 
to its external environment.  The Culinary Union had identified the primary weakness 
of Las Vegas casino operators as their continued vulnerability to strikes, therefore the 
corporate campaign focused on exposing this vulnerability to a variety of stakeholders 
who the union thought would influence the decision making process of the operators 
in the negotiations.  These stakeholders were primarily gaming industry investors, 
investment analysts, creditors, meeting and convention planners, travel agents, and 
vacationers.  In order to gain leverage vis-à-vis casino operators, the Culinary Union 
educated these stakeholders about the likelihood and probable cost of a city wide 
strike in Las Vegas’s casino industry and used them to pressure casino operators to 
settle with the union.  Therefore, developing a credible strike threat was critical to 
these efforts, and a highly visible rank-and-file mobilization campaign was the key to 
this process. 
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Chapter VII: 2002 Contract Negotiations: Overview of Events 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the actual 2002 contract negotiations 
between the Culinary Union and most of the unionized gaming operators in Las 
Vegas.  It will begin with an overview of how gaming operators approached the 
negotiations and describe how a variety of factors inhibited the casino operators from  
coordinating their bargaining strategy with each other.  This gave the Culinary Union 
an additional degree of leverage in the negotiations, because it allowed the local to 
whipsaw casino operators and put additional pressure on operators who were the most 
resistant to settling on the union’s terms.  This chapter will also highlight the 
important role played by rank-and-file mobilization in the negotiations.  For example, 
it is important to note that the first settlements the union reached with Strip and 
downtown operators respectively occurred right after the union had held massive 
rallies demonstrating the militancy of its members.  This level of mobilization would 
not have been possible without the great degree preparation of the union went through, 
as described in previous chapters.  
Las Vegas Strip Employers’ Strategies and Objectives 
In the 2004 contract negotiations, casino operators bargained in several distinct 
groups, each with its own set of objectives and strategies.  The most fundamental sub-
division amongst casino operators was between those who primarily operated casinos 
along the Las Vegas Strip and those who primarily operated casinos located either 
downtown or other locations off the Strip.  The Strip operators can be further 
subdivided into two groups: large multi-property operators and smaller single property 
operators.  The former group tended to run the Strip’s newer, more upscale properties, 
and have a dominant presence in other major gaming markets such as Atlantic City.  167 
 
At the time of the 2002 negotiations there were four of these larger Strip operators: the 
Mandalay Resort Group, Park Place, MGM-Mirage, and Harrah’s.  The second group 
of Strip casino operators were the smaller gaming companies who only owned one 
property along the strip and maybe a few additional properties in other gaming 
markets.  In contrast to the first group, these smaller operators generally ran the Strip’s 
older, less upscale casinos. 
The major strip casino operators were the first to enter into negotiations with 
the Culinary Union in 2002.  However, by 2002 this group of employers was no 
longer led by Steve Wynn.  Wynn did not participate in the negotiation process 
because in 2000 his Mirage Resorts had been acquired by Kirk Kerkorian’s MGM in 
an unfriendly take over.  The name of the new entity created by this take over was 
MGM-Mirage. With Wynn, out of the picture, there was some question at the 
beginning of 2002 about how local gaming operators would organize themselves for 
the upcoming negotiations. 
By mid-Spring 2002 it became apparent that the major strip operators were 
going to follow two distinct strategies in the upcoming contract negotiations:  The 
Mandalay Resort Group pushed for the three other major Las Vegas gaming operators 
to negotiate together and adopt a confrontational strategy in the negotiations.  The 
Mandalay Resort Group’s initial demands included shifting more healthcare costs to 
the union members, the elimination of the guaranteed work week, the ability to assign 
shorter shifts, and an increase in the use of “steady extras”
21 (Pappageorge, 2003).  
The Mandalay Resort Group also strongly resisted the Culinary Union’s efforts to 
reduce GRA workload.  The Mandalay Resort Group’s tactics and rhetoric in the 
                                                 
21 Steady-extras are workers who are part of the bargaining unit, but do not have steady schedules and 
are instead called in on a per need basis.  Therefore, many of these employees do not qualify for the 
same benefits as full time employees.  Many employers call in steady extras through the Culinary 
Union’s hiring hall. 
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negotiations were much more confrontational than had been usual for Las Vegas.  The 
company’s management refused to attach any legitimacy to the GRA workload issue 
and repeatedly attacked the union in the press.  In one incident security guards 
working for Mandalay Bay beat up a group of workers who were holding an EDR 
rally at the operator’s Circus-Circus casino.   
None of the Culinary Union officials that interviewed for this case study could 
say conclusively why the Mandalay Bay Group chose to pursue such an antagonistic 
strategy.  One theory suggested by several Culinary Union staff and leaders was that 
the management of the Mandalay Resort Group thought that workers were still 
traumatized by the post-9/11 layoffs and so would acquiesce when faced with 
confrontational management tactics and concessionary contract demands (Wilhelm, 
2004, Alexander, 2005, Pappageorge, 2005).  Another possible explanation is that 
with Steve Wynn out of the picture, the management team at the Mandalay Resort 
Group saw an opening to assume his previous leadership role in Las Vegas’s casino 
industry.  Additionally, the Mandalay Resort Group had an added incentive to demand 
a concessionary contract from the Culinary Union, because it earned a larger 
proportion of its overall EBITDA from its Las Vegas properties than any of the other 
three major casino operators.  This meant that an expensive contract in Las Vegas 
would be more harmful to the Mandalay Resort Group than it would be to any of its 
rivals (Rothman, 2003).   
However, the Mandalay Bay Resort Group's efforts to convince the major 
casino operators to follow their lead largely failed, with only MGM-Mirage agreeing 
to cooperate with them in the 2002 negotiations.  MGM-Mirage adopted a 
confrontational stance in the negotiations for probably largely the same reasons as the 
Mandalay Bay Group.  It most likely saw a chance to take advantage of its traumatized 
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EBITDA was significantly larger than the other two major casino operators (Bohner, 
2003, Wilhelm, 2004, Alexander, 2005).  Furthermore, MGM-Mirage owner Kirk 
Kerkorian historically has had a checkered relationship with the Culinary Union.  He 
was one of the leaders behind casino operators’ efforts to force a strike and bust the 
Culinary Union in 1984 (Benz, 2004).  Furthermore, in the early 1990s Kerkorian 
resisted the spirit of cooperation, which characterized the relationship between the 
Culinary Union and the major casino operators during that period by opening the 
MGM Grand non-union (Alexander, 2002, Rothman, 2002).  Therefore, MGM-
Mirage’s more aggressive stance in the negotiations may have just been a reflection of 
Kerkorian’s more combative approach to labor-management relations.   
In contrast, Park Place and Harrah's opted to negotiate separately, using a 
quieter, more conciliatory approach to the negotiations.  In other jurisdictions Harrah’s 
has generally taken a strong stand against unionization and adopted a hard line at the 
bargaining table.  However, because it only owns two properties in Las Vegas, it may 
have decided that it was in its own best interest to pursue a less aggressive role in the 
2002 round of negotiations.  Therefore, if the Culinary Union obtained a particularly 
expensive contract, it would give Harrah’s a competitive advantage over the other 
major casino operators, since its exposure to Las Vegas casino industry labor costs is 
comparatively low (Alexander, 2005). 
There are a variety of reasons why Park Place also decided to pursue a more 
conciliatory strategy.  First, in previous years Park Place has enjoyed a cooperative 
relationship with the Culinary Union in Las Vegas.  Secondly, at the time of the 
negotiations it was carrying a large debt load and its financial condition was further 
destabilized by the fallout from the 9/11 attacks.   
The smaller gaming companies who operated casinos along the Strip waited 
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Culinary Union.  Traditionally in the Las Vegas casino industry, smaller operators 
wait until larger operators settle with the union and then agree to contracts patterned 
after those reached by the major operators.  The one exception to this was the Boyd 
Gaming Group, which owns one Strip property in addition to its multiple downtown 
properties.  Because it operated several downtown properties, the Boyd Gaming Group 
negotiated with the downtown operators (Berns, 2002m).   
Negotiations between the Culinary Union and the downtown and neighborhood 
casino operators also did not begin until the Culinary Union had settled with the major 
Strip operators.  The Culinary Union hoped that the non-strip operators would sign 
contracts patterned after those of the major Strip operators as they had in previous 
years.  However, the growing disparity between the fortunes of unionized Strip and 
non-Strip properties in Las Vegas caused non-Strip operators to intensely resist the 
Culinary Union’s efforts in 2002.  In general, non-strip operators wanted contracts that 
were significantly less expensive than those agreed to by their strip counterparts.   
Going into the 2002 negotiations the non-strip operators were divided into 
roughly three different camps.  The first group adopted a very aggressive strategy with 
the Culinary Union and demanded the following concessions: putting employees on an 
inferior employer-run healthcare plan, an unlimited right to replace union workers 
with subcontracted workers, the reduction of workers' shifts to as little as four hours, 
the right to hire an unlimited numbers of part time workers, and the right to terminate 
union contracts and workers' jobs if properties are sold.  Furthermore, these properties 
strongly resisted Culinary Union attempts to restrict GRAs workload.  The Culinary 
Union regarded these demands as entirely unreasonable (German, 2002a, German, 
2002b, German 2002c, Simpson, 2002g). 
There were a number of operators that pursued this strategy.  Jackie Gaughan 
was the only operator in this group who owned more than a single unionized property 171 
 
in Las Vegas.
22  Cooperating with Jackie Gaughan at the beginning of the negotiations 
were the owners of Binion’s Horseshoe, Fitzgerald’s, The Four Queens, and 
Castaways.  Not only did these operators demand significant contract concessions, 
they engaged in heated rhetorical battles with the Culinary Union through the press 
(German, 2002a, German, 2002b, German, 2002c, Simpson, 2002g, Wilhelm, 2004).   
Boyd Gaming, which operated two unionized non-Strip properties, The 
Freemont and The Main Street Station, adopted a more conciliatory approach to the 
negotiations.  HERE President John Wilhelm, who was the Culinary Union’s lead 
negotiator credits this to the very positive relationship he had with Boyd’s 
management team going into the negotiations (Wilhelm, 2004).  However, the less 
aggressive strategy pursued by the Boyd Gaming Group in the 2002 negotiations may 
also be the result of the success Boyd Gaming’s non-strip properties have enjoyed 
relative to other unionized casinos located off the strip (Rothman, 2003).   
The third camp of non-strip casinos involved in the negotiations were the 
independently owned Jerry’s Nugget and Golden Gate casinos, both of whom pursued 
a strategy of waiting for the other non-strip properties to settle with the union and then 
negotiating a contract patterned after those of the other non-strip properties.  The final 
unionized non-strip property, the Golden Nugget, was operated by MGM-Mirage and 
settled at the same time as the other MGM-Mirage properties. 
Therefore, Las Vegas’s Casino operators entered the 2002 round of contract 
negotiations divided by the issues they felt were most compelling and the strategies 
they thought they should pursue.  This was partially caused by the diverse economic 
circumstances faced by the different operators as well as by each operator’s unique 
management style.  These divisions were not new in Las Vegas’s casino industry, 
rather, as indicated in the earlier discussion of the history of the industry’s labor-
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management relations, they have existed for the past 40 years, ever since the first 
corporate owned casinos opened in the city.  However, by failing to come together and 
bargain as a group, the casino operators undermined their position vis-à-vis the 
Culinary Union, which was able to whipsaw the casino operators.  In the gaming 
industry, because labor markets are localized and firms are site specific, it is to the 
advantage of the casino operators within a particular area to coordinate their 
bargaining in order to prevent from being whipsawed by the union (Cobble & Merrill, 
1994).  Perhaps, if the casino operators had been able to agree on a single strategy and 
better coordinate among themselves in the 2002 negotiations they could have better 
countered the Culinary Union’s contract campaign strategy. 
Bargaining on the Strip 
The initial meetings between the major Strip casino operators
23 and the union 
took place in the second and third weeks of April (Simpson, 2002c).  The union's 
initial proposal was for a two-year deal where employers would pay an extra 72.5 
cents an hour per employee for each year of the contract, increasing by a total amount 
of $1.45 by the last year of the contract (Berns, 2002c).  Pretty much all of the first 
year's 72.5 cent increase would go towards paying for members' health insurance, with 
up to 70 cents of second year's raise also going towards members' health insurance.  
The remainder of the annual increase not covering health benefits would go towards 
members' pensions and/or increases in their hourly wages (Berns, 2002d).  These 
would be the largest annual increases in total compensation in the history of the union 
(Berns, 2202g).  Overall under the Culinary Union’s proposal employers' contributions 
to the union health plan would increase to $2.92 from $2.22 per hour per employee in 
the first year of the pact and then increase to $3.62 in the second year of the pact.  The 
Culinary union also insisted that new contracts include language placing restrictions 
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on GRA workload (Berns, 2002e).  Such language had been absent from the local’s 
previous contracts (Pappageorge, 2003). 
Park Place Entertainment was the first of the big-four Strip operators to offer a 
counterproposal.  Park Place Entertainment's offer consisted of a two and half year 
proposal that increased employees' hourly compensation by $1.05.  The offer did not 
propose any new contract language dealing with the workload issue.  Officials from 
the Culinary Union stated to the media that this counter offer was a positive step 
forward in the negotiations and said they would make a counter proposal in their next 
meeting with Park Place Entertainment executives (Berns, 2002r). 
MGM-Grand and The Mandalay Resort Group responded to the Culinary 
Union offer with a counterproposal that increased employees' hourly compensation by 
47 to 49 cents annually over five years.  Mandalay Resort Group's Senior Vice-
President argued that the union's proposal was too expensive especially given that Las 
Vegas's Gaming industry was still recovering from the effects of 9/11 (Berns, 2002g).  
Although they negotiations negotiated together, MGM-Mirage and the Mandalay 
Resort Group approached the GRA issue separately.  MGM-Mirage said it was open 
to negotiating about the issue, even though it argued that many of the Culinary 
Union’s claims about the GRA's workload were false.   
The Mandalay Resort Group held that the GRA workload issue was a phony 
issue constructed by Culinary officials for their public relations campaign as well as 
internal union electoral concerns, and refused to bargain over it.  In the negotiations 
themselves, the Mandalay Resort Group accused the union officials and GRAs of 
lying about the extent of the GRAs workload and its impact on the GRAs health.  The 
Mandalay Resort Group also took out a full page add in the Las Vegas Review 
Journal, to counteract the unions claims about GRA workload and its efforts to use the 
GRA issue to win public sympathy in the negotiations (Berns, 2002r).  In an interview 174 
 
HERE President John Wilhelm said that he thought that both MGM-Mirage and the 
Mandalay Resort Group were trying to use the temporary impact of 9/11 as an excuse 
to obtain a substandard contract from the Culinary Union, ensuring lower labor costs 
long after the effects of 9/11 had worn off  (Wilhelm, 2004).  
This effort to refute GRAs' and union officials' claims about GRA workload 
created a lot of tension at the negotiations as the GRAs that were on the bargaining 
committee became very upset at what many of them perceived as a management effort 
to brand them as liars.  This effort by the Mandalay Resort Group was communicated 
through the Culinary Union’s bargaining committee to the rank-and-file and facilitated 
their mobilization campaign.  This incident provides a good example of how the use of 
a large and representative bargaining committee was beneficial to the Culinary Union 
because it allows the local to rapidly and effectively communicate what is going on in 
the negotiations to the rank-and-file (Berns 2002p, Wilhelm, 2004). 
The aggressiveness of MGM-Mirage and The Mandalay Resort Group was 
also reflected in their responses to the Culinary and Bartenders Unions' mobilization 
and corporate campaigns.  In one incident of employer retaliation, Al Williams, a lead 
contract committee member at a Mandalay owned property, Circus-Circus, was beat 
up by casino security guards and suspended along with several GRAs, while 
participating in an EDR rally during their break.  Williams, an African-American pot 
washer, was leading a group of female GRAs in a chant about their contract demands 
when they claim they were tackled by a group security guards, in a melee that 
involved as many as 100 people.  Williams suffered a fractured wrist and a dislocated 
shoulder and five GRAs suffered unspecified injuries in the incident.  Three of these 
GRAs were part of the unions' bargaining committee.  Williams and one of the GRAs 
were hospitalized as a result of the melee.  The Mandalay Resort Group claimed that 
Williams had been asked to stop the rally and had refused and that such a rally was a 175 
 
violation of the Culinary Union’s contract with The Mandalay Resort Group.  The 
operator suspended Al Williams along with two of the GRAs, and charged Williams 
with trespassing (Berns, 2002d, German, 2002d, Simpson, 2002x, German, 2002o, 
Simpson, 2002v, Dalton, 2003). 
HERE claimed that EDR rallies, such as the one lead by Al Williams, were 
clearly not in violation of their contact.  Furthermore, the union argued that it had 
organized a previous rally in Circus-Circus's EDR two weeks earlier and had been 
using them as part of their contract administration procedure previous to that, without 
any complaints from management.  The union put together a campaign in response to 
the incident to win reinstatement for the suspended workers with full back pay and to 
get the Mandalay Resort Group to drop their charges against Williams.  In addition to 
filing grievances over the issue, the union had the suspended workers lead their 
contract committee into the negotiations with the Mandalay Resort Group the next day 
and had all members of the bargaining committee wear shirts with pictures of the 
injured workers in the negotiations.  The union also fired battery complaints with the 
police against the security officers.  
The incident turned out to be a major mobilizing issue for the Culinary Union, 
as many members, especially those who worked for The Mandalay Resort Group, 
became more disenchanted with management.  As a result of the Culinary Union's 
efforts Williams and the two suspended GRAs were reinstated on May 17th.  The 
GRAs were reimbursed for income they lost as a result of their suspensions; however, 
Al Williams was not reimbursed.  Therefore, the union continued to pursue their 
grievances against the Mandalay Resort Group to obtain back pay for Williams and to 
have the incident stricken from the employees’ record.  On May 23rd the Culinary 
Union brought Reverend Jesse Jackson and a delegation from the Coalition of Black 
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that Williams as well as the suspended GRAs be made whole (Berns, 2002d, German, 
2002d, Simpson, 2002x, German, 2002f, Simpson, 2002v, Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 
2003). 
As mentioned earlier, the management of MGM-Mirage and The Mandalay 
Resort Group verbally sparred several times with the Culinary Union in the media.  
Perhaps the most notorious incident was when MGM-Mirage Senior Vice-President 
Alan Feldman, upset about the union campaign to notify travel agents and meeting 
planners about the contract dispute, likened the Culinary Union to terrorists.  Several 
Culinary Union staff people reported that these comments were very alienating to the 
union’s members (Dalton, 2003, Hughes, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003, Zeitz, 2003).  
This part of the union's corporate campaign was also vigorously condemned by The 
Mandalay Resort Group.  In contrast, the responses of the management at Park Place 
Entertainment and Harrah's were much more muted, with Park Place executives 
emphasizing the progress they were making in their negotiations with the Culinary 
Union.  (Berns 2002a)  
Around the end of April, casino operators began to seriously consider 
contingency plans in case the Culinary Union did go on strike.  Some casino 
executives such as those from Harrah's and Park Place Entertainment downplayed the 
chance of a strike, while others such as ones from The Mandalay Bay Resort Group 
were much less dismissive of the possibility of a strike.  However, none of the casino 
executives nor union leaders thought a strike against one of the major casino operators 
was likely (Berns, 2002n).  According to one casino executive who asked to remain 
anonymous, management's strike contingency plans consisted of using temporary 
employment agencies to hire temporary replacement workers from other population 
centers in the southwest such as Phoenix, Laughlin, and southern California.  These 
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firms.  Furthermore, casino operators considered hiring replacement workers from 
non-union gaming facilities in the area and having managers do union members jobs, 
including housekeeping (Berns, 2002n). Casino operators also began hiring more 
workers in the weeks leading up to the contract expiration date in preparation for a 
potential strike (Dalton, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003). 
In response to the different counterproposals and tactics of the major casino 
operators the union adopted a strategy that tried to divide the more conciliatory major 
casino operators, (Park Place Entertainment and Harrah’s), from the more 
confrontational ones, (The Mandalay Resort Group and MGM-Mirage), and settle 
with the former more conciliatory operators first.  The Culinary Union believed that 
once it had obtained a more favorable deal from the more conciliatory casino 
operators, the more combative operators would be less willing to endure a strike 
because their competitors would be able to operate with limited disruptions.  Therefore 
after their initial meetings, Culinary Union negotiators refused to meet with 
representatives from MGM-Mirage and The Mandalay Resort Group until it had 
settled with Park Place and Harrah's.  Mandalay Resort Group Chief Negotiator said in 
the local evening paper The Las Vegas Sun "The union is shopping around to find the 
best deal it can. When the industry does not bargain together, it unfortunately winds 
up bargaining against itself."  (German 2002q, German, 2002r). 
As the May 16th strike vote approached rumors began to be reported in the 
media that Park Place Entertainment was on the verge of reaching an agreement with 
the union and that Harrah's was soon to follow.  These rumors gained further 
credibility when Culinary Union lead negotiator and in-coming secretary-treasurer, D. 
Taylor, commented to the media on May 13 that the union had received "constructive" 
proposals from both Harrah's and Park Place the week before that could lead to 
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increase in hourly compensation of 65 cents in the first year and 55 cents in the 
following 18 months of a two-and-a-half year contract.  Details on Harrah’s proposal 
were not disclosed in the media.  Around this time the Culinary Union offered a 
counterproposal: a two year contract that would increase employees compensation by 
65 cents in its first year and 75 cents in its second  (German, 2002q, German, 2002r, 
German, 2002s, Berns, 2002r).  
During the negotiations with Park Place and Harrah’s, The Mandalay Bay 
Resort Group and MGM-Mirage pursued both a public and behind the scenes strategy 
that was aimed at encouraging Park Place and Harrah's to pursue a harder line in the 
negotiations with the Culinary Union and dissuade the local from settling a contract 
with the more conciliatory casino operators separately.  The public aspect of this 
campaign consisted of first offering a contract extension of one month and a revamped 
counterproposal to the union that raised employees’ hourly compensation by $2.78 
over the course of a five year deal.  The operator's previous offer was a five year deal 
that increased employees’ hourly compensation by about 47-49 cents annually over a 
period of five years.  The casino operators also curbed their rhetoric dealing with 
employee healthcare premiums with the Mandalay Resort Group's chief negotiator 
Mike Sloan saying that: "We want to make our position on health-care clear. We are 
not trying to make the employees pay for their family coverage…We are trying to 
make them understand it is an extraordinarily expensive benefit, which can only be 
preserved if we work together."  This offer was rejected by the Culinary Union.  
HERE President Wilhelm described the proposal a "media stunt" and a "back door 
attempt to cut benefits" for union members (German, 2002q, Berns, 2002s). 
The Monday following the union's massive strike vote and rally on Thursday 
May 16th, MGM-Mirage and The Mandalay Resort Group offered a second revamped 
proposal that increased employees hourly compensation by $2.92 over the course of a 179 
 
five year deal.  Although, the union publicly welcomed this offer saying to the press 
that it was a constructive step in the right direction, it refused to negotiate with either 
MGM-Mirage or the Mandalay Resort Group before its scheduled upcoming 
negotiations with Park Place and Harrah’s on May 23rd.  As it turned out the Culinary 
Union settled with Park Place Entertainment and Harrah's that Thursday, obtaining 
contracts that increased employee compensation by $3.23-and-a-half over five years, 
considerably more than what MGM-Mirage and Mandalay Bay offered. The deals 
reached with Park Place and Harrah’s also included strong language dealing with 
GRA workload issues (Berns, 2002s, German, 2002q). After the news of the deal 
reached the remaining gaming operators who had yet to settle, one executive, who 
asked to remain anonymous exclaimed: "I would venture to say the game's over…I 
doubt the union could have lasted five days if the major properties had stood together" 
(Las Vegas Review-Journal, 2002a).  
Settlement with Major Strip Operators 
The union began to reach settlements with the major Las Vegas casino 
operators in the week following the May 16th strike vote.  Although, Harrah’s and 
Park Place may have already been making progress towards an agreement with the 
Culinary Union, the May 16
th rally demonstrated to all casino operators and other 
stakeholders the high level of militancy that existed amongst union members at their 
properties, and the high risk of a city-wide strike if the two sides failed to reach an 
agreement.  Without such a high-level of participation in the May 16
th strike vote and 
rally by the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file, and their overwhelming vote in favor of 
giving local union the leaders the right to call a strike; the local would not have been 
as successful in pressuring operators to reach an agreement with the local before the 
contract expired on May 31.  Several people interviewed for this case study that sat in 
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after the May 16
th strike vote and rally, employer representatives in the negotiations 
became much more focused settling with the Culinary Union and avoiding a strike 
even if it meant agreeing to the local’s contract terms.  (Pappageorge 2003, Arguallo-
Kline 2003, Dalton 2003, Hughes 2003, Weiss 2003, Wilhelm 2004, Pappageorge 
2005)  
The first major Strip operator to settle with the Culinary Union was Park Place 
Entertainment, who settled along with the Aztar Corp.
24 on May 22
nd.  Harrah’s settled 
with the Culinary Union the next day.  As mentioned earlier these properties took a 
generally less confrontational approach to the negotiations than MGM-Mirage and 
The Mandalay Group.  One reason that Harrah's may have settled first was that it 
derived a smaller proportion of its overall annual EBITDA from the Las Vegas's 
Gaming Industry than the other major gaming companies along the Strip.  Since it is 
likely that the first contracts in the 2002 round of negotiations would set the pattern for 
the other Strip contracts, Harrah's had less of an incentive to hold down labor costs for 
their Las Vegas operations and had an interest in increasing the labor costs of their 
primary competitors the other large Strip casino operators. (Rothman, 2003).  Park 
Place, for its part, was deep in debt at the time of the negotiations creating an incentive 
to settle with the Culinary Union and avoid a costly strike that could inhibit its ability 
to meet its debt service requirements.  The Culinary Union’s rank-and-file 
mobilization effort was key in convincing Park Place that the local was prepared to 
engage in an effective strike.  Within a week of Park Place and Harrah's settlement 
both The Mandalay Resort Group and MGM-Mirage agreed to substantially the same 
contracts with the Culinary and Bartenders Unions on May 26th and 27th respectively  
(Berns, 2002j, Berns, 2002k). 
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The contracts called for five year deals that would cost casino operators an 
additional $3.23 1/2 per hour per employee by the fifth year of the contract, the 
greatest increase called for by a single contract in the history of the Culinary Union.  
The annual breakdown of the increases are depicted in table 7.1: 
Table 7.1 Annual Increase in total compensation called for in 2002 contract  with 
major strip operators: 
 1st  year 2nd 3rd 4th  5th
Accumulated 
Increase 
0.68 1/2  $1.48 1/2 $2.13 1/2 $2.68 1/2  $3.23 1/2
(Source: Las Vegas Review-Journal, 2002c) 
Under the new contract non-tipped workers only receive about half the raises 
that tipped employees receive.  Furthermore, the contract guaranteed premium-free 
family healthcare for Culinary Union members without decreasing the quality of the 
coverage.  Officials from the Culinary Union estimated that contributions to the union 
health care plan will absorb as much as 61.8% of the increased casino compensation, 
or $2 of the $3.23 1/2 payable in the fifth year.  
In addition the new contracts contained new language specifically dealing with 
GRA workload.  This language was also added to the contracts for properties owned 
by Harrah's and MGM-Mirage that were not involved in the 2002 round of contract 
negotiations.  The provisions included a freeze on the number rooms cleaned by each 
GRA during the life of the deal, a reduction in the number of rooms cleaned by 
housekeepers on checkout days, the development of a formula for the Rio and the Park 
Place Entertainment owned hotels that will cut the number of standard rooms cleaned 
by a housekeeper who also has to clean suites, a reduction in the workload of 
housekeepers who have to travel between two floors in the course of a day and the 
creation of special teams to deal with the clean up of potentially hazardous materials  
(Pappageorge, 2003, Pierce, 2002, Las Vegas Review-Journal, 2002c). 182 
 
On June 6
th, members of the Culinary Union voted to ratify the contracts with 
MGM-Mirage, The Mandalay Resort Group, Park Place Entertainment, Harrah's, and 
Aztar by a margin of 2,003 to 36. The vote doubled as a solidarity rally for union 
members who worked in the downtown and neighborhood casinos, which had not 
settled with the union by that time.  This was part of the union's solidarity campaign 
between rank-and-filers from casinos that had already settled with the union and those 
that had not.  The contract negotiations for the downtown and neighborhood properties 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section (Simpson, 2002e). 
Settling with the major casino properties was important because, historically, 
once the union had agreed to contracts with the major casino operators the smaller 
casino operators in Las Vegas tended to agree to contracts patterned on ones 
previously settled by the union.  In 2002 this pattern held for the independent Strip 
operators, however, downtown and neighborhood casino operators resisted union 
efforts to apply the strip settlement to them, citing the growing disparity between the 
financial well being of the Strip operators and the downtown as well as the unionized 
neighborhood casinos.  The downtown and neighborhood casino operators argued that 
they could not afford the contracts agreed to by the major Strip operators.  This 
resistance led to an acrimonious round of bargaining between downtown operators and 
the Culinary Union in 2002.  Because the Culinary Union’s previous contract with all 
of the properties involved in the 2002 negotiations expired at the end of May, it had 
very little time to negotiate with the other casino operators after settling with the last 
of the major Strip operators.  Therefore, it negotiated one month contract extensions 
covering  all the remaining operators who had not settled by the end of May (Smith, 
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Negotiations and Settlement with Downtown and Neighborhood Casinos 
After the Culinary Union settled with most of the major Strip operators they 
initially proposed that the downtown contracts ought to be patterned on the Strip 
contracts (Simpson, 2002h).  In response, downtown operators almost universally 
argued that the contract with the major strip operators was too expensive and that the 
Culinary Union, by proposing to extend it to downtown and neighborhood properties 
was ignoring the growing economic disparity between the Strip properties and the 
downtown as well as older neighborhood casinos.  However, in spite of their unified 
reaction to the Culinary Union’s initial proposal the downtown and neighborhood 
casinos pursued a variety of different strategies in the rest of the negotiations 
(Simpson, 2002h) 
Several of the properties negotiated together and hired attorney Greg Kamer as 
their representative in the 2002 round of negotiations.  These properties were: The 
Plaza, El Cortez, The Las Vegas Club, The Western, Binion's Horseshoe, Fitzgerald's 
and The Four Queens.  Castaways was represented by their own lawyer, Sal Gugino, 
but they also bargained with the properties represented by Greg Kamer.  Of these 
properties The Plaza, El Cortez, The Las Vegas Club, and The Western, were all 
owned by Jackie Gaughan. The rest of the casinos in the group were owned by casino 
operators with only a single property under contract with the Culinary Union in Las 
Vegas.  These casino operators initially took a confrontational stance with the 
Culinary Union, and engaged in heated rhetorical battles with the union in the process  
(German, 2002a, German, 2002b, German, 2002c, Simpson, 2002g, Wilhelm, 2004). 
In contrast, Boyd Gaming adopted a much more conciliatory and less public 
approach to the negotiations.  In statements to the press both sides emphasized the 
constructive efforts made by each other in the negotiations.  Wilhelm in an interview 
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cooperative relationship the two parties enjoyed preceding the negotiations (Wilhelm, 
2004).  During the 2002 negotiations Boyd Gaming owned two downtown casinos, the 
Main Street Station and The Fremont, it also owned one older Strip property, The 
Stardust.  Boyd Gaming negotiated for all of these properties together.   
The remaining downtown and neighborhood properties involved in the 
negotiations were the independently owned Golden Gate and Jerry's Nugget.  These 
two properties opted to wait for the contract talks with the other downtown and 
neighborhood casinos to conclude, and then negotiate a contract patterned after those 
of the other properties (German, 2002a, Simpson, 2002i, Simpson, 2002j, Wilhelm, 
2004). 
While the contract negotiations between the Culinary Union and Boyd Gaming 
progressed smoothly, those between the two locals and the casino operators 
represented by Kamer had bogged down by mid-June to a point where both sides 
publicly suggested that there was a good chance of a strike.  In response to the locals' 
efforts to extend the Strip contract to the downtown and neighborhood casinos, Kamer 
put forward a counter proposal that was described by HERE president John Wilhelm's 
as basically "gutting" the Culinary Union contracts.  The counterproposal offered by 
Kamer included several provisions which guaranteed that it would be unacceptable to 
the Culinary Union.  These provisions included: that employees be put on inferior 
company healthcare plans,  an unlimited right to  replace union workers with 
subcontracted workers, the reduction of workers' shifts to as little as four hours, the 
right to hire an unlimited numbers of part time workers, and the right to terminate 
union contracts and workers' jobs if properties are sold.  Union officials reacted very 
strongly against the counterproposal and accused Kamer of trying to provoke a strike 
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According to reports in both the Las Vegas Review-Journal and the Las Vegas 
Sun, negotiations between the Culinary Union and the downtown and neighborhood 
casino operators began to move forward when Fitzergerald’s pulled Kamer as their 
lead negotiator on June 18th and Boyd Gaming agreed to a request by the Culinary 
Union to help broker a deal between the other downtown and neighborhood casino 
operators and the two locals.  Executives from Fitzgerald’s parent company Majestic 
Investor Holdings said they would negotiate directly with the Culinary Union after 
becoming alarmed at the escalating rhetoric used by Kamer and the two locals in the 
negotiations.  They were also concerned about their employees’ strong negative 
reaction to Kamer's counterproposal.  Kamer argued that Majestic Holdings was able 
to better afford the Culinary Union's contract demands because it had other gaming 
properties outside of Nevada while his remaining clients were concentrated in Las 
Vegas  (Simpson, 2002k, German, 2002f). 
With a week and a half left before the downtown and neighborhood casino 
contracts expired on July 1st, both casino operators and union leaders made repeated 
statements to the press that a strike was very likely.  Although both the Culinary 
Union and Boyd Gaming reported making significant progress in negotiations, 
reaching agreement on everything except wages and benefits, the local and the 
properties represented by Kamer still had not come any closer to a settlement.  The 
two sides still had not come to an agreement on issues such as subcontracting, use of 
part-time workers, and flexibility in the length of workers' shifts.  The inability to 
make any progress with the properties represented by Kamer made it difficult for the 
unions to reach a deal with the more conciliatory casino operators, (Majestic Holdings 
and Boyd Gaming), because of these operators’ concerns about being undercut if the 
properties represented by Kamer obtained less expensive contracts from the union.  
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granting another contract extension to casino operators that had not reached a 
settlement with them by the time their contracts expired on July 1
st, further increasing 
the likelihood of a strike  (Simpson, 2002l, Norman, 2002, German, 2002h). 
Talks downtown began to make progress when Boyd Gaming tentatively 
agreed to a scaled back version of the Strip contract proposed by the Culinary Union 
on June 23rd and began to lobby other downtown casino operators to get behind the 
proposal as well.  The June 21
st downtown rally, drawing around 12,000 protesting 
Culinary Union members to the Fremont Street experience, may have been 
instrumental in convincing Boyd Gaming, not only to agree to a tentative contract, but 
also pressure other operators to settle with the union.  Boyd Gaming was anxious to 
avoid a strike at the other downtown properties because the close proximity of all the 
casinos downtown made it likely that a strike at a small number of these properties 
would significantly cut into the revenues of all the casinos.   
The Culinary Union’s mobilizing efforts made it clear to Boyd Gaming that a 
strike was likely if it and the other casino operators did not settle.  These efforts began 
to bear fruit by June 29th when it was reported in the Las Vegas Sun that the El 
Cortez, the Four Queens, the Plaza, and Fitzgerald's had dropped Kamer as their 
negotiator and joined with Boyd Gaming and agreed to the offer the union bargaining 
committee had put forward on June 23rd.
25  All of these properties, except for the 
Plaza, were able to finalize agreements with the union negotiating committee on June 
30th in the final hours before their contracts expired.  At the last minute Jerry's Nugget 
agreed to a contact that was substantially the same as the other downtown properties 
who had settled with the union earlier that night. (Associated Press, 2002a, Associated 
Press, 2002b).  
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The new downtown contracts covering employees at Main Street Station, The 
Fremont, El Cortez, Four Queens, Fitzgerald’s, and Jerry's Nugget were similar to the 
agreements that the Culinary Union had reached with the Strip Casinos (including the 
new language related to the housekeepers' workload) except that it allowed the non-
Strip properties to delay paying for six months half the annual increase dedicated 
toward wages, pensions, and job training called for the by the Strip contract.  For 
example, according to their new contract, Strip operators agreed to pay an extra 60 
cents per hour in the second year of their contracts.  If the union health and welfare 
fund trustees decided 30 cents of the second year increase needed to go toward health 
care, the remaining 30 cents would go toward wages, pensions and job training.  
Therefore, according to the tentative agreement, downtown operators would pay an 
extra 30 cents for health coverage, but would pay only 15 cents for wages, pensions 
and job training for the first six months of the year.  They would pay the full amount 
the second half of the year  (Simpson, 2002m). 
Overall, the contract would likely cost casino operators an additional $2.20 per 
hour per employee by its fifth and final year (Las Vegas Review-Journal, 2002c).  
Union officials estimated that contributions to the unions' health care plans would 
absorb as much as 91% of the additional casino payments in the fifth year, or $2 of the 
$2.20 increase (Las Vegas Review-Journal, 2002c).  The annual increase in total 
compensation per worker is shown in table 7.2.  
Table 7.2 Annual cumulative increase in compensation called for by the 2002-
2007 contract for downtown and neighborhood casinos with the exception of the 
Golden Nugget.  
1st Year  2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year  5th Year
$0.68 $0.98 $1.28 $1.72    $2.20 
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Downtown tipped workers would receive an even smaller increase, with 
operators only responsible for paying half of the amount they pay for non-tipped 
workers' wages, pensions and job training.  Gregory Kamer, who at this point was 
only bargaining on behalf of The Las Vegas Club, The Western, and Binion's 
Horseshoe estimated that the locals' proposal was 30% less expensive than the Strip 
contracts (Simpson, 2002m).  
While the contract talks with the downtown and neighborhood casinos were 
going down to the wire, the Culinary Union began its 33-hour picket line downtown, 
counting down the time before the contract extensions with the neighborhood and 
downtown casinos expired.  The 33-hour picket line drew about 1,000 union members, 
demonstrating to downtown and neighborhood casino operators what a major strike 
would be like if they did not settle with the union.  As each property began to settle, 
the local would pull their picketers from that property and move them to other 
properties which had not settled with the union (Pierce, 2003, Simpson, 2002p).  
As the downtown and neighborhood contracts expired at 12:01am on July 1st 
the Culinary Union delayed striking and continued bargaining with the remaining 
properties without an agreement.  However, the Culinary Union would continue their 
informational picketing outside those properties that had not settled with the union.  
The marathon bargaining session lasted 17 ½  hours and finally ended at 6:30 in the 
morning on July 1
st, with all but two properties reaching settlements with the union, 
The Western and The Golden Gate.   
The first properties to settle were the El Cortez and the Plaza, who settled on 
tentative deals that contained the same terms as the those agreed to by The Main Street 
Station, Fitzgerald’s, The Fremont and The Four Queens.  The Las Vegas Club settled 
next, followed by Castaways, and Binion's Horseshoe.  It was reported in the Las 
Vegas Sun that both Boyd Gaming and Michael Gaughan helped the union reach a 189 
 
settlement with the properties that had been holding out.  Overall, the contracts 
reached by these properties were very similar to the ones already reached by the other 
downtown casinos.  The Plaza reached an agreement substantially the same as the 
ones agreed to by the other downtown properties.  While the Las Vegas Club's 
contract allows the casino to delay making annual compensation increases by about 
six months.  Castaways and Binion's Horseshoe had the least expensive contracts, 
allowing the properties to delay their annual increases for 11 months (Simpson, 2002q, 
Simpson, 2002r, German, 2002i, Las Vegas Review Journal, 2002c). 
In the midst of the June 30th -July 1st marathon bargaining session Michael 
Gaughan announced, that for reasons unrelated to the contract negotiations, that his 
father Jackie Gaughan had decided to close the Western on September 1
st 2002.  
Michael Gaughan announced that his father was closing the property because it was no 
longer "economically viable" and no degree of union concessions would keep the 
property open.  However, later that day Michael Gaughan announced that his father 
was having second thoughts about closing The Western and in cooperation with the 
Culinary Union was going to explore options for keeping the casino open.  This 
strange turn of events culminated on Tuesday July 2nd when Jackie and Michael 
Gaughan agreed to a contract substantially the same as the one covering the Las Vegas 
Club.  In an interview, a local gaming industry expert who asked to remain 
anonymous, attributed this peculiar scenario to Jackie Gaughan’s failing health.  The 
Culinary Union members at the Western as well as at all the other downtown and 
neighborhood properties except for the Golden Gate voted 808-3 on July 3rd to ratify 
the new contract (Associated Press, 2002c, Associated Press, 2002d, Simpson, 2002r, 
German 2002j, Las Vegas Review Journal, 2002). 
By the afternoon of July 1st only the Golden Gate had failed to settle with the 
Culinary Union.  At 6 pm on July 1st all but two union members walked off the job at 190 
 
the Golden Gate after the union negotiators decided that the Golden Gate co-owner 
and lead negotiator, Marc Brandenburg, would not budge from his refusal to continue 
funding the union members' healthcare plan and the union called a strike at the 
property (Associated Press, 2002e, Associated Press, 2002c, German, 2002k, 
Simpson, 2002s). 
The key issue in the negotiations with The Golden Gate was the cost of the 
contract demanded by Culinary Union, which in turn was driven by the cost of the 
union healthcare plan.  Already the Golden Gate had failed to pay their workers a $.40 
raise in December 2001 that was called for by the previous contract.  Marc 
Brandenburg claimed that the Golden Gate could not afford this increase, because of 
the casino's poor financial condition.  In 2001 the casino had a net operating loss of 
$300,000.  Furthermore, Marc Brandenburg claimed that he and the other Golden Gate 
owner Craig Ghelfi had forgone any salary, as owners of the Golden Gate, for a 
"substantial" period because of the property's poor financial performance.  The owners 
offered to open their books to prove their claims (Associated Press, 2002e, Associated 
Press, 2002c, German, 2002k, Simpson, 2002s).  
The strike continued through July 9
th and the Las Vegas Review-Journal 
reported that it had a deep impact on the casino's business leaving its gaming area 
empty.  Of the Golden Gate's 380 workers, 188 are union members and all but 2 of 
these union members honored the picket lines.  The Golden Gate remained open 
during the strike by having managerial staff, non-union workers and temporary 
replacements fill in for its union workers.  However, some of its facilities, such as one 
of its two restaurants, remained closed throughout the strike (Simpson, 2002r, 
Simpson, 2002u).   
The Golden Gate settled with the Culinary Workers' and Bartenders Unions on 
July 9th at 7:30 pm.  The contract was similar to other non-Strip contracts except that 191 
 
it called for the Golden Gate to pay an extra $2.00 per worker per hour by the fifth 
year of the contract.
26  However, if it was determined that either the union pension or 
health funds need money, the Golden Gate must contribute an additional 20 cents per 
hour per worker to the funds.  Furthermore, the contract called for the Golden Gate to 
pay a lump sum to workers who had not received the December wage increase that 
was called for in the previous contract.  Finally, if the operators of the Golden Gate 
did not live up to the contract, the contract allowed the unions to use an accelerated 
enforcement provision, which let them go to district court to mandate contract 
compliance. The contract was unanimously approved by HERE members that same 
day.  The vote was 118-0 (Simpson, 2002t). 
Conclusion 
Although the Culinary Union did not reach all of its major goals in the 2002 
round of contract negotiations, it did accomplish its two primary ones: reducing the 
workload of GRAs and protecting the quality of its healthcare plan without having to 
introduce premiums.  The ability of the Culinary Union to achieve its major goals was 
the product of its own and casino operators’ strategic choices, as well as the 
bargaining context in which they found themselves.  In the negotiations the Culinary 
Union not only benefited from short strategies designed specifically for the 
negotiations, but also from long term strategies that have increased its ability to 
mobilize its members and put together effective corporate pressure campaigns.  
Therefore, when examining at the 2002 contract negotiations it is important to place it 
in a wider historical context as well as look at in terms of the Culinary Union’s 
bargaining environment.  The conclusion of this case study will examine this idea in 
greater detail.  
 
                                                 
26 The other non-Strip contracts call for casino to pay an extra $2.20 by their fifth year.  
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion & Analysis 
Introduction 
The Culinary Union’s success in the 2002 round of contract negotiations was 
the result of both strategic and contextual factors.  The local employed a strategy that 
enabled it to take advantage of contextual variables in order to build power vis-à-vis 
the Las Vegas casino operators that were its counterparts in the negotiations.  This 
strategy relied on the mobilization of rank-and-file members in order to create a 
legitimate strike threat and publicizing this threat to the relevant stakeholders in the 
negotiations.  The external and internal contextual factors the Culinary Union faced in 
the negotiations played an important role in determining this strategy’s success.   
By linking the interaction between union strategy and context to industrial 
relations outcome this case study builds upon the union revitalization tradition in the 
industrial relations literature.  One of the definitive precepts of union revitalization 
research is that within the current industrial relations context there are opportunities 
that unions can strategically exploit in order to influence industrial relations outcomes.  
Union revitalization scholars further argue that unions that are particularly adept at 
adopting the correct set of strategies in a given context will be able to thrive, even in 
today’s inhospitable industrial relations climate.  Therefore, because the Culinary 
Union is one of the few examples of such a union, it is important for industrial 
relations scholars, trade unionists, as well as anyone else interested in the survival of 
the American labor movement to develop a solid understanding of the factors which 
have contributed to its success.  Although context has played an integral role in the 
success of the Culinary Union, there are also elements to the local’s story, which could 
provide useful lessons to other unions that are struggling with their own revitalization 
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Industrial Relations Context 
This case study recognizes the importance of both context and strategy in 
determining industrial relations outcomes.  It breaks the context of the 2002 
negotiations into two linked categories: variables that are largely external to the 
Culinary Union and those that largely arise from within the local.  External context 
primarily refers to characteristics of the principle players in Las Vegas’s Gaming 
industry other than the Culinary Union, such as employers, consumers, investors, as 
well as the political, social, and political traits of the Las Vegas metropolitan area and 
casino industry.  Internal context refers to the Culinary Union’s organizational 
structure, practices, long-term strategies in the period leading up to the 2002 
negotiations.  These internal and external contextual factors had a profound influence 
on the strategies the Culinary Union employed in its 2002 comprehensive contract 
campaign.  For example, external factors such as the aversion on the part of tourists to 
vacation in Las Vegas during a major strike made casino operators particularly 
vulnerable to this kind of labor action.  This was also amplified by the fact that several 
major Las Vegas casino operators were significantly in debt, which made them and 
their creditors particularly concerned about how a strike could disrupt casino revenue.   
In terms of internal context, this case study focuses on the revitalization 
process of the local in the fifteen years prior to the 2002 negotiations and its influence 
on the Culinary Union’s comprehensive campaign capabilities.  For example, as a 
result of specific long-term strategies and practices the local pursued as part of its 
revitalization process, it enjoyed a highly developed rank-and-file mobilization and 
corporate campaign capabilities by the time of the 2002 negotiations.  If the union had 
not gone through this revitalization process prior to the negotiations it would not have 
had the organizational capacity to successfully mount such an ambitious 
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This case study shows how the Culinary Union adopted a set of strategies that 
were well matched to the industrial relations context it faced in Las Vegas’s gaming 
industry, and how by using this set of strategies the Culinary Union increased its 
collective bargaining power in the 2002 round of contract negotiations.  The 
effectiveness of the Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization and corporate 
pressure strategies is demonstrated by the fact that in both the Strip and downtown 
casino markets, casino operators began to settle with the union after it had engaged in 
large public rallies, such as the May 16
th strike and the June 21
st Freemont St. rally.  
Rank-and-file participation in both of these events exceeded the expectations of both 
union officials and casino operators (Berns, 2003, Pappageorge, 2003).  After the May 
16
th strike vote, Culinary Union officials described a marked change in the tone of 
negotiations at the bargaining table with negotiators for the casino operators becoming 
much more willing to accede to the union’s demands (Pappageorge, 2004, Wilhelm, 
2004). 
The effect of the June 21
st rally on Freemont St. in downtown Las Vegas was 
even more dramatic, with one of the leading downtown casino operators, Boyd 
Gaming, stepping forward and offering to cajole other operators to settle with the 
union after the rally.  It is important to point out that these large rallies were not the 
only demonstrations of rank-and-file militancy that occurred during the negotiations.  
There were numerous smaller demonstrations both on the Strip and in downtown Las 
Vegas.  Furthermore, the Culinary Union used a variety of inside tactics to mobilize 
members and to signal their militancy to casino operators.  These tactics included 
break room rallies, delegations to management, and more typical solidarity actions 
such as the wearing of union pins in support of workers who had faced reprisals from 
management for their union activism.   195 
 
Thus, Culinary Union strategies, both long-term and short term, have had a 
profound influence on contract bargaining outcomes in Las Vegas’s casino industry.  
Therefore, strategies employed by the Culinary Union do play an important role in 
determining industrial relations outcomes in Las Vegas’s gaming industry, and the 
success of the local can not be totally ascribed to favorable external contextual factors.  
These strategies have an interactive relationship with both the external and internal 
contexts the union faced in the negotiations. 
Union Revitalization 
By focusing on the strategies the Culinary Union used in its 2002 contract 
campaign as well as the influence of long-term union strategies on the negotiations, 
this case study builds upon ideas introduced by the union revitalization branch of the 
industrial relations literature.  As discussed previously, the union revitalization 
research focuses on the role union strategies can play in influencing industrial 
relations outcomes (Hickey, 2003, Behrens et al. 2004, Turner, 2005).  This case study 
relates most directly to three strands of the union revitalization literature: 1) case 
studies of comprehensive contract campaigns, 2) strategic integration, 3) the 
organizing model as it relates to collective bargaining. 
Case Studies of Comprehensive Contract Campaigns 
Most of the union revitalization literature covering union collective bargaining 
functions have been case studies of union comprehensive campaigns.  Numerous 
examples of case studies were discussed in the literature review of this thesis.  Despite 
the large amount of research in this area, this particular case study still makes several 
important contributions.   
First, this case study shows how an ideal comprehensive contract campaign 
plays out in the context of Las Vegas casino industry.  As was discussed in the 196 
 
preceding section in this chapter the context of Las Vegas’s gaming industry as well as 
internal characteristics of the Culinary Union itself left an important imprint on the 
comprehensive contract campaign both in terms of the strategic choices made by the 
Culinary Union and the effectiveness of the strategy the union employed.  It is 
important to understand the interactive relationship between context and union 
strategy because of the success of the Culinary Union in Las Vegas.  In a period of 
overall decline in the American labor movement, the Culinary Union stands out as an 
example of how a private sector union can thrive in an environment otherwise 
inhospitable to collective bargaining.  As casino style gambling is making inroads into 
almost every state in the United States, it is increasingly important for union leaders in 
other jurisdictions to learn from the success of the Culinary Union in Las Vegas. 
This case study is also relatively unique because most other case studies of 
comprehensive contract campaigns examine instances of almost complete breakdown 
in relations between a union and an employer.  In fact, the vast majority of case 
studies examine instances where there is considerable doubt as to whether the union 
will continue to represent the employees of the particular employer.  The only 
exception to this, to my knowledge, is Matthew O’Malley’s study of the 1997 IBT 
strike against UPS. (O’Malley 1999)  In the case of the 2002 contract negotiations 
between the Culinary Union and Las Vegas casino operators, the continued existence 
of a collective bargaining relationship between the two parties was never in doubt.  
This is important because, as Robert Hickey (1993) correctly points out in his 
case study of PACE’s comprehensive contract campaign against Crown Petroleum, if 
unions are going to regularly utilize the kinds of tactics and strategies advocated by 
many revitalization scholars they will have to learn how to use them in situations other 
than the most extreme examples of industrial conflict.  Furthermore, as demonstrated 
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them begin at least a year in advance. However, union leaders do not often how 
antagonistic negotiations will be that far ahead of time, and there are plenty of 
examples within the past twenty years of comprehensive campaigns that failed 
because preparations began too late in the negotiations for them to be effective.  
Therefore, in many cases unions need to begin planning for a comprehensive 
campaign before they know what kind resistance they can expect from employers in 
the upcoming negotiations.  For example, preparations for the Culinary Union’s 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign began more than a year before the negotiations 
actually began. 
This study also differs from other case studies of comprehensive contract 
campaigns because it examines a union local that has made significant progress in its 
revitalization process, giving it the organizational capacity to successfully carry out 
strategies and tactics beyond the means of most other locals.  In comparison most 
other previous studies of comprehensive contract campaigns have looked at unions 
that have not or are just beginning to go through there revitalizing process, usually as 
part of the comprehensive campaign that is under study.   
By examining a revitalized union local, this case study provides answers to 
several important questions relating to comprehensive contract campaigns.  First, this 
thesis demonstrates that locals can continue to increase their overall rank-and-file 
mobilization capacity, even after mounting a resource intensive comprehensive 
campaigns in previous rounds of negotiations.  This means that such tactics do not 
necessarily burn out rank-and-file activists and union staff.  
Furthermore, it demonstrates that such campaigns do not necessarily cause 
irreparable damage to long term labor-management relations.  In spite of putting 
together a progressively more ambitious comprehensive campaign for all rounds of 
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cooperative efforts with casino operators such as the Culinary Academy and various 
initiatives to decriminalize casino style gaming in jurisdictions where it had been 
previously illegal. 
This case study also provides insight into how the organizing, political and 
contract administration policies of a union further along in the revitalizing process 
interact with each other and with the union’s contract bargaining activities.  It shows 
that as a result of previous coordinated initiatives in these areas, the Culinary Union 
has retained staff and rank-and-file leaders that are well versed in the types of tactics 
that are common in comprehensive contract campaigns, thereby increasing the union’s 
ability to successfully carry out its ambitious contract campaign strategy. 
Furthermore, as a result of previous corporate campaign activities the Culinary 
Union has a more experienced research department that had already developed 
relationships with a variety of stakeholders relevant to the negotiations, thereby 
increasing their credibility with these audiences.  It also shows that as a result of 
previous strikes and other rank-and-file intensive and corporate campaign pressure 
tactics, the Culinary Union has earned significant credibility with casino operators and 
other relevant stakeholders regarding their threats to use similar tactics in the 2002 
contract negotiations.  Finally, this thesis describes how the organizing model of 
contract administration can increase a union’s capacity to mobilize members for 
upcoming rounds of negotiations. 
Strategic Integration 
Strategic integration is a relatively new strand of the union revitalization 
literature.  This area of the literature describes how unions coordinate their political, 
collective bargaining, and external organizing activities, in order to increase their 
overall strategic effectiveness (Hickey, 2003, Katz et al. 2003).  The strategic 
integration literature also suggests that unions can better sustain their revitalization 199 
 
efforts, if they approach their efforts comprehensively taking into account all the 
aforementioned areas of activity (Hickey, 2003)   
This case study describes how the Culinary Union benefited from the 
coordination of its political, external organizing, and collective bargaining strategies 
both in terms of making its strategic initiatives in these areas more effective and in 
creating sufficient organizational capacity to sustain its revitalization process.  For 
example, the union was able to successfully organize new casinos by bargaining for 
neutrality and cooperating with the gaming industries on political initiatives in other 
jurisdictions outside of Las Vegas.  Furthermore, by pursuing a number of 
comprehensive initiatives focusing on rank-and-file leadership development and 
participation, the Culinary Union has developed an organizational culture that 
facilitates member mobilization in its political, external organizing, and collective 
bargaining efforts.  More specifically, the Culinary Union’s contract administration, 
political, and external organizing strategies all created avenues for the members to 
take positions of responsibility in the local and for union staff and leaders to identify, 
recruit, and train rank-and-file leaders.  As described earlier in this case study, 
Culinary Union efforts to increase rank-and-file participation in one area of union 
activity complemented similar efforts in other areas, thereby creating an overall 
organizational culture that placed a high value on rank-and-file involvement in the 
union.  Because of the comprehensive nature of these efforts to increase rank-and-file 
participation, this organizational culture was diffused throughout the union, instead of 
just being isolated in one area of union activity or one level of the local’s hierarchy.  
This created the organizational momentum necessary to make additional 
organizational reforms further facilitating rank-and-file participation, leadership 
development, and mobilization.  For example, the Culinary Union’s contract 
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union’s external organizing campaigns.  In turn, members who became involved in the 
local’s external organizing campaigns were radicalized, as they witnessed employer 
reprisals against casino workers who were attempting to organize, and therefore 
became more active participants in the union as a result (Fantasia & Voss, 2004).  
In the 2002 comprehensive contract campaign, the strategic integration 
initiatives across all areas of union activity benefited the Culinary Union in a variety  
of ways.  For example, as mentioned above, as a result of its contract administration 
procedure the Culinary Union was able to rely on a deep pool of capable to rank-and-
file leaders in its efforts to mobilize its members for the 2002 negotiations.  
Furthermore, the union contract administration structure also gave union leaders a 
reliable way through which they could communicate with members.  Finally, as a 
result of previous political efforts, local and state political leaders were sympathetic to 
the union in the negotiation process.  
By describing how the Culinary Union has benefited from the comprehensive 
coordination of its own strategies this case study provides additional evidence 
supporting Hickey’s (1993) hypothesis that strategic integration is a primary requisite 
for sustained union revitalization.  In his case study of PACE’s comprehensive 
contract campaign he argues that “lasting union vitality requires certain sustaining 
mechanisms such as organizational transformations and other appropriate strategic 
innovations: integration of union strategies and other complimentary organizational 
transformations are examples of these.”  He argues that in order to achieve sustained 
revitalization, unions must take a comprehensive approach to their strategic planning 
and integrate their political, external organizing, and collective bargaining activities, 
as well as undergo the necessary cultural and structural organizational transformations 
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strategies, unions will be unable to institute the cultural and structural changes 
necessary to sustain revitalization (Hickey, 2003). 
This study contributes to the strategic integration literature in a variety of other 
ways as well.  For example, this study examines contract administration as it is related 
to strategic integration of union activities.  Although contract administration is often 
treated as a part of a union’s collective bargaining activities, it has been ignored by 
previous strategic integration research.  These previous studies have only examined 
union contract bargaining strategies when discussing their collective bargaining 
activities.  However, contract administration is arguably one of the most important 
functions of a union. Unlike contract negotiations which occur every few years, 
contract administration activities are ongoing and thus are a much more integral way 
in which members form opinions about the union.  This is especially true in 
workforces plagued by a high rate of turnover, like the casino industry.  Furthermore, 
contract administration is one of the most directly visible services a union can perform 
for its members.  A variety of studies have found that union members place a 
particularly high value on a union’s contract administration functions and union 
members’ subjective evaluations of their union’s grievance procedures have a strong 
positive correlation with their overall union commitment and participation (Kochan, 
1979, Gallagher & Clark, 1989, Clark, Gallagher, & Pavlak, 1990, Eaton, Gordon, & 
Keefe, 1992, Bemmels, 1995a).   
This case study not only includes contract administration in its analysis, but 
also argues that the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy forms the 
foundation of its rank-and-file mobilization efforts for its contract bargaining, external 
organizing, and political strategies.  Culinary Union officials consistently credited the 
Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy as one of, if not the most, important 
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capacity.  The local’s contract administration process serves as the primary means 
through which the union identifies, recruits, and trains rank-and-file leaders to take 
important roles in union campaigns.  Eventually, many of these rank-and-file leaders 
become part of the union’s staff to work as union representatives, organizers, or in a 
variety of other capacities.  Secondly, the union uses its contract administration 
procedure to communicate with its general membership and encourage them to think 
of their workplace issues in a collective rather individualistic manner.  Finally, the 
contract administration structure acts as the primary communication conduit between 
rank-and-file members and the local’s staff and leadership. 
This case study is also unique among the strategic integration literature 
because, as discussed above, the Culinary Union is much further along in their 
revitalization process than any other union locals that have been subjects of previous 
case studies.  Neither PACE nor the IBT, which were subject of Hickey’s (2003) and 
O’Malley’s (1999) case studies respectively, have been able to comprehensively 
integrate their organizing, collective bargaining, and political strategies.  The CWA, 
which is the subject of Katz et. al.’s (2003) study has made more progress in this area 
than either PACE or the IBT, however, it still has not integrated these strategies in a 
consistent manner, which is one of the main points made in their article.  Furthermore, 
the case studies by Katz et. al., and O’Malley examine their subjects on a national 
level, while this case study focuses on a local union organization. 
Contract Administration and the Organizing Model 
A primary argument of this thesis is that the Culinary Union’s representation 
activities between rounds of negotiations formed a key element of its long-term rank-
and-file mobilization strategy.  The large part of these non-contract bargaining 
representational activities fall in to the category of contract administration.  In other 
words, the Culinary Union’s contract administration strategies, in conjunction with its 203 
 
contract bargaining, external organizing, and political strategies, greatly increased the 
Culinary Union’s rank-and-file mobilization capacity.  Although it looks at these other 
areas of union activity in conjunction with contract administration, this case study 
concentrates on contract administration because of the central role it plays in the 
Culinary Unions rank-and-file mobilization process.   
The Culinary Union follows a strategy based on the organizing model of 
contract administration.  This means that the Culinary Union’s contract administration 
strategy emphasizes rank-and-file member involvement in and responsibility over the 
contract administration process.  It further means that the union emphasizes dealing 
with grievances on a collective rather than individual basis.  This case study describes 
how the Culinary Union, by using the organizing model of contract administration, 
created an organizational culture and structure that lead to increases in the quality and 
quantity of rank-and-file participation in the union and how this benefited the union in 
its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign.  As a result of the Culinary Union’s 
organizing model of contract administration, not only were rank-and-file members 
more active but they learned to perceive their workplace issues collectively and 
develop the skills necessary to begin to address them in this way.   
As discussed in the literature review, industrial relations scholars have found 
strong correlations between the organizing model of unionism and increased rank-and-
file participation in the union (Fosh, 1993, Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 1995, Tetrick, 
1995, Bacharach et. al. 2001, Snape & Redman, 2004a, Snape & Redman, 2004b).  By 
describing the effect of the Culinary Union’s contract administration policy on rank-
and-file mobilization for its 2002 comprehensive contract campaign, this case study 
provides further evidence supporting the conclusions reached by these previous 
studies.  Furthermore, since studies of union participation and commitment tend to be 
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absent in those other studies.  Finally, by focusing on just one union local this case 
study allows for an in-depth discussion of the dynamic interplay between union 
contract administration strategies and context that is absent in other previous research 
in this area.   
Areas of Future Research 
The Culinary Union is one of the most prominent exceptions to the current 
decline of the labor movement in the United States.  Therefore, more research needs to 
be done on other contextual factors that may influence industrial relations outcomes in 
Las Vegas’s casino industry.  First, a more detailed study of the early stages of the 
Culinary Union’s revitalization process needs to be conducted.  This case study 
focuses on the organizational characteristics of the Culinary Union after it had already 
made the organizational transformations that lead to its sustained revitalization and 
does not provide an in-depth discussion of how and why those transformations began.  
In order to get a full understanding of organizational reforms and contextual 
influences behind the Culinary Union’s successful revitalization process a detailed 
case study of the local covering the period beginning in the late 1980s through the 
early 1990s needs to be conducted.   
Further research could also be conducted on the influence of workforce 
demographic variables on the Culinary Union’s revitalization process.  This topic was 
only briefly discussed in this case study, although the growing predominance of 
Hispanic, Asian, and female workers is a significant change in the composition of the 
casino industry workforce.  Such a study would be especially valuable because similar 
demographic changes are occurring throughout the American labor force and the labor 
movement needs to learn how to reach out to diverse groups of workers if it is going to 
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revitalization effort, UNITE-HERE and SEIU, are concentrated in industries 
dominated by these demographic groups. 
Research could also be conducted on how the personalities and relationships of 
Culinary Union leaders and gaming industry executives have influenced industrial 
relations in the Las Vegas’s gaming industry.  As mentioned in chapters four and five, 
industrial relations strategies of the larger gaming companies operating  in Las Vegas 
have been driven by several key industry leaders such as Steve Wynn, William 
Bennett, and Kirk Kerkorian.  These business leaders largely set the tone for industrial 
relations strategies pursued by the major gaming operators in Las Vegas during the 
1990s and into the 21
st century.  Likewise, the innovative leaders of the Culinary 
Union such as Jim Arnold, John Wilhelm, and D. Taylor have also had significant 
influence on the industrial relations outcomes in Las Vegas gaming industry, through 
the strategic choices made the Culinary Union.  A future study could look at how these 
individuals and their mutual relationships have influenced industrial relations 
outcomes in Las Vegas’s gaming industry. 
The Culinary Union’s contract administration strategy provides another 
potentially rich area of research for scholars interested in the local.  This case study 
discussed the influence of the organizing model of contract administration on union 
participation and mobilization capacity, however, quantitative statistical research in 
this area is still lacking.  Such a study should find a way to measure both formal and 
informal varieties of participation, since much of the quantitative research on union 
participation research to date does not take into account the full range of ways in 
which a member can participate in his/her union.   
Future research could also look at the influence of union orientation strategies 
and policies on rank-and-file participation and union mobilization capacity.  A variety 
of studies have found a strong and resilient correlation between a rank-and-file 206 
 
member’s opinion of a union’s new members orientation policy and their commitment 
to the union as well as their participation in union affairs (Clark et al. 1993, Clark et 
al. 2000, Clark et. al. 2004).  The Culinary Union has an extensive new member 
orientation procedure, which some of the union’s internal organizers credit with 
playing an important role in increasing rank-and-file participation in the union (Henry, 
2005, Pappageorge, 2005).  In addition the Culinary Academy could also act like an 
informal pre-orientation for new members, and have the effect of increasing rank-and-
file commitment to and participation in the union (Pappageorge, 2005, Cole, 2003).  A 
case study examining the relationship between new members’ orientation and union 
participation could also explore the relationship between new member orientation and 
other areas of union activity such as contract administration or external organizing.  
A comparative study of the contract administration strategies of the Culinary 
Union and HERE’s local in Atlantic City could be another potentially interesting 
avenue of research.  HERE’s Atlantic City affiliate pursues a contract administration 
strategy that is closer to the servicing model, and therefore it would be interesting to 
compare these two contrasting strategies as they are applied in similar contexts.  
Furthermore, HERE’s Atlantic City affiliate, unlike the Culinary Union, has not gone 
through a significant revitalization process, so a broader comparative study of these 
two locals could be a valuable contribution to the debate over the degree to which the 
Culinary Union’s success is the result of contextual variables associated with Las 
Vegas’s casino industry.  Such a study could also provide additional insight into the 
specific success of the Culinary Union, and would also be an important addition to 
wider union revitalization literature.  For example, it could help explain why only a 
few union locals have managed to revitalize themselves.  Finally, given the current 
scarcity of contract administration research in the revitalization literature, further case 
studies of attempts by unions to apply the organizing model of contract administration 207 
 
in diverse contexts would be an invaluable way to build on the findings of this case 
study.  
Implications for other Union Locals 
The Culinary Union is often offered as an example of how labor unions can 
thrive in today’s inhospitable industrial relations climate.  However, examples of other 
union locals similarly revitalizing themselves are few and far between.  Therefore, it 
has been suggested that the Culinary Union’s success is in large part due to its 
contextual environment.  Yet this case study describes how the Culinary Union’s 
strategic decisions have not only contributed to its success, but also changed the 
context in which it operates.  Therefore, it is the dynamic interaction between external 
contextual variables and the Culinary Union’s strategies that are responsible for the 
local’s success.   
This conclusion is supported by the fact that other private sector unions such as 
SEIU Local 1877 which represents workers in California’s property services industry, 
and SEIU 1199NY which represents healthcare employees in New York State, have 
enjoyed levels of success similar to those of the Culinary Union, in widely varying 
contexts.  As with the Culinary Union, many of the tactics used by SEIU Local 1877 
and SEIU 1199NY, such as using workers’ relationships with consumers as leverage 
points to put pressure on employers, rely on rank-and-file mobilization.  Therefore, 
these local unions as well as others whose tactical repertoire depends on rank-and-file 
mobilization, would benefit from using many of the strategies that Culinary Union 
uses to increase its rank-and-file mobilization capacity.  One such strategy is the 
Culinary Union’s organizing model of contract administration, which this case study 
shows is one of the primary factors behind the Culinary Union’s successful 2002 
comprehensive contract campaign.  208 
 
Therefore, although external context clearly influences industrial relations 
outcomes in Las Vegas’s gaming industry, union strategies have a significant role as 
well.  By demonstrating that Culinary Union strategies do influence industrial 
relations outcomes in Las Vegas, this thesis supports the argument often made by 
union revitalization researchers, that in today’s inhospitable industrial relations 
climate, unions can still revitalize themselves if they utilize a set of strategies that is 
well matched to the industrial relations contexts in which they operate.  Furthermore, 
even though context influences both the Culinary Union’s strategic choices and 
effectiveness, there are lessons that can be taken from this case study and applied 
elsewhere, especially where unions can rely on rank-and-file intensive tactics to place 
pressure on employers.   
Future Prospects of the Culinary Union 
Since the 2002 negotiations the Culinary Union has improved its density in the 
Las Vegas Strip market, signing neutrality agreements with every casino operator 
along the Strip except for The Las Vegas Sands Corp., which owns the Venetian.  This 
process has been facilitated by a wave of mergers that has consolidated the casino 
industry in Las Vegas and the re-entry of Steve Wynn into Las Vegas’s casino 
industry.  However, the Culinary Union’s efforts to organize off the Strip have been 
stymied.  While it has maintained density in the stagnant downtown submarket, it has 
failed to make any headway organizing neighborhood properties or any major 
properties located just off the Strip, such as the Palms and Hard Rock Café.  
Therefore, while it is likely the Culinary Union will continue to enjoy extremely high 
density along the Strip, there are no clear signs as to whether the Culinary Union will 
be able to expand it presence off the Strip in future.  
Furthermore, there have been signs that the NLRB may begin to place 
restrictions on the neutrality agreements the Culinary Union has typically used in its 209 
 
external organizing campaigns.  It is unclear at this time what the specifics of the 
NLRB’s new policy in this area will be, and therefore it is hard to make predictions as 
to what the impact of a change in policy on the Culinary Union’s future organizing 
prospects will be.  However, considering the degree to which such agreements have 
become routine for most of Las Vegas’s major gaming operators and the amount of 
power the Culinary Union has in the local industry, it would be surprising if the 
change in the NLRB’s policy would have much of an effect on the Culinary Union 
external organizing ability along the strip, unless the NLRB adopted an extremely 
draconian policy against neutrality agreements.  However, the impact of the NLRB’s 
change in policy off the Strip, where neutrality agreements and the Culinary are not as 
established, is less clear.  
The gaming industry has continued to proliferate throughout the United States 
and the Culinary Union’s parent union, UNITE-HERE, has made some headway in 
organizing these casinos.  For example, UNITE-HERE has won a national neutrality 
agreement covering a large number of properties that were being developed by Park 
Place Entertainment, before it was acquired by Harrah’s.  Furthermore, it has gotten 
neutrality agreements written into state gaming laws in a few states such as New York, 
covering most new casino development.  It is unclear if UNITE-HERE’s organizing 
efforts will catch up to the pace of the casino industry’s expansion and what the 
overall effect of this expansion on Las Vegas gaming industry will be.  However even 
with the expansion of the gaming industry, Las Vegas’s major gaming operators are 
still relatively concentrated Las Vegas; making it difficult for them to offset any losses 
they incur in this market as a result of Culinary Union pressure tactics, with revenues 
from other locations.  
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APPENDIX A 
Job Classifications & 2002 Wages (before tips)  of Culinary Union Members at the 
Mirage Resort and Hotel as called for by the 2002 – 2007 contract. 
 
Classification  Hourly Wage (in Dollars) 
Sous Chef  13.884 
Master Cook  13.709 
Cook  13.353 
Butcher  13.353 
Sushi Cook  13.709 
Teppan Cook  13.353 
Baker  13.571 
Pantry Worker  12.821 
Helper  12.021 
Steward  12.390 
Stove Cleaner  10.940 
Kitchen Worker  10.690 
Utility Cleaner  11.840 
Linen Chute Room  11.859 
General Cleaner  10.721 
Guest Room Attendant   10.453 
Status Board Operator  11.965 
Uniform Attendant  11.859 
Server  8.709 
Server (6 Hour Shift)  8.907 
Server-Showroom  8.709 
Server-Showroom (6 Hour Shift)  8.907 
Server-Cocktail   8.509 
Server-Cocktail (6 Hour Shift)  8.907 
Server-Banquet-Hourly  9.440 
Server-Banquet-Hourly/Temp  9.440 
Host Person  12.115 
Host Person (6 Hour Shift)  12.315 
Usher  10.825 
Usher (6 Hour shift)  11.030 
Head Usher  15.200 
Head Usher (6 Hour Shift)  15.400 
Fountain/Counter   9.684 
Fountain/Counter (6 Hour Shift)  9.884 
Cashiers-F & B   12.540 
Cashiers-F &B (6 Hour Shift)  12.790 211 
 
Classification  Hourly Wage (in Dollars) 
Slot Booth Cashier  12.653 
Busperson-Regular  8.921 
Busperson-Regular (6 Hour Shift)  9.032 
Busperson-Showroom  8.921 
Busperson-Showroom (6 Hour Shift)  9.032 
Runner  9.165 
Bartender, Tipped  13.078 
Bartender, Tipped (6 Hour Shift)  13.280 
Bartender, Non-Tipped  13.515 
Bartender, Non-Tipped (6 Hour Shift)  13.720 
Apprentice Bartender  10.646 
Apprentice Bartender (6 Hour Shift)  10.850 
Beverage Porter   11.240 
Beverage Porter (6 Hour Shift)  11.435 
Mini-Bar Attendant  10.700 
Room Svc Dispatcher  12.590 
Front Svc Baggage Handler  10.715 
Front Svc Dispatcher Supervisor  10.960 
Front Svc Dispatcher  10.700 
Front Svc Door Person Supervisor  10.490 
Front SVC Door Person  9.240 
Front SVC Door Person (6 Hour Shift) 9.440 
Front SVC Bell Person   9.001 
Front SVC Bell Person (6 Hour Shift)  9.201 
Linen Attendant  11.859 
Banquet Set-Up Porter  11.240 
Lead Banquet Set-Up Porter  12.240 
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APPENDIX B 
Location, Ownership, and Contract Expiration Date of Las Vegas Casinos whose 
employees are represented by the Culinary Union, 
 
Name of 
Property 
Ownership at time of 2002 
Negotiations Location 
Contract 
Expires in 
2002?
Bally's 
 
Park Place Entertainment  Strip Yes
Barbary 
Coast 
Owned by Coast Resorts  Strip Yes
Bellagio 
 
MGM-Mirage  Strip Yes
Binion's 
Horseshoe 
Binion Family  Downtown Yes
Ceasers 
Palace 
Park Place Entertainment  Strip Yes
Castaways 
 
VSS Enterprises, LLC  Neighborhood Yes
Circus 
Circus 
 
Mandalay Resort Group 
Strip Yes
El Cortez 
 
Jackie Gaughan  Downtown Yes
El Dorado 
 
Boyd Gaming Corp.  Neighborhood No
Excalibur 
 
Mandalay Resort Group  Strip Yes
Flamingo 
Las Vegas 
Park Place Entertainment  Strip Yes
Fitzgeralds Fitzgeralds  Gaming  Corp 
  Downtown Yes
Four 
Queens 
Elsinore Corp. 
Downtown Yes
Fremont 
 
Boyd Gaming Corp.  Downtown Yes
Golden 
Gate 
Partners, Mark Mark 
Brandenburg and Craig Ghelfi  Downtown Yes
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Name of 
Property 
Ownership at time of 2002 
Negotiations Location 
Contract 
Expires in 
2002?
Golden 
Nugget 
MGM-Mirage  Downtown Yes
Harrah's 
Las Vegas 
Harrah's Entertainment Inc.  Strip Yes
Jerry's 
Nugget 
George Stamis and Jerry Lodge  Neighborhood Yes
Las Vegas 
Club 
Mel Exber and Jackie Gaugha  Downtown Yes
Las Vegas 
Hilton 
Park Place Entertainment  Strip Yes
Luxor 
 
Mandalay Resort Group  Strip Yes
Mandalay 
Bay 
Mandalay Resort Group  Strip Yes
MGM 
Grand 
MGM-Mirage  Strip No
The Mirage 
 
MGM-Mirage  Strip Yes
Monte 
Carlo 
MGM-Mirage/Mandalay Resort 
Group  Strip Yes
New 
Frontier 
Phil Ruffin  Strip No
New York-
New York 
MGM-Mirage  Strip Yes
Paris 
 
Park Place Entertainment  Strip Yes
Plaza 
 
Jackie Gaughan  Downtown Yes
Rio 
 
Harrah's Entertainment Inc.  Strip No
Riviera 
 
Riviera Holding Corp.  Strip Yes
Sahara 
 
Sahara Gaming Corp.-Controllen 
by Bill Bennet  Strip Yes
Slots a Fun 
 
Mandalay Resort Group  Strip Yes
Stardust 
 
Boyd Gaming Corp.  Strip Yes
Stratosphere 
 
Operated by Carl Icahn  Strip Yes
Treasure 
Island 
MGM-Mirage  Strip Yes214 
 
Name of 
Property 
Ownership at time of 2002 
Negotiations Location 
Contract 
Expires in 
2002?
Tropicana 
 
Aztar Corp.  Strip Yes
Western 
Hotel 
Jackie Gaughan  Downtown Yes 
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